Building a Pious Self in Secular Settings: Pious Women in Modern Turkey by Topal, Semiha (Author) et al.
Building a Pious Self in Secular Settings  
Pious Women in Modern Turkey  
by 
Semiha Topal 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved November 2012 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Shahla Talebi, Chair 
Linell Cady 
Souad Ali 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
December 2012  
  i 
ABSTRACT  
   
This dissertation aims to explore the diverse ways in which piety is 
conceptualized and cultivated by highly-educated Muslim women in Turkey. 
These women hold active positions within the secular-public sphere while trying 
to keep their aim of becoming pious in their own way, in relation to their 
subjective understanding of piety. After a detailed analysis of the formation of the 
secular modern public sphere in Turkey, in relation to the questions of modernity, 
nation-building, secularism, Islamism, and the gender relations, it gives an 
account of the individual routes taken by the highly educated professional women 
to particular aspirations of piety. The individual stories are designed to show the 
arbitrariness of many modern binary oppositions such as modern vs. traditional, 
secular vs. religious, liberated vs. oppressed, individual vs. communal, and etc. 
These individual routes are also analyzed within a collective framework through 
an analysis of the activities of two women's NGO's addressing at their attempt of 
building a collective attitude toward the secular-liberal conception of gender and 
sexuality. Finally the dissertation argues that Turkey has the capacity to 
deconstruct the aforementioned binary categories with its macro-level 
sociopolitical experience, and the micro-level everyday life experiences of 
ordinary people. It also reveals that piety cannot be measured with outward 
expressions, or thought as a socio-political categorization. Because just like 
secularism, piety has also the capacity to penetrate into the everyday lives of 
people from diverse socio-political backgrounds, which opens up possibilities of 
rethinking the religious-secular divide, and all the other binaries that come with it. 
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PREFACE  
The names of people in this research, except for the facilitator of the Women’s 
Studies seminars at the WP, are pseudo-names in accordance with the request of 
confidentiality by my interlocutors. 
The field site of this research is Istanbul, Turkey, where the native 
language is Turkish. In order to protect the authenticity of the realities of my field 
site I decided to use the Turkish characters instead of using their English 
transliterations. For some Islamic terms that have their origin in Arabic but 
adopted by Turkish characters, I kept using the Turkish words with the Arabic 
original in parentheses.  
 Turkish alphabet is a modified form of Latin alphabet since 1928. There 
are eight extra letters that signifies the specific sounds to Turkish: 
 C, c is pronounced as j in jungle 
 Ç, ç is pronounced as 'ch' as in chimpanzee 
 Ğ, ğ only serves to lengthen the preceding vowel 
 I, ı is pronounced as the o in women 
 J, j is pronounced as in French 
 Ö, ö is pronounced as in German or eu in French 
 Ş, ş is pronounced as sh in shield 
 Ü, ü is pronounced as in German or u in French 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Prologue 
Either appear as you are, or be as you appear. —Rumi  
It was a cold November afternoon in Istanbul. I was in a hurry to give a 
presentation at the Women’s Platform (WP) that day, and I ended up wearing all 
black because I did not have time to think matching colors, to which I am usually 
attentive while dressing up. So, in my black coat, long black skirt, black boots and 
black headscarf, I got on the bus, and was lucky to find a seat next to an old man. 
The man had a long beard and was wearing an Islamic cap (takke), which gave the 
impression that he was a religious or at least a conservative man. As soon as I sat 
by him, he started mumbling some words. I thought he was saying a prayer by 
himself. Occasionally he was looking at me and then his mumbling was becoming 
more enthusiastic. When I started to catch the word “maşallah”1 repeatedly 
among his mumbling, I grew suspicious of his intent. It was not unheard of old 
men using the word “maşallah” as a lustrous verbal harassment toward women. 
Then he turned to me and asked “Are you a hoca?”2  I said “yes” thinking that it 
                                               
1 Maşallah is a very commonly used expression in Turkish to praise someone or 
something. It means “God willed it” but in common usage it is meant for saying 
“Magnificent, may God protect him/her from evil.” The blue and white beads 
called evil-eye are also called as maşallah beads.   
2 The binary of hoca vs. öğretmen is one of the foundational creations of the 
Kemalist regime. In this binary, the hoca represents the old, ancien regimé, 
because it is an Arabic word, and it stands for the Ottoman era religious teachers. 
Öğretmen, on the other hand, is a Turkish word, meaning “teacher”, which refers 
to the teachers of the secular modern schools. In the Republican regime, these 
  2 
would be pointless to explain to this old man that I was a graduate student and a 
teaching assistant. His next question, “Are you a hafız?”3 however, made me 
understand what he meant by “hoca.” I responded: “No, I am not that kind of 
hoca, I am öğretmen.” Then he replied: “Don’t worry.  That’s still fine” and again 
repeated: “maşallah, maşallah!”  
I saw a clear happiness in this old man’s face. Simply from my outfit he 
had concluded that I was a pious woman. He was happy to see a pious woman 
who is also a teacher. The fact that he asked me whether I was a hafız implied an 
expectation as well. From the way I was dressed, I was seen so pious to this old 
man that he expected me to know the entire Qur’an by heart.  
The stark difference between how I looked to this man and who I really 
was made me so deeply sad and ashamed of myself, for I realized that I could 
neither appear as I was nor be as I appeared, as the most popular teaching of Rumi 
known by Turkish people suggests.   
When I got off the bus after a few stops I was already filled with remorse 
at my failure to meet the naïve expectations of this old man. Besides, this 
realization added  more to my constant self-mortification for not being able to 
routinize the basic markers of piety such as five daily prayers, reciting the whole 
Qur’an at least once a year, fasting besides the month of Ramadan, etc. These 
                                                                                                                                
teachers were glorified as carrying the beacons of enlightenment, which is still the 
emblem of the National Education Ministry. In common usage, however, hoca is 
still used as an informal way of addressing at teachers by those who are not 
actively endorsing, or uninformed about this Republican ideology.  
3 Hafız means someone who has memorized the entire Qur’an, and knows it by 
heart.  
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were the things I was taught as the basics of piety. Yet I was far from 
implementing them, let alone being a hafız as this old man had assumed me to be.  
But then I thought to myself that perhaps I was misreading piety. My piety 
was obviously quite different from the form of piety ascribed to me by that old 
man. I was definitely lacking in piety according to his mind’s standards. But did 
anyone who fulfilled all the required and expected practices was necessarily as 
much connected to God in her everyday life as I was? My connection to God may 
sometimes be in the form of gratitude, sometimes request, sometimes seeking 
refuge and sometimes complaining, but one thing was certain that I was always in 
connection with God. As this experience with the old man showed me, the 
conventional understanding of piety was not sufficient to express my experience 
of piety. There was certainly a mismatch between how I looked and who I was, 
and I needed to learn if this mismatch was shared by other women like me —
meaning that trying to be pious in non-traditional secular settings. I wondered to 
what extent this sense of disillusionment that I felt was repeated in other people’s 
everyday life experiences, and yet how my experience was unique to my 
conditions of existence.   
In one sense, this feeling of disillusionment was part of my life starting at 
the age of four, when my family moved to the city of Ordu, on the north of 
Turkey, from a village forty miles away. None of my parents were educated 
beyond the secondary school level; actually my mother was almost illiterate. I 
therefore I had no guidance from them in adjusting to the secular school I was 
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attending. I can say that I was living in two different worlds, one at the school and 
one at home; one with secular, modern, urban values and the other with religious, 
traditional, rural values. My brother had a harder time with his accent, while I was 
not exposed to the rural accent that much. But I was always aware that I had to 
behave like a şehirli (a city dweller), because being a köylü (a village dweller) 
was disgraceful at the school. And I gradually learned that being a religious 
person was part of this köylü identity and not “cool” at all.  
So, I faced a serious dilemma from the age of ten when my mother insisted 
that I cover my head outside home, while I knew no one among my peers who 
wore the headscarf. I knew that my mom was genuinely afraid of my punishment 
in the Hereafter, as we were made to believe by the imams in the village that, a 
snake would be hanging down from each hairpiece that is left uncovered. At least, 
we both believed that not covering the hair was a sin. I was nevertheless delaying 
the avoidance of this sin due to the fear of being mocked by my friends at school.  
When I finally made my decision to wear the headscarf outside of the 
school, I was already fourteen and at seventh grade at a school attended mostly by 
the high class families’ kids. I was literally the only one wearing the headscarf in 
the whole school which had around seven hundred students. Of course, I was 
paying extra attention to prevent anyone from my school to know that I was 
covering my hair. I was hence never wearing the headscarf when I had my school 
uniform on. In other words, I made an agreement with the secular authority —i.e. 
the school, to keep my religion invisible in its realm which was embodied in my 
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school uniform, therefore my uniform and my headscarf could never be worn 
together.  
This mutually exclusive binary of religion and the secular in my mind was 
totally shaken during the occasions at school when they allowed civilian clothing, 
as I had weeks of excruciating inner struggles trying to evaluate the risks of each 
decision in my mind: If I chose not to wear civilian clothing and went with school 
uniform I would be the only one with school uniform there; if I wore the civilian 
clothing my friends and teachers would see my headscarf and mock me; if I wore 
the civilian clothing without the headscarf I would betray myself and the self-
agreement I had made in my mind between the religious and the secular realm. 
And each time I tried one of these options and things turned out exactly as I 
imagined in my mind. I finally dared to enter school with my headscarf on one of 
these occasions when I was at the ninth grade. They still mocked me by saying 
things like “What have you done to yourself?” or “What is that thing on your 
head?” etc. But I did not take them seriously, for, by then, I considered them 
immature kids, while I saw myself a full subject, an adult: aware of my identity 
with the headscarf, and waiting to finish high school to declare it as the 
indispensable part of my subjectivity. I was hoping to be rescued from this 
fragmented subjectivity when I started higher education in Istanbul in 2001.  
However, the headscarf ban at universities, which was put into effect after 
the military forced the Islamist party to resign from the government in 1997, was 
even a greater obstacle to the defragmentation of my identity. This was because I 
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no longer had the school uniform to hide behind when I had to uncover my hair. 
In secondary school and high school, I rarely questioned the reasons for the 
headscarf ban; I did not even need to be told that it was prohibited to wear 
headscarf at school, because somehow I had internalized this idea that school is 
not a place for religion —or to tell the truth, not even religiosity though we had 
religion classes every year.  
But university was different: I was fully aware that I was a başörtülü (one 
wearing the headscarf) young woman. I had to be carrying the headscarf on my 
head even when I was not physically wearing it. How could this be possible? By 
the time I started the university, the headscarf ban had been in effect for two 
years, and people had already found various ways of wearing the headscarf 
without actually wearing it. In other words, you could tell that a person was 
başörtülü outside the campus by simply looking at their hair (either wearing a wig 
or hair tied up clumsily with no style nor any coloring). Most of them were 
wearing long coats and had no make-up on their faces. I could never wear the 
long coats, but I could do the rest in the beginning. However, as time passed we 
all started to observe gradual changes in our outfit and hairstyle and finally began 
putting on make-up.  
The struggle to maintain the başörtülü identity without wearing the 
başörtüsü (headscarf) was too intense and painstaking for all of us, as we were 
constantly warned about the value and importance of the headscarf for a Muslim 
woman while we were also encouraged to have a college degree in order to be 
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able to lift this ban for the future generations, or at least not let the future 
generations remain at the hands of the secularist elite. In other words, we believed 
that we had to take off our headscarf in order to be able to put the seal of Islam at 
the current Western disciplines of science. 
 On my part, I had a hard time figuring out how I could make a difference 
in English language and literature, as I laughed in my sleeve at my classmates’ 
naïve attempt to try to proselytize our native British instructor who was an 
agnostic —actually he was the first non-Muslim person I had ever met in my life, 
let alone a non-believer. I had never talked about religion with a non-believer; 
therefore my ideas about religion and faith were never tested before. I still 
remember the shock I had when he told us that he stopped reading the Qur’an at 
the third page when he saw the verse “Indeed, those who disbelieve —it is all the 
same for them whether you warn them or do not warn the—they will not believe. 
Allah has set a seal upon their hearts and upon their hearing, and hearing, and 
over their vision is a veil. And for them is a great punishment.4 
That experience at the beginning of my undergraduate education and the 
later classes I took on literary criticism gave me an idea about the importance of 
hermeneutics and reading with a context; it also made me venture into the realm 
of religion and gender in order to make sense of my existence as a Muslim 
woman in relation to God and to the society I lived in. The collective mission 
encumbered on my physical appearance was now disturbing me as I started to see 
                                               
4 Qur’an 2: 6-7. 
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it as an imposition of the patriarchy instead of God’s real demand from me. And I 
knew that I could not study about religion in Turkey outside of the theology 
faculties, the very place where those “disturbing” norms like veiling, gender 
segregation and submissive female roles were being reproduced. 
Besides, the headscarf ban in Turkey would still not let me attain a full 
sense of subjectivity, and my relationship with religion was quite shattered 
because of constantly shifting between the modes of being religious and being 
secular in my everyday life. I was clearly seeing that the path of religiosity which 
I was taught to walk on since my childhood was now fading. Because I was now 
seeing it similar to playing a computer game: collecting reward points by ritual 
prayers, fasting, reciting the Qur’an, giving charity; and avoiding punishment 
points by staying away from haram things like uncovering the body parts, 
mingling with the opposite sex, drinking alcohol, eating pork, backbiting, telling 
lies, etc.; and finally reaching at the Heaven at the end of the game. What it 
lacked was the sense of piety, a sense of connection with God beyond the 
expectation of reward and the fear of punishment. 
The progressive feminist interpretation of the Qur’an, and the tendency to 
disregard the non-progressive Prophetic traditions on the grounds of having a 
week chain of transmission were new and attractive to me. Thus, I devoted my 
MA study in London, UK to explore modes of being pious in a liberal-progressive 
framework. Since the focus of both Western feminist theology and Islamic 
feminism was on the deeper connection with God rather than the specifics of 
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behavioral and bodily norms of the organized religion, I found Sufism, and 
especially Ibn ‘Arabi’s formulation of becoming a perfect human being as the 
most helpful tool to combine Islamic piety with the feminist theology’s desire to 
construct ways of becoming a full subject as a woman. In other words, I tried to 
embrace a particular kind of feminism that allowed a conversation with the 
discipline of building a deep connection with God.  
Despite my focus on the issue of belief versus practice, and trying to find 
ways for true belief rather than true behavior, I always had a feeling that I did not 
want to abandon the traditions that did not fit into this progressive framework. 
Carving up my individual pious self was incomplete without a meaningful 
framework to establish my relationship to my community, and without the bodily 
tools that would help me in my self-disciplining.  
In that sense, coming to the USA for a doctoral degree in religious studies 
became a new step stone in my configuration of piety both as an analytical tool 
and as my personal quest. My exposure to scholars mainly as Talal Asad, Saba 
Mahmood, and Judith Butler helped me to have a different look at the classical 
scholars of Islam, like Al-Ghazzali, whom I had thought of quite negatively due 
to his unfavorable comments about women in his treatise on marriage. Mahmood 
and Asad provided me with a whole different understanding of the concept of 
ritual and bodily practices in religion, allowing me to appreciate al-Ghazzali’s 
detailed formulation of cultivating a pious self through an exquisite study of 
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proper conducts and behaviors, which used to seem trivial to me compared to his 
lack of understanding of the feminist values that I embraced.  
Judith Butler, on the other hand gave me a significant hint in configuring 
how community is involved in the creation of this subjective performativity 
outlined by the classical Islamic scholars. As she says, the main mistake I made, 
as did the other Islamic feminists like Amina Wadud, Asma Barlas, Fatima 
Mernissi and others do in their search for a woman-friendly Islam, was equating 
religion with belief, and thinking that we could reform religion by reforming the 
belief (i.e. The Qur’an and the Sunnah) through reinterpretation of the text. 
Seeking a certain ideology in a religion necessarily leads to a simplistic 
understanding of religion, which is much more complex than a belief system: 
“That effort to distinguish the cognitive status of religious and nonreligious belief 
misses the very fact that very often religion functions as a matrix of subject 
formation, an embedded framework for valuations, and a mode of belonging and 
embodied social practice.”5 
In one sense, the ethnography of piety conducted by Saba Mahmood 
opened up a new path for me in my academic career and my personal quest for 
piety. However, it was just a beginning, and far from translating my experience of 
piety as it was restricted to a specific Islamist movement in Egypt. Whereas, my 
context was much more complicated and overlapping with multiple 
                                               
5 Judith Butler, “Is Judaism Zionism?” in The Power of Religion in the Public 
Sphere, eds. E. Mendieta & J. Vanantwerpen. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2011), 72.  
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categorizations above the binary of liberal secular versus the Islamist realms. In 
that sense, I set out to conduct the ethnography of my own piety story by 
comparing it to the stories of other women who have gone through similar 
stations in their journey towards piety. In other words, I am both the subject and 
the object of this study.  
About the research  
  This research aims to explore women's piety in the context of the modern 
secular public sphere in Turkey, which was established at the beginning of the 
twentieth century with the claim of being freed from religion. Today’s public 
sphere, on the other hand, is inhabited and reconstructed by a great number of 
pious people, especially with pious Muslim women, who are actively involved, 
and participate in that public sphere. Considering the conditions that made this 
transformation of the public sphere possible, this research seeks to understand the 
self-cultivation process of these women in their everyday life experiences at the 
secular public sphere, i.e. the school, the workplace, the streets of the modern 
city, etc. In other words, my main research question is “how is it possible to build 
a pious self in a setting established on secular-liberal values?”  
  The second concern of this research is to explore the effects of Turkish 
secularism on the process of making a pious Muslim self. There have been lots of 
studies on Turkish secularism especially after the rise of Islamism in all over the 
Middle East, most of which were restricted to political analysis and the study of 
the secularist and Islamist elites acting on a kind of higher ground.  I, on the other 
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hand, wanted to look at the ground itself, and try to understand how secularism 
penetrated into the everyday lives of ordinary people, not like politicians, not like 
well-known families or elites, but regular, ordinary people that you see on the 
street. So, my aim was to understand to what extent secularism was able to 
penetrate into people's everyday lives. Because secularization is usually thought 
in the way that people take secularism and leave religion behind. But that's not 
how the situation goes. People keep both of them. And they transform each of 
them: religion is transformed by the secular and the secular is transformed by 
religion. This research aims to look at this process of mutual transformation.   
Another aim of this research is to test the limits of conventional 
understandings of piety. What I understand as piety, what I experience as piety is 
not the same as what it means, and how it is used in political language. For 
example, in recent months the PM of Turkey said that “we want to raise a pious 
generation,”6 which created a huge debate on whether the prime minister of a 
                                               
6 The debate started when the secularist opposition party CHP (Republican 
People’s Party) opposed a regulation in the undergraduate placement exam (LYS) 
that aimed to remove the obstacles for the vocational high school graduates and 
imam-hatip school graduates. Erdoğan uttered these words in his parliamentary 
group meeting on January 20, 2012: “Why do imam-hatip schools disturb you so 
much? Why are you disturbed when the graduates of these schools pass university 
entrance examination and study at a university? Why shouldn’t a pious generation 
come?” When the CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu accused him for dividing 
people on the basis of pious and non-pious, Erdoğan quickly responded him by 
saying that: “There is no reference to people as pious or non-pious in my 
statements. There is the ideal of raising a pious generation. I stand behind my 
words. Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu, do you expect us, the AK Parti [Justice and 
Development Party], which has a conservative-democrat identity, to raise an 
atheist generation? This could only be your work or goal.” Interestingly, 
Erdoğan’s statements did not receive a widespread appreciation among the 
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secular state can aim to raise a pious generation. But besides that, the reactions of 
people in the mainstream and the social media were directly against the very 
concept of “pious” (dindar) and “piety” (dindarlık) which were used 
synonymously with politically loaded terms like “Islamist” “fundamentalist” and 
“reactionaries” and such.7  To my experience, piety has nothing to do with these 
concepts, and it definitely is not something to be afraid of. In that sense, I want to 
see the ways in which we can extend or expand the scope of the definition of piety 
                                                                                                                                
conservative circles, for they asked for religious freedom instead of more state 
intervention in raising their children.  
For a detailed analysis of the entire debate, see Fatma D. Zıbak, “Not State’s Job 
to Raise People According to Religion,” Today’s Zaman, February 12, 2012, 
accessed May 21, 2012, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=271162  
Also see Simon Cameron-Moore, “Turkish School Reforms Raise Debate on 
Islamism,” Reuters, March 20, 2012, accessed May 21, 2012, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/03/20/uk-turkey-education-
idUKBRE82J0GB20120320 
7 In the Turkish political terminology all of these terms are corresponded with a 
single word: dinci. It literally means “religionist” indicating that religion is equal 
to Islam in Turkish popular imagination, whether secularist or not. This word is 
used by the secularists to mean “utilizing religion for political ends” –a common 
feature of all the right-wing political parties according to them. An equally 
popular word they use is irticacı, meaning reactionaries for any opposition 
displayed against the Westernist elite and their reforms from the late Ottoman 
period to the current day. They use this word synonymously with dinci because 
the only remarkable opposition to the Kemalist reforms came from the (mostly 
Kurdish) religious leaders in the formative years of the Republic. So, in this 
political economy, piety is strictly restricted within the private realm, and it is 
totally deprived of its public manifestations. For the Islamists, then, the main 
struggle would be to emphasize the public manifestations of piety, at the expense 
of reducing it to forms and appearances.  
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with which also the secularists8 too identify. Because I believe that piety is not the 
monopoly of Islamists, or the conservatives.  
Furthermore, I believe that this limited and even distorted understanding 
of piety creates a fault line between two constructed lifestyles, one as 
conservative and the other as secular, while a brief observation of everyday life 
would show that neither conservative people are always pious, nor secular people 
are always impious. In other words, with this research, I hope to feature a brand 
new conceptualization of piety in the Islamic context, which can create the 
possibility of thinking about piety beyond politics and political categorizations 
disconnected from everyday life realities. Such a conceptualization of piety is 
only possible if we start from the very beginning —i.e. the establishment of a 
relationship with the divine (God) and the construction of a self in relation to the 
nature of this relationship between the human and the divine, and the society.  
In search of an Islamic care of the self  
Michel Foucault is certainly very important to the scholars of humanities 
and social sciences, and he has been referenced a million times in countless 
number of academic studies so far. However, what has been least highlighted 
among his theories is his analysis of the care of the self, which he deals with in 
the last volume of his History of Sexuality series. The book was actually a 
                                               
8 The secularists I mean here are those who believe in the idea of the Divine, but 
defend secularism as a social-political principle, i.e. considering belief as a private 
matter, and not displaying public manifestations of religiosity. Those who do not 
believe in the divine or simply those for whom seeking a relationship with the 
divine is not a goal are not in the scope of this work.   
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rewriting of his lecture series at the Collége De France from 1981 to 1982, 
compiled under the title of Hermeneutics of the Subject in 2005. In these lectures 
he digs into the Antiquity and uncovers the ancient concept of the care of the self 
(epimeleia heautou) in addition —and sometimes in contrast to, the concept of 
knowing the self (gnothi seauton) which is better known in the history of 
Christianity, as well as Islam: 
Throughout the period we call Antiquity, and in quite different modalities, 
the philosophical question of “how to have access to the truth” and the 
practice of spirituality (of the necessary transformations in the very being 
of the subject which will allow access to the truth), these two questions, 
these two themes, were never separate. … Now, leaping over several 
centuries, we can say that we enter the modern age …, when it is assumed 
that what gives access to the truth, the condition for the subject’s access to 
the truth, is knowledge (connaissance) and knowledge alone….I think the 
modern age of the history of truth begins when knowledge itself and 
knowledge alone gives access to the truth. That is to say, it is when the 
philosopher (or the scientist, or simply someone who seeks the truth) can 
recognize the truth and have access to it in himself and solely through his 
activity of knowing, without anything else being demanded of him and 
without him having to change or alter his being as subject. 9 
 
The care of the self, therefore, used to be the prerequisite for knowing 
oneself as the knower was required to transform his/her self in order to acquire the 
knowledge of the truth. Foucault describes the care of the self as “an attitude 
towards the self, others, and the world”10 so as to become a full subject in relation 
to one’s self, one’s society, and one’s position in the cosmos. It “implies a certain 
way of attending to what we think and what takes place in our thought [and] 
                                               
9 Michel Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject Lectures at the Collège de France 
1981–1982, ed. Frédérick Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 17. 
10 Foucault, Hermeneutics, 11. 
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designates a number of actions exercised on the self by the self, actions by which 
one takes responsibility for oneself and by which one changes, purifies, 
transforms, and transfigures oneself.”11 
The concept becomes especially useful in configuring one’s relationship to 
the others in the subjectivation process. Foucault recounts the story of Alcibiades 
—a young and restless candidate of politician in the city of Athens, and his lover 
and teacher Socrates, who tries to prepare him for his future career. In other 
words, the context of the subjectivation is not a divine one here, but it includes the 
employment of the divine in cultivating a self that is worthy of governing the city 
and its people. In this story that Foucault tells us, Socrates establishes the ground 
for self-knowledge through the existence of the other, which is identical to the 
self. He uses the analogy of the eye seeing itself in the eye of someone else 
instead of a mirror. What the eye sees in the eyes of the other is nothing other than 
itself, meaning that “the soul will only see itself by focusing its gaze on an 
element having the same nature as itself, and more precisely, by looking at the 
element of the same nature as itself, by turning towards and fixing its gaze on that 
which is the very source of the soul’s nature, that is to say, of thought and 
knowledge.”12 Hence, the soul must turn towards “the divine element” which is 
“the part that ensures thought and knowledge”, and in this way “the soul will be 
able to grasp itself.”13  
                                               
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 70. 
13 Ibid. 
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Socrates explains it to Alcibiades that attending to one’s self means 
turning one’s soul to the divine, and one cannot know oneself without knowing 
the divine because: “Just as true mirrors are clearer, purer and brighter than the 
mirror of the eye, so God is purer and brighter than the best part of our soul…It is 
God, then, that we must look at: for whoever wishes to judge the quality of the 
soul, he is the best mirror of human things themselves, we can best see and know 
ourselves in him.”14  
So, what is the meaning of this information for Alcibiades, whose main 
concern is to learn the principles of governing? How will this information help 
him to care for his self and cultivate his self to be worthy of the truth of 
governing? When he grasps the knowledge of the divine, and thus knowledge of 
his self by caring for himself, his “soul will be endowed with wisdom as soon as it 
is in contact with the divine” and will “think and know the divine as the source of 
thought and knowledge.” Then his soul will turn back to the world with this 
divine wisdom which teaches him how to distinguish between right and wrong, 
good and bad; and “at this point the soul will be able to conduct itself properly, 
and being able to conduct itself properly, it will be able to govern the city.”15 
I see this piece of information very helpful in understanding how the 
subject formation was handled by the mediaeval Islamic scholars, mainly by Ibn 
‘Arabi and Al-Ghazzali, who authored the majority of the texts that established 
the Islamic conception of the self and the care and the disciplining of the self. 
                                               
14 Ibid., 71. 
15 Ibid. 
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While Ibn ‘Arabi configured the position of the human self in relation to the 
Divine and the cosmos, Al-Ghazzali elucidated the technologies of the self that 
one must employ in order to reach up to that position pointed at by Ibn ‘Arabi. 
The similarity between how Socrates and Ibn ‘Arabi define the divine as mirrors 
to human self-knowledge and perfection, is clearly a sign to the link between the 
Ancient Greek wisdom and Mediaeval Islamic wisdom which revived the former: 
In your seeing your true self, He is your mirror and you are His 
mirror in which He sees His Names and their determinations, 
which are nothing other than Himself.16  
 
According to Ibn ‘Arabi’s formulation of the human-the cosmos-and the 
Divine triangle, The Real/The Absolute created the Cosmos “as an 
undifferentiated thing without any of the spirit in it” that manifested the Names 
but separately in each object, which he calls “an unpolished mirror” that cannot 
reflect the whole Names at once. So He created the Human being, insan, which 
has a dual meaning in Arabic, being the human being and the pupil of the eye. Ibn 
‘Arabi takes this second meaning as a major reference to his point that insan, who 
in his/her perfect form, encompasses all the Divine Names in him/herself, “is as 
the pupil is for the eye through which the act of seeing takes place.” So the Real, 
the unknowable Absolute, in some way stoops to the state of being God for the 
human being that He created in order to see the essence of His Names, which at 
the end of the day, is nothing other than Him.17 Unlike the angels and the Cosmos, 
                                               
16 Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi, The Bezels of Wisdom (Fusus al-Hikam), trans. R.W.J. 
Austin (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1980), 65. 
17 Ibn ‘Arabi, Fusus, 51. 
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which display a limited manifestation of the Real, the Perfect insan is given the 
skill to unite “the polarity of qualities” in him/herself, which allows a perfect 
reflection of the self-manifestation of the Real. Hence, insan, or Adam who 
symbolizes the human species as a whole, “is the mirror that reflects the 
ontological level of Divinity [the Real as the ‘God’] and acts as a receptacle for 
the manifestation of all the Divine Names. Nothing else possesses such 
receptivity.”18  
Ibn ‘Arabi asserts with a certain commitment that the Perfect Man is the 
only one among existents who can contain God “through receiving His image” or 
“being the locus of God’s self-manifestation.”19 He explains this self-
manifestation by the analogy of mirror, saying that just as God is the mirror for 
human being to see his own essence, human being is also the mirror which 
reflects God’s attributes. He points at the relationship between the image and its 
reflection on the mirror by explaining the removal of the mirror which separates 
the actual image from its reflection: 
Try, when you look at yourself in a mirror, to see the mirror itself, 
and you will find that you cannot do so…In your seeing your true 
self, He is your mirror and you are His mirror in which He sees His 
Names and their determinations, which are nothing other than 
Himself.20 
 
                                               
18 William Chittick, “The Chapter Headings of the Fusus,” the Journal of the 
Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society 2 (1984): 7. accessed October 7, 2012, 
http://www.ibnarabisociety.org/articlespdf/fususchapterheadings.pdf. 
19 Ibn ‘Arabi, Futuhat al-Makkiyya, Vol. 2, ed. O. Yahia (Cairo: Al-Hay’at al-
Misriyyat al-`Amma li’l-Kitab, 1972), 464. 
20 Ibn ‘Arabi, Fusus, 65. 
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Being a mirror to God might seem like a given status to every human 
being, but Ibn ‘Arabi makes it clear that this is a potential that can only be 
realized through perfection, i.e. self-disciplining.  
This is where the bodily practices and subjecting the self to the 
Islamic law becomes essential, and Al-Ghazzali serves as one of the best 
teachers in the Islamic scholarship of the ways of this perfection of the self. 
In fact, he uses the exact word Foucault chooses for explaining care of the 
self: attending to one’s self: “Man  (sic.), until he descends to his grave, 
must always watch over his soul (nafs) with attention, to discover in what 
degree it is obedient to the holy law and in  harmony with knowledge. 
Whoever does not thus watch over and guard himself, is most surely in a 
delusion and in the way of a just destruction. It is the first step in Islamism21, 
that a man should keep his soul subject to the law.”22 He introduces the 
position of human being in regards to the cosmos and the Divine, long 
before Ibn ‘Arabi, by referring to the mirror analogy, or the ancient “Imago 
Dei” conception, and claiming the human body to be a kind of microcosm:  
“God created man in his own image.” What does this mean, and how 
is it known to be true? Know, beloved, that the sovereign recognizes 
no other person except the sovereign himself. If the Lord had not 
appointed you to be sovereign over the body as over a kingdom, if he 
had not confided to you the affairs of its government, and had not 
given you this brief copy as model, how would you have been able to 
comprehend the sovereign, who is independent of reasoning and of 
                                               
21 Islamism means here the system of Islam, not the political meaning it gained in 
the twentieth century. 
22 Mohamed Al-Ghazzali, The Alchemy of Happiness, trans. Claud Field (London: 
J. Murray, [1910] 2011), Kindle edition. 
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place, and who cannot be known by argument or by hypothesis or in 
any other way? Thanks and praises be given to him who is without 
beginning and eternal, to him who is unceasingly beneficent, to him 
who made you sovereign over yourself, who subjected your body to 
you for a kingdom, who made your heart to be an empyreal throne, 
and made the animal spirit which is the fountain of the heart, to be a 
seraphic messenger. He appointed the brain to be the throne, and the 
treasury of the imagination to be the Preserved Tablet. He made the 
cupola of the brain, which is the source of the nerves and the mine of 
the faculties, to be like the vault of heaven and the stars. He 
appointed the fingers and the pen to serve the elemental qualities of 
nature, and subjected them to your order. He made you more 
excellent and noble than all other creatures, and to exercise rule over 
all possible things.23  
 
However, Al-Ghazzali draws the limits of this self-governmentality 
very quickly by reminding the human subject that “He has bidden you to 
beware and not to be heedless of your soul, which is your kingdom and 
dominion: for to be regardless of your soul is to be regardless of your 
Creator and Benefactor.”24 
Piety as a matter of becoming 
How is this conception of the care of the self, related to my analysis of 
piety? This is directly related to the question of what kind of a piety I am trying to 
discover and cultivate. In fact, the reason for my search for a new definition of 
piety is the double meaning attributed to the same word in Turkish, dindar, which 
simultaneously means piety and religiosity. Before starting to think about piety as 
an analytical category, I did not differentiate my experience of being dindar as 
being either pious or religious. This was simply because I used to cultivate my 
                                               
23 Al-Ghazzali, The Alchemy. 
24 Ibid. 
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relationship with God in my native language —i.e. Turkish, which in and of itself, 
says a lot about the role of language in the self-cultivation process. I did not have 
the linguistic tools to identify the kind of relationship I wanted to establish 
between myself and God: dindar was already too much politicized and reduced 
into practices and appearances without carrying the spirituality in it. The word 
takva (Ar. taqwa) which is translated as righteousness as well as piety, was the 
closest one to the ideal relationship between Allah and His servants, as Allah 
declared in the Qur’an that  “Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is 
the most righteous of you.”25 
 There is not a Turkish word corresponding with the word taqwa, so we 
just gave it Turkish characters, and the meaning of takva was determined by the 
dominant voices in the interpretation of the Qur’an.26 In the end, takva came to 
                                               
25 Qur’an 49: 13. 
26 The concept of taqwa has recently been redefined by some Muslim feminist 
scholars in different terms. Amina Wadud, for instance defines it as righteousness. 
It is moral personality for Asma Barlas and equilibrium for Nimat Barazangi.  
Despite these different terms they use to talk about taqwa, all these scholars share 
the goal of attempting to reread the Qur’an from a feminist perspective. They 
suggest that the goal of this rereading is to reveal the egalitarian essence of the 
Quran that they argue was buried under centuries of patriarchal interpretation. But 
in Turkish society, this Arabic term remained within the realm of the scholarly 
elite, and could not make into the popular usage as the Turkish word dindar 
could. In the Turkish context, understanding takva as piety or any of these 
translations would not work, because it is a term that is rarely attributed to 
someone, and thus not as accessible as piety which is translated as dindarlık. In 
the popular usage, there has been no category of “muttakiler” (those who have 
takva) outside of the realm of theology, while “dindarlar” (those who are dindar) 
has a very common usage albeit with different meanings attached to it. In that 
sense, tracing takva in the everyday lives of people is much less possible than 
tracing dindarlık, which corresponds to both religiosity and piety in the Turkish 
context.  
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mean being the most of everything the classical Sharia wants a Muslim to be, and 
being the least of what it forbids a Muslim to be. The most righteous woman was 
then the one with the largest veil with the darkest color. She certainly had no 
contact with the opposite sex, and stayed at home, and was extremely careful 
about what ate, how she talked, how she looked, and etc. In short, being the 
noblest in the sight of God was equated with being the most obedient to the 
Islamic law, without any implication of a deep connection with God other than 
seeking His reward (Heaven) and fearing His punishment (Hell).  
Now that I have the language which provides me with two different words 
for being dindar, I would name this approach as religiosity, the outward 
manifestation of appertaining to a religious tradition, which is usually thought to 
be sufficient for salvation from eternal punishment. However, this is certainly not 
what Ibn ‘Arabi means when he talks about the Perfect Human (insan-ı kâmil), 
who is the noblest of all creatures. Heaven and Hell are not the concerns of Ibn 
‘Arabi or Al-Ghazzali, as their main concern is to establish a relationship between 
the servant and God that would lead to the unification of both at the ultimate 
point. Even when Al-Ghazzali warns his reader against eternal torment, he makes 
clear that the reader should recognize “that God’s design in creating you was, that 
you should know him and love him, you should never cease for one moment to 
walk with humility and prayer in the path of obedience.”27 Pious would be the one 
                                               
27 Al-Ghazzali, The Alchemy. 
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Al-Ghazzali calls as the “traveler on the way and seeker after the love of God.”28 
Being a traveler and a seeker is a sign of becoming, a process in which one 
constantly strives for the next station ahead, to the point of letting the self go to 
become united with God, as Ibn ‘Arabi describes in his mirror metaphor.  
Seeing piety as becoming, as an ongoing process, allows space for a 
broader definition which would be inclusive of each ways of building a 
relationship with God within a religious tradition. It also implies a whole new 
conception of the divine as immanent and the ultimate potential of the human 
being at the end of a process of self-cultivation. The concept of becoming is also 
glorified by the French feminist thinker Luce Irigaray, who sees it as the 
complementary step of women’s becoming subject on their own terms without 
having to imitate men or fulfilling roles ascribed to them by men. The horizon of 
becoming is the key for creating a harmonious relationship between women and 
men, if each knows the value of what is given to them by God and strives for the 
perfection of those parts: 
God forces us to do nothing more except become. The only task, the only 
obligation laid upon us is to become divine men and women, to become 
perfectly, to refuse to allow parts of ourselves to shrivel and die that have 
the potential for growth and fulfillment.29  
 
In that sense, piety as becoming is not possible with the conception of an 
utterly transcendent God, which would not provide the constant motivation for 
continuing the journey for perfection; as Ibn ‘Arabi warns the traveler: 
                                               
28 Ibid. 
29 Luce Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies, trans. Gillian C. Gill (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), 69. 
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If you insist only on His transcendence, you restrict Him, 
And if you insist only on His immanence you limit Him. 
You are not He and you are He and 
You see Him in the essences of things both boundless and limited.30  
 
Ibn ‘Arabi says that the Real (al-Haqq) is in constant self-manifestation 
which never repeats itself. Therefore, the heart of the Perfect Human should be 
ready for recognizing infinite types of God’s self-manifestation, which requires 
him/her to be in a constant mode of fluidity and change. The Perfect insan, in Ibn 
‘Arabi’s terms is never rigid or fixed; he/she should be always in the course of 
becoming, his/her heart being “as the setting of the stone of the ring, conforming 
to it in every way, being circular, square, or any other shape according to the 
shape of the stone itself, for the setting conforms to the stone and not 
otherwise.”31  
In that sense, I approach piety as an ongoing process, hence immeasurable 
with the conventional tools of dress (pious if wearing the headscarf, more pious if 
she is wearing a face veil), participation in rituals (pious if performing the five 
daily ritual prayers, more pious if performing extra prayers), political views 
(pious if demanding the secular government to abide by the Sharia, more pious if 
striving to be governed by a caliph under a Sharia regime), or lifestyle choices 
(pious if stays away from the luxuries of modern life, more pious if lives in total 
asceticism), and so on. I aim to problematize all these conventional 
understandings of piety, particularly in the current Turkish society, with the case 
                                               
30 Ibn Arabi, Fusus, 75. 
31 Ibid., 149. 
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studies I will present in the following chapters. And I will show how different 
conceptions of piety exist and aspired by the subjects I worked with. 
Disciplinary approach  
I came to know anthropology of religion quite recently, and ever since I 
have admired its sensitivity to the complexities of the human beings in their 
individual, social, and spiritual settings. A particular sociological approach which 
finds its survival in generalization and erasing of unique human differences did 
not appeal to me as much as the way anthropology pays attention to the 
uniqueness of the human being.  Similar to Saba Mahmood’s understanding, I 
found “anthropology’s commitment to thinking critically about difference unique 
in the human sciences and worthy of engagement and exploration.”32 
As Mahmood also says in the same interview, it was Talal Asad's short 
article called “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam” that initiated the 
anthropological turn in my interest in learning about religion in general, and Islam 
in particular.  
Islam as a discursive tradition 
In this short article, written in 1986, Asad focuses on the complexity of 
understanding the categories of Muslim and Islam. If anthropology is about 
studying human beings then what we can study about Islam is basically the 
category of Muslim, and Islam to the extent of its effect on the life of the Muslim: 
                                               
32 Nathan Schneider, “Religious liberty, minorities, and Islam: An interview with 
Saba Mahmood,” The Immanent Frame, August 17, 2011, accessed June 10, 
2012, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/08/17/religious-liberty-minorities-and-islam/.  
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“A Muslim's beliefs about the beliefs and practices of others are his own beliefs. 
And like all such beliefs, they animate and are sustained by his (sic) social 
relations with others.”33  In other words, knowing about the Sharia —i.e. the 
Qur’an, the Sunnah and the other basic Islamic texts— is not equal to knowing 
about Muslims, or Islam as an anthropological category. Because, there has never 
been a time when a Muslim society had the Shariah governing the whole social 
life; comparing to the modern states, indeed, one sees that “the administrative and 
legal regulations of such secular states are far more pervasive and effective in 
controlling the details of people’s lives than anything to be found in Islamic 
history.”34  
If Islam’s foundational texts are not giving us the definition of Islam, then 
should we abandon this concept altogether and go after the various islams, as 
some scholars have suggested,35 in the ways they are manifested in each Muslim 
society? If anything can be studied as Islam, then how do you study Islam as an 
anthropological category? Against this idea of many islams, Asad gives a helpful 
conceptual tool which approaches Islam as a singular, albeit diverse and 
constantly transforming discursive tradition: 
If one wants to write an anthropology of Islam one should begin, as 
Muslims do, from the concept of a discursive tradition that includes and 
relates itself to the founding texts of the Qur’an and the Hadith. Islam is 
                                               
33 Talal Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam (Washington, D.C.: Center 
for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1986), 2. 
34 Asad, Anthropology of Islam, 13. 
35 Talal Asad’s interlocutors in this article were Ernest Gellner and Clifford 
Geertz. They were trying to show the diversity in Islam but they went to a point of 
erasing the commonalities.  
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neither a distinctive social structure nor a heterogeneous collection of 
beliefs, artifacts, customs, and morals. It is a tradition.36 
 
As Asad says, there is a single corpus of Islam that Muslims all share; and 
an anthropological category of Islam should be understood as historical, i.e. there 
is a point it starts (not eternal). In other words, the idea that “Islam means 
submission, and everyone who submits to God is a Muslim” cannot be an 
anthropological category. We must recognize the centrality of the sacred sources 
in the everyday lives of Muslims, while being attentive to the diverse ways of 
interpretation and appropriation of these sacred sources.  
We must remember that Islam is a living tradition which includes people, 
power, politics, gender dynamics and geographical conditions. As a living 
tradition, it constantly changes, goes through rapturous moments, and yet keeps 
some kind of continuity. And as a religious tradition, it has to have a claim for the 
sacred —in other words, it cannot be simply studied as a secular category. An 
anthropological study of Islam must take different living practices and realities of 
Islam into consideration, and it must be able to capture transformations of the 
subjects in their relation to this discursive tradition.37  
Building on this view, I claim that piety occurs in the context of the sacred 
sources and the secular factors that shape one’s relationship to these sources. 
Considering that piety is happening within a living, discursive tradition, one 
                                               
36 Asad, Anthropology of Islam, 14. 
37 As can be seen in my own example that was mentioned in the Prologue. 
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cannot see piety as a fixed matter. It is a becoming that takes place over a variety 
of discursive grounds overlapping each other.  
Studying the everyday life 
The everyday life analysis shows these multiple and overlapping loci of 
power. As Lila Abu-Lughod suggests, one cannot understand a Muslim’s life 
simply by looking at the religious texts: 
In popular and much scholarly thinking in the West, Islam is perceived as 
all-determining. This view corresponds to that of many Muslims who 
believe that they should indeed be guided by the ideals of Islamic faith and 
practice… However, I want to show to both groups…that not all events or 
utterances can be explained by reference to Islam.38  
 
 The everyday life, indeed, reveals that there is much more than Islam, and 
even Islam is quite plural within itself. Focusing on the everyday life is like 
walking in the city, a tactic39 in Michel de Certeau’s words, through which the 
pedestrian appropriates the topographical system of the city in ways unknown to 
the owners of the strategy,40 the city planners. 
                                               
38 Lila Abu-Lughod, Writing Women’s World: Bedouin Stories (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993), 23. 
39 de Certeau defines tactic in this way: “I call a “tactic”…a calculus which cannot 
count on a “proper” (a spatial or institutional localization), nor thus on a 
borderline distinguishing the other as a visible totality. The place of a tactic 
belongs to the other. A tactic insinuates itself into the other’s place, fragmentarily, 
without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance.” 
Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), xx. 
40 “I call a “strategy” the calculus of force relationships which becomes possible 
when a subject of will and power (a proprietor, an enterprise, a city, a scientific 
institution) can be isolated from an “environment”. A strategy assumes a place 
that can be circumscribed as proper and thus serve as the basis for generating 
relations with an exterior distinct from it (competitors, adversaries, “clienteles”, 
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The act of walking is to the urban system what the speech act is to 
language or to the statements uttered. At the most elementary level, it has 
a triple “enunciative” function: it is a process of appropriation of the 
topographical system on the part of the pedestrian…; it is a spatial acting-
out of the place…; and it implies relations among pragmatic “contracts” in 
the form of movements…It thus seems possible to give a preliminary 
definition of walking as a space of enunciation.41 
 
  What this metaphor kindles in my mind is the possibilities of different 
ways of appropriating piety, as in the case of space, and language. This seems 
contrary to Lacan’s totalistic account of symbols, which 
 envelop the life of man in a network so total that they join together, before 
he comes into the world, those who are going to engender him 'by flesh 
and blood'; so total that they bring to his birth...the shape of his destiny; so 
total that they give the words that will make him faithful or renegade, the 
law of the acts that will follow him right to the very place where he is not 
yet and even beyond his death...42  
 
  However, even this totalistic account does not override the possibilities of 
appropriating these symbols in the moment of happening, as shown by De 
Certeau, as well as Mikhail Bakhtin, whose ideas on the question of language and 
discourse open up the possibilities of multiple ways of being a subject, if we 
follow Lacan’s idea that subjectivity occurs within language. His conception of 
“dialogized heteroglossia,” in particular, highlights the complexity that language 
is never completely one’s own, but also one’s language is always unique:  
 The authentic environment of an utterance, the environment in which it 
lives and takes shape, is dialogized heteroglossia, anonymous and social as 
                                                                                                                                
“targets”, or “objects” of research). Political, economic, and scientific rationality 
has been constructed on this strategic model.” De Certeau, The Practice, xx. 
41 de Certeau, The Practice, 97. 
42 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: WW 
Norton & Co., Inc., 1977), 74. 
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language, but simultaneously concrete, filled with specific content and 
accented as an individual utterance.43  
 
An example to this concept of heteroglossia would be the word “modern” 
in Turkish. Although its Turkish equivalent “çağdaş” and the Ottoman-Turkish 
equivalent “asrî” are also available in the language, the French derivative 
“modern” is the most commonly used word. However, it takes on different 
meanings in different environments:  among the Republican women, being 
modern means dressing up in Western outfit, while the conservative women I 
worked with used that word to mean highly-educated and liberal-minded. Among 
the youth, being modern means literacy of technology, while for the urban older 
generation (Republican generation in particular) being modern means being 
Kemalist.  
  Similarly, the concepts of religion and piety do take on different meanings 
for individuals who have certain relationships to those concepts, even though 
there exists a general meaning for them in their social usage. Hence, while Islam 
and piety have common meanings in collective imagination, individuals might 
employ unique meanings for these concepts depending on their relationship to the 
divine, to the sacred sources, and to their society. 
  Diverse forms of piety 
 This question of unity vs. uniqueness should also be considered in 
studying Islam. Carl Ernst, for example, brings a good point in interpreting Islam 
                                               
43 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1981), 272. 
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in his book titled Following Muhammad. He refers to the dialogue between 
Gabriel and Prophet Muhammad in the Islamic tradition, where Gabriel comes to 
the presence of the Prophet and his companions in the form of a man, and asks 
him “What is Islam?”, “What is Iman?” and “What is Ihsan?” After he answers all 
these questions, he confirms about receiving the correct answers, and leaves.  
Then the Prophet turns to his companions and asks them: “Did you 
recognize that man?” When nobody answers affirmatively, he says: “He was 
Gabriel. He came to teach you your religion.”44 “This striking dialogue,” Ernst 
says, “indicates a structure of religious values that proceeds from the outer to the 
inner.”45 Submission (islam) 46, the practical aspect being the “first and most 
external step,” followed by faith (iman)47 and spiritual virtue (ihsan)48 which “are 
affairs of the mind and heart, creating the basis for religious consciousness.”49 
Through telling this story and the depth of meaning it entails, Ernst comes to the 
conclusion that current interpretations of Islam which exclude the faith and 
                                               
44 Carl Ernst, Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary 
World (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 63-64. 
45 Ernst, Following Muhammad, 63-64. 
46 These are: uttering the phrase “There is no deity but Allah, and Muhammad is 
His Messenger”; performing the ritual prayer (namaz); fasting (oruc) during the 
month of Ramadan; giving a certain amount of your property for charity (zekat); 
performing the pilgrimage (Hac) to the Ka’ba in Mecca.  
47 These are faith in the existence and unity of Allah; faith in the previous 
revelations; faith in the existence of angels; faith in the existence and 
righteousness of all the prophets from Adam to Muhammad; faith in the existence 
of the Hereafter and the Judgment Day; faith in the Divine plan (kader) and the 
realization of that Divine plan (kaza) and that Allah is the creator of good and 
evil. 
48 Having the consciousness of seeing Allah and being seen by Allah all the time.  
49 Ernst, Following Muhammad, 64. 
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spiritual virtue and reduce Islam to its practices “present an impoverished picture 
of this religious tradition.”50 In other words, there are always possibilities of 
different ways of being pious, and the practical aspects should not be the only 
criteria for measuring piety.  
The story of Moses and the shepherd in Rumi’s Mesnevi51 is also a striking 
example of how different layers of relationship to God and understanding God are 
possible. Here is an excerpt from the story, which ends with God’s declaration 
that He does not care about the wordings and phrases as long as His servants 
come to Him with a burning heart: 
Moses saw a shepherd on the way, who was saying, “O God who choosest 
(whom Thou wilt), Where art Thou, that I may become Thy servant and 
sew Thy shoes and comb Thy head? 
That I may wash Thy clothes and kill Thy lice and bring milk to Thee, O 
worshipful One; 
That I may kiss Thy little hand and rub Thy little foot, (and when) bedtime 
comes I may sweep Thy little room, 
 O Thou to whom all my goats be a sacrifice, O Thou in remembrance of 
whom are my cries of ay and ah!” 
 The shepherd was speaking foolish words in this wise. Moses said, “Man, 
to whom is this (addressed)?” 
 He answered, “To that One who created us; by whom this earth and sky 
were brought to sight.” 
 “Hark!” said Moses, “you have become very backsliding (depraved); 
indeed you have not become a Moslem, you have become an infidel. 
                                               
50 Ibid. 
51 Mevlana Celaleddin Rûmî, as is known in Turkish historical accounts, is a 
famous Sufi master who lived in the city of Konya in the 13th century. He is 
world-famous with his exquisite poems of wisdom and divine love, which he 
wrote in Persian, and are compiled in his most famous work Mesnevi, or the 
Masnavi. He is the founder of the Mevlevi order, who are well-known for their 
particular form of worship called sema. Detailed information about Rumi and the 
Mevlevi order can be found at the website prepared by his descendants: 
http://mevlana.net/mevlana.html 
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 What babble is this? What blasphemy and raving? Stuff some cotton into 
your mouth! 
 The stench of your blasphemy has made the (whole) world stinking: your 
blasphemy has turned the silk robe of religion into rags. 
 Shoes and socks are fitting for you, (but) how are such things right for 
(One who is) a Sun? 
 If you do not stop your throat from (uttering) these words, a fire will come 
and burn up the people. 
 If a fire has not come, (then) what is this smoke? Why has your soul 
become black and your spirit rejected (by God)? 
 If you know that God is the Judge, how is it right for you (to indulge in) 
this doting talk and familiarity? 
 Truly, the friendship of a witless man is enmity: the high God is not in 
want of suchlike service. 
  ……. 
He (the shepherd) said, “O Moses, thou hast closed my mouth and thou 
hast burned my soul with repentance.” 
He rent his garment and heaved a sigh, and hastily turned his head towards 
the desert and went (his way). 
A revelation came to Moses from God—“Thou hast parted My servant 
from Me. 
  Didst thou come (as a prophet) to unite, or didst thou come to sever? 
…….. 
I have bestowed on every one a (special) way of acting: I have given to 
everyone a (peculiar) form of expression. 
In regard to him it is (worthy of) praise, and in regard to thee it is (worthy 
of) blame: in regard to him honey, and in regard to 
  thee poison. 
  ……. 
O Moses, they that know the conventions are of one sort, they whose souls 
and spirits burn are of another sort.”52 
 
  I quoted almost the whole story in order to highlight the importance of 
remembering to look beyond the embodied practices while conducting an 
ethnographic study on the piety of Muslim women, as previously, and 
                                               
52 Rumi, The Masnavi, Book 2, trans. Javid Mujaddedi (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 101-105. 
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successfully done in recent years by Saba Mahmood in Politics of Piety,53Lara 
Deeb in An Enchanted Modern,54and Sylvia Frisk in Submitting to God55 on the 
contexts of Egypt, Lebanon, and Malaysia respectively. In addition to works on 
women’s piety in Muslim societies, many other successful accounts of the public 
piety of these Muslim societies have been introduced by Charles Hirschkind,56 
and Amira Mittermaier57 (Egypt), Stefania Pandolfo58 (Morocco), Mandana E. 
Limbert59(Oman), and many others if we include the non-ethnographic ones.  
  Ethnographies of Islamic piety 
  Many of these works have shown to me the value of studying embodied 
practices and zooming in everyday life to understand the global Islamist current in 
various Muslim societies.60 Not only as a scholar but as a Muslim, I learnt a lot 
regarding the diversity of being a pious Muslim. At least, they broke the 
mechanistic account of Islamist movements which described them, as Saba 
                                               
53 Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, 2012).  
54 Lara Deeb, An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi’i Lebanon 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
55 Sylvia Frisk, Submitting to God: Women and Islam in Urban Malaysia 
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2009). 
56 Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic 
Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 
57 Amira Mittermeier, Dreams That Matter: Egyptian Landscape of the 
Imagination (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011). 
58 Stefania Pandolfo, Impasse of the Angels: Scenes from a Moroccan Space of 
Memory, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
59 Mandana E. Limbert, In the Time of Oil: Piety, Memory, and Social life in an 
Omani Town (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).  
60 This does not mean that they have neglected the importance of internal belief 
(iman), for there is a strong emphasis on iman, especially in the works of 
Mahmood, Deeb, and Mittermeier. 
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Mahmood says, “largely in functionalist and reductive terms…a displacement of 
something more fundamental –economic frustration, lack of democracy, and so 
on.”61  
  For years and years, I had read many works on the veiling and headscarf 
issue which became suffocating after a while, but only with Saba Mahmood’s 
approach to bodily practices and especially veiling that I was able to give a new 
and a more personal meaning to my insistence on covering my hair despite my 
growing suspicions on its religious justifications. This kind of approach to bodily 
practices in religion helped me to develop a new understanding of piety that 
recognized the interconnectedness between the individual, the community, and 
the Divine in creating a pious subject.  
  Mahmood’s help was more on my conception of the human-divine 
relationship, which gave an explanation about Islamist women’s acceptance of the 
norms that are reproducing gender inequality in the society: they cared more 
about being a pious Muslim than having equal rights with men in the world. And 
she was right that understanding these kinds of “misogynist” bodily practices as a 
symbolic act would not help in grasping the real nature of this practice for the 
people who actually perform it, whereas “an understanding in which a bodily act 
is both an expression of, and a means to, the realization of the subject”62 would do 
                                               
61 Schneider, “Interview with Saba Mahmood.” 
62 Saba Mahmood, preface to Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the 
Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [2005] 2012), xi. 
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more justice to the inner motivations of these pious Muslim women in 
maintaining and valuing those practices.  
 On the other hand, she makes so little reference to the involvement of the 
society (the others) in this process of subjectivation, which cannot be disregarded 
since, in Judith Butler’s words, “…the viability of our individual personhood is 
fundamentally dependent on these social norms.”63 Or, “A subject becomes a 
subject primarily by recognizing its relationship to and separation from others and 
the surrounding world,” as Shahla Talebi suggests.64 This social self is more 
carefully considered by Lara Deeb, as in her context, piety had to be public as a 
manifestation of the resistance to the Israeli occupation; and  
 in order to fully enact public piety, women had to participate in the public 
arena, most obviously through their community service activities, but also 
through participation in Ashura commemorations and engagement with 
changing religious discourses in the authentication process. As such, 
public participation was crucial to both their piety and the spiritual and 
material progress of the community as a whole...65 
 
  Amira Mittermaier’s ethnography of dreams, on the other hand, opens up 
the possibility of non-self or the collapse of the self as a manifestation of piety, as 
she analyzes the effects of the Prophetic dreams seen by pious people in Egypt, 
and argues that these dreams “matter in the sense of having significance in 
                                               
63 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York; London: Routledge, 2004), 2. 
64 Shahla Talebi, “Who is Behind the Name? A Story of Violence, Loss, and 
Melancholic Survival in Post-Revolutionary Iran,” Journal of Middle East 
Women’s Studies 7 (2011): 45. 
65 Deeb, An Enchanted Modern, 213. 
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people’s lives and more literally, in the sense of having an impact on the visible, 
material world.”66  
  Like Mahmood and Hirschkind, she attempts to understand the Islamic 
Revival in Egypt in relation to the experiences of the ordinary people and their 
embodied practices in everyday life situations. However, her work diverges from 
theirs in terms of its field site and arguments. Instead of working with mosques, 
preaching, sermons, or study groups, she relates her field study to the “saint 
shrines, the dead, and the barzakh.”67 In this way, she complicates the very 
concept of the real on which subjectivity and agency are built whether in the 
context of a secular-liberal subject or an Islamist subject. She brings up “a 
barzakhian perspective” which 
 ...ruptures binary outlooks and invites us to think beyond the present and 
the visible. It invites us to dwell on the in-between. I believe that a serious 
consideration of this in-between as an ethnographic object -one of 
discourse, practice, and contestation- and as an analytical tool can offer us 
insight into modes of being in the world that might not easily be 
intelligible from within rationalist, secular vocabularies but are 
nevertheless of political and ethical relevance to my interlocutors.68  
 
  This strategy of dwelling on the in-between, takes her to a further 
approach towards agency and subjectivity employed by Mahmood, who is 
interested in the ways in which exterior practices shape the interior states, and 
                                               
66 Amira Mittermeier, Dreams That Matter: Egyptian Landscapes of the 
Imagination (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010), 2. Barzakh, in 
Islamic terminology, is the liminal space between this world and the afterlife. It is 
the name given to the form of life spent in the grave until the time of the 
Judgment Day comes.  
67 Mittermeier, Dreams, 4. 
68 Ibid. 
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Hirschkind, who looks at how the sound from the cassette sermons cultivates an 
ethic of listening. For Mittermaier, “in both ethnographies the believer’s self still 
figures as a central locus, or repository of agency.” However, her research 
portrays Talal Asad’s argument that “...contrary to the discourse of many radical 
historians and anthropologists, agent  and subject (where the former is the 
principle of effectivity and the latter of consciousness) do not belong to the same 
theoretical universe and should not, therefore, be coupled.”69 Because, as she 
explains, “while dream-visions are agentive in the sense that they affect actions, 
[her] interlocutors simultaneously understand them as mediums because, for 
them, agency ultimately belongs to God.70 From the way her interlocutors express 
their visitational dreams as some kind of a spirit possession, as something falling 
on them, she seeks out the possibility of a spiritual world that is not completely 
controlled by the subject.  
“Romanticizing difference” and the insider/outsider question 
 
 What has not been done in any of these ethnographies is to look beyond 
the Islamist or organized networks to “anthropologize” —in other words to draw 
attention to the difference of these groups from the mainstream and the dominant 
liberal-secular view in Western academia. In other words, I, as a Muslim reader, 
get the impression that Western anthropologists are more interested with what is 
different and marginal, at the expense of overlooking the mainstream majority in 
                                               
69 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in 
Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993), 16. 
70 Mittermeier, Dreams, 242. 
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those societies. In some sense, I could describe this approach as “a tendency of 
romanticizing difference,”71or seeing difference as more valuable than similarity 
in producing an anthropological work.  
 It is a striking fact that all these everyday life ethnographies in the Islamic 
world arise from the context of Islamization, where the dominant life-organizing 
power is Islam, while in my own case as a Muslim in a nation-state with a 
predominantly Muslim population I have only felt that power in very limited and 
encircled spaces. Even during the years when Islamism was on a rise 
synchronously with other countries in the region, I, as a mere secondary school 
student from a non-politicized72 family, never felt the strength of it in the air I 
breathed in my actual environment. I could see the numerical increase in the 
number of women covering up their head, and the sudden abundance of Islamic 
publications on the streets and the annual book fairs; yet I could not sense any 
moderation in the secularist and nationalist indoctrination at the school, where I 
spent two thirds of my day. I was still a strong fan of Atatürk, still proud of being 
                                               
71 This is a reference to the phrase of “romanticizing resistance” mentioned by 
Lila Abu-Lughod in “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of 
Power Through Bedouin Women,” (1990): 42; Talal Asad in Formations of the 
Secular (2003), 71.; and Saba Mahmood in Politics of Piety (2005), 8.  
72 Having no political affiliations other than voting for the mainstream right-wing 
parties which appealed to them more than the anti-religious left-wing parties. Still 
my parents did not have a consistent choice of political views as they had voted 
for the social-democratic party in the early 1990s, but they opted for the Islamist 
Refah party in the next elections. In other words, their voting choices are still 
determined primarily by economic concerns instead of a certain ideology, which 
is the case for the majority of voters in Turkey (See the conclusion for a more 
detailed analysis of this voter behavior). 
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a Turk, and had no favor for the Islamist political party which had just been 
ousted by the military regime by the time I finished high school in the year 2001.  
The political language, though, totally ignored this experience of mine as 
the headscarf I was wearing had already been defined as a political symbol of the 
opposite of everything I mentioned above. For all these years, both in Turkey and 
abroad, I felt the pain of being seen as different simply because of my headscarf. I 
was different, as everyone is in their own way; yet it was not only because of the 
headscarf I was wearing. This also implied that I was the same with all the women 
who wore the headscarf, as we were lumped into the category of başörtülü73 or 
more pejoratively türbanlı74 within Turkey. In the West, though, this took place in 
the form of filling us all in the jug of “veiled women” or even “Muslim women” 
in a more sloppy way; making me feel like being in a zipped folder.  
Therefore, all the talks about multiculturalism and respecting differences 
miss the target as they serve to the process of polarization instead of dialogue. 
Whereas, I believe that knowing the other should lead to knowing one’s own self 
and appreciating the similarities between them instead of building culture walls 
between them. With its capacity of being a mirror to diverse human societies to 
see and know each other, I believe that anthropology should also be able to create 
                                               
73 Başörtülü means “those who wear the headscarf” which is preferred by 
conservative, Islamist and liberal people in order to refer it as a religious practice 
or symbol. 
74 Türbanlı means “those who wear the turban” the name attributed to the 
headscarf worn by young women in order to separate it from the traditional way 
of covering the head, which had a social connotation rather than a political one for 
the secularists. In other words, başörtülü meant simply a lower class woman, 
while türbanlı meant an Islamist.  
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dialog and mutual sharing, instead of promoting difference between the researcher 
and the research field.  
What is clearly seen in these ethnographic accounts on Muslim piety by 
Western scholars, who lack nativeness to their field sites in terms of affiliation 
and shared experiences, is the openness of their interlocutors to remove the 
barriers. In most of these ethnographic accounts, the natives’ desire to turn these 
outsider researchers into insiders can be sensed, while the researchers are always 
self-aware that they are “guests” in the “foreign land” which they came to 
explore. It is even possible to feel a subtle sense of superiority in some of these 
researchers’ mentioning of how their interlocutors were trying to impress and thus 
convert them to Islam, an offer which they kindly refused. I could not help getting 
this kind of feeling while I was reading Sylvia Frisk’s account of her relationship 
with her interlocutors in Malaysia:  
 As friends, these women have a deep concern for my personal religious 
beliefs. Firdaus, my adopted sister and dear friend, has ever since we met 
the first time in 1995 nurtured a hope that I would see the beauty and truth 
in Islam the same way that she does. She has explained the verses of the 
Koran to me hundreds of times, she has introduced me to female sessions 
of devotion, always making me aware of the spiritual aspects of everyday 
life and how the words of God may be experienced in any small detail. 
She does not give up on me and has never shown any disappointment or 
frustration over my personal inability or ignorance to see the world as she 
does. “You are simply not ready yet,” is her calm comment to my lack of 
personal commitment. Other women have worked equally hard to guide 
me both as an anthropologist trying to understand the meaning of religious 
practice in this particular context, but also as a friend, who, as they see it, 
is in need of guidance from God. ...I know that they have hoped and 
desired that I, personally, would discover the truth in Islam along the way. 
While I have disappointed them on that point, I have written this book 
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with deep respect for the religious lives they lead and for their willingness 
to open them up to me.75 
 
Because their starting point was an “illiberal realm” from their 
perspective, these accounts of piety by secular Western scholars, particularly 
those ones by women who were distinctly different from the communities they 
analyzed, might have contributed to an understanding of Islamic piety as a distinct 
category peculiar to these illiberal realms.  
Therefore, a great concern to me in conducting this research was to 
explore the diversity of experiencing piety under and beyond all the veils of 
categories such as pious, Islamist, conservative, or membership to such and such 
pietist community or Sufi order. I believed that in my research, my difference 
would be an obstacle to me, as my interlocutors would either try to proselytize me 
or impress me (as they did to the Western, and especially, female researchers), or 
they would think I was more pious than them, so they would try to prove their 
piety to me. I know this, because this is what I have been experiencing in my 
daily life in Turkey. If there is an insider-outsider position in ethnographic 
research, I knew that the outsiders always had an easier access to the local 
community, but only with the risk of accessing to the kind of data to which the 
local people desired to allow access.  
Especially in the conservative circles, men respect and desire to impress 
the uncovered, Western looking women more than covered women, as the 
covered women are in no way different to them than their mothers, wives, or 
                                               
75 Frisk, Submitting to God, vii. 
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daughters at home. For conservative women, on the other hand, these Western 
looking women are usually a potential field to plough (to proselytize as they are 
thought to be less pious than them) and also a window to a world which they 
cannot access. In that sense, I did not want to be in either position of insider or 
outsider. I rather chose to do my research in a field where I would be both and 
none at the same time.  
The vanishing of the line between insider and outsider position is also the 
case for my interlocutors in this study. Living in a secular world as a pious person 
necessarily complicates this position of belonging, as one finds herself in a 
nomadic situation where she has to walk between two lands the borders of which 
are already drawn by a dry political language: liberal or illiberal, secular or 
religious, modern or backward.76 Being forced to play in an undefined space with 
a desire to build their own place takes them to the “juncture from which critique 
emerges” as defined by Judith Butler, “where critique is understood as an 
interrogation of the terms by which life is constrained in order to open up the 
possibility of different modes of living” which does not mean “to celebrate 
difference as such but to establish more inclusive conditions for sheltering and 
maintaining life that resists models of assimilation.”77 This research aims to show 
how difference can be appreciated without necessarily building walls of 
                                               
76 Even the recent literature on Islamic modernity, or alternative modernity adds 
to this notion of distancing or othering the Muslims while they are right in the 
heart of Europe and the US for a couple of centuries; or as if those who carried 
out modernization in Turkey were not Muslims (i.e. it was Islamic from the 
beginning). 
77 Butler, Undoing Gender, 4. 
  45 
separation, and how proximity and similarity can be appreciated without leading 
to assimilation and the erasure of human uniqueness.  
Methodology and "Subjects" of concern 
Believing that one should not be necessarily performing on a different 
framework than the Western liberal-secular one in order to be the subject of 
anthropology, I aimed to expand my fieldwork to multiple frameworks that 
become a setting for piety.  
The fieldwork for this research took place within a time span of fifteen 
months in Istanbul. I ended up choosing three institutions to conduct my research 
through participant observation. I found my interlocutors within and through these 
institutions. In fact, it was not completely me choosing these institutions as I 
needed to be chosen by them as well. I was mainly located in Women's Platform 
(WP), which is under the Journalists and Writers Foundation established by the 
largest pietist movement in Turkey. The founder of the movement is Fethullah 
Gülen, an Islamic scholar who attracted the support of a large population within 
Turkey through his educational philantrophism.  The WP was established as a 
representative of this movement in 2009. It aims to build dialogue with women 
from different backgrounds, such as secularists, non-Muslim minorities, or with 
Alevi or Kurdish backgrounds. Thus, their main goal throughout the six months I 
spent there, was trying to meet with as many different people as possible.  
The other field site I found useful for my research was the Meridyen 
Circle, a supportive network of pious women seeking academic career. Most of 
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them had to pursue their graduate career abroad because of the headscarf ban in 
universities. After getting their degrees and moving along in their fields, they 
decided to form a network and help each other in their academic endeavors 
inasmuch as provide guidance on finding an authentic voice in already said things 
in the Western academia.  
The third and the final institution was a private university where I found a 
job with the help of my connection with the pietist Gülen network. It was founded 
by the members of this network. The academic staff did not necessarily have a 
connection with the network, but everyone was recruited according to the criteria 
of not being hostile to the visibility of religion in the public sphere, as they had to 
work together with pious people in that institution. Besides that, they were not 
forced to claim any affiliation with the Gülen movement at all.  
My aim in this research was to compare my story of piety as a highly 
educated professional woman with the stories of other women having gone 
through similar settings to the ones in my story. Therefore my subjects of concern 
were directly related to the challenge faced by highly-educated professional 
women who desire to cultivate a pious self within the secular everyday life 
settings —also in relation to the changes they made to this secular space in 
Turkey.  I focused specifically on those who experienced this challenge to a more 
significant extent than those who have little contact with the secular public 
sphere.  
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In other words, my concern was not directly about the class issue, nor 
about financial status, but more about the level of engagement with the formative 
ground of secular-liberal values and the public sphere itself, mainly the areas of 
higher education, non-governmental organizations, media and publicity, and some 
professions like psychology and psychiatry, where there is no space for religion 
and piety thereof. One thing common to all these subjects is their exposure to 
secular education at least beyond high-school level (they all have college 
degrees), and their preoccupation with their related professions (in other words, 
they are pursuing their career in relation to their college degree, rather than 
relying on their family business). 
I imagined this work as a collection of multiple travel stories, the 
destination of which is the cultivation of a pious self. Even though each of these 
travelers started their journey from a different point, and probably heading 
towards different stations of piety, one thing is common for all of them: that they 
have to pass through the same stations of the secular-liberal public sphere, which 
has transformed a lot in recent years as each of them left their own marks on this 
station.  
The next chapter aims to give a historical trajectory of this secular-liberal 
public sphere, and introduce the main actors that had a role in its transformation. 
The individual stories of my interlocutors in chapter three will give a more 
detailed itinerary of this journey of becoming a pious Muslim woman in Turkey 
from 1970s to the year 2011. After discussing the various context these journeys 
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take place, I will devote the fourth chapter to the ways in which the technologies 
of self, such as veiling and ritual prayer are utilized along the way. The fifth 
chapter will try to look at the process in which the secular-liberal ethics is 
critiqued by these women in the context of conceptualizing womanhood in a pious 
modern context. Lastly, chapter six, which is designed as the concluding chapter, 
will discuss how the stories of these women can take the scholarship on women, 
Islam, and Turkey beyond the boundaries presented by the binary oppositions 
such as traditional-modern, religious-secular, conservative-liberal, Islamist-
secularist, and etc. 
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Chapter 2 
SECULARISM, ISLAMISM, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
This is a micro-level study of piety, regarding a group of highly-educated 
professional women who want to cultivate piety while actively taking roles in the 
secular modern public sphere of Turkey. However, a macro-level analysis of that 
public sphere and its history of formation are essential to be laid out before 
talking about the micro-level experiences. 
There is an interesting and long story behind the current picture of Turkey 
as a model for a successful Muslim democracy, with an ex-Islamist Prime 
Minister and President, whose wives are both wearing headscarves. Their story is 
embedded with the collective story of Turkey within the last two centuries, which 
includes the collapse of a six-hundred year old empire, the end of the twelve-
century old Islamic caliphate, the birth of a nation-state, a civilizational 
conversion, and the rise of globalization and a return of religion into the public 
sphere.  
Hence, this chapter will take you to a journey to the recent history of 
Turkey, before telling you about the individual journeys of the women who 
emerged out of this recent history. While learning about the historical 
background, you will also get an idea about the major concepts that rise up 
throughout this study, such as modernity, secularism, Islamism and Islamic 
revival, the Hizmet movement, and finally, the gender issue.   
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At the end of the chapter, I will present the most recent picture of the 
Turkish public sphere after all the transformations it has gone through with the 
deprivatization of religion and the impacts of the Islamist movement. 
The Islamist movement and deprivatization of religion  
The modernization efforts of the Muslim states beginning in the 
nineteenth century were accompanied by secularization of the public sphere, 
thereby leaving religion with no valid official space within these states and thus 
relegated to the private sphere.  This corresponded with Enlightenment theories of 
progress and secularization, which saw religion in the public sphere as irrelevant 
and dysfunctional at best, and harmful and worthy of being destroyed at worst. 
However, during the second half of the twentieth century this enlightenment 
theory of secularization has failed in its prediction that religion would remain 
exclusively in the private sphere.  
Jose Casanova named this process as the “deprivatization” of religion, 
meaning that “religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the 
marginal and privatized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of 
secularization had reserved for them.”78 Casanova was actually trying to save 
secularization theory that was claimed to be a myth because of the increasing 
public visibility of religion since the 1980s. He claimed that secularization theory 
has three components: religious decline, structural differentiation, and 
privatization of religion. And only the second one constitutes the valid core of the 
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secularization thesis because “the differentiation and emancipation of the secular 
spheres from religious institutions and norms remains a general modern structural 
trend.”79 In this sense, deprivatization of religion does not render secularization 
theory invalid, since religions can act in the public sphere without disturbing the 
structural differentiation of the secular public spheres.  
Talal Asad discarded this argument as invalid because, he said, once 
religion−even in its least ambitious form−enters public discourse it cannot remain 
“indifferent to debates about how economy should be run, or which scientific 
project should be publicly funded, or what the broader aims of an education 
system should be.”80 In other words, it is a false argument to see religion as an 
agent which enters into the public sphere with a specific purpose; as if it would 
go back to its private sphere once that purpose is fulfilled.  
As Asad says, the power relations in the public sphere make it necessary 
to be heard as well as being able to speak. In a modern secular public sphere, 
religion “may have to disrupt existing assumptions to be heard.”81 Hence, religion 
will need to create a space for itself in the modern public sphere, by influencing 
the existing institutions or by forming its alternative ones in order to create a 
setting where its message can be heard by the public. Above all, “religious 
institutions and norms” can be embodied in the public sphere through individuals, 
who practice the values of those institutions and norms in their daily lives despite 
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fulfilling a public role in a secular setting. Therefore, a religion which is carried 
to the public sphere –even with a single individual– has the potential to disrupt 
the structural differentiation. 
This process of deprivatization has been more distinctly observed in the 
case of Islam, especially in the areas previously governed by the Ottoman 
Empire, which had a long tradition of integrating religion and politics. Once they 
lost their “sacred canopy”82 in Peter Berger’s terminology, the previous Islamic 
elite returned to Islamic sources to empower themselves and the “innocent 
masses” that had little chance to resist the official secularizing ideology.  
This empowerment came about in mainly two modes of action, as 
explained by the famous Turkish sociologist Nilüfer Göle, “one associated with 
political Islam, the other with cultural Islam.”83 While political Islam gives 
priority to seizing power and seeks for a “top-to-bottom” change, a process that 
enjoys a great popularity in Western media and academia, cultural Islam does not 
get that much attention. Whereas, this study will show that it is the main driving 
force behind the deprivatization of Islam as it focuses on cultivating religious and 
pious individuals who would transform the public sphere through their everyday 
actions and thus create a space for Islam in the public sphere.  
The secularization process where religion was pushed back to be a private 
matter is tightly connected to the modernization projects in the post-Ottoman 
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lands, as well as in Turkey. And the story of the initial encounter of Muslim 
societies with Western modernity and secularism must be known understand the 
deprivatization process, and the marching of religion back to the public sphere 
along the two lines of political and cultural Islam.  
Encounter with modernity 
Modernity, as it originated in Europe as a result of various developments, 
is described by Anthony Giddens in the Consequences of Modernity as having 
four institutional dimensions: Capitalism (capital accumulation in the context of 
competitive labor and product markets), Surveillance (control of information and 
social supervision by the nation-state), Industrialism (transformation of Nature: 
development of the “created environment”), and the Military Power (control of 
the means of violence in the context of the industrialization of war).84   
These institutions cover numerous new paradigms in themselves, which 
developed in response to specific social, cultural, economic, and political 
experiences in European societies. The first encounter of Muslim societies’ 
encounter with modernity took place in the form of modernism, which meant the 
transfer of these institutions to their societies, accompanied with other projects 
such as secularism and nationalism with the hands of the ruling elites.  
For all Muslim majority societies, the encounter came as a direct threat to 
their political and economic sovereignty, as well as their socio-cultural dignity. 
Especially in the Middle East, the Western attacks on their lands were quickly 
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associated with an attack on their religion because of the living memory of the 
Crusades -also because these military attacks were co-happening with the flow of 
Christian missionaries in Muslim lands with an open aim of refuting the 
credibility of Islamic faith. Therefore, the attempted import of Western modernity 
started on a ground of conflict and threat, rather than peace and negotiation. This 
tells us a lot about the emergence of “Islamic revivalism” and also the militant 
secularism and modernism of some rulers like Atatürk in Turkey, Reza Shah in 
Iran, and Nasser in Egypt. 
Islamic modernism first appeared in the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth 
century in response to the subsequent military defeats against the Western 
powers. The basic aim of the Ottoman rulers was to save the state rather than 
create a social change. The young intellectuals they sent to Europe, on the other 
hand, realized that more needs to be done than simply modernizing the army to 
save the state, because the threat was not restricted to military realm. Called by 
Europeans as the Young Ottomans, these intellectuals criticized the cosmetic 
reforms of Tanzimat (1839) that was mostly dictated by the European powers, 
and called for an authentic modernization by synthesizing Islam and European 
technology and science.  
Chief among them was Namık Kemal, who harshly criticized the blind 
imitation of the West in his novels and writings. However, Namık Kemal was not 
able to get his due credit as the pioneer of Islamic revivalism because he wrote in 
Ottoman Turkish that was not read as much as Arabic at that time. As Nikki 
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Kedie suggests, Namık Kemal developed the idea of pan-Islamism much before 
Al-Afghani, against the wave of nationalism which was tearing the multinational 
empire apart in a great pace.85  
As the ethnic groups kept cutting their ties with the Ottoman state, the new 
generation of reformists who graduated from the Western type schools (who were 
named as the Young Turks in the West) gradually adopted the idea of Turkish 
nationalism rather than pan-Islamism as the only way to save the state. Since the 
Turkish identity was not solidified at any time during the history of the Ottoman 
Empire, they had to “imagine” the community. Ziya Gökalp was the main 
ideologist of this newly formed Turkish nationalism, which aimed to show people 
that they should seek for remedy to the social and political ills in the empire in 
their Turkic origins rather than Islam.  
Another group was arguing for the need to completely adopt the Western 
ways of life, led by Abdullah Cevdet who claimed that Western civilization 
should be adopted “with its thorns and roses.” He believed that Western 
modernity was coming to the Muslim lands like “mighty flood…utterly 
demolish[ing] every obstacle it finds on its way.” Therefore, he argued that “the 
Moslem people must refrain from resisting this flood of civilization. They can 
preserve their national existence only by following this current.”86  
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By the time the WWI was lost and the Ottoman Empire saw its end in 
1920, nationalism and modernism had superseded their rival ideologies and 
became the state ideology of the new Republic of Turkey. Most of the ideas put 
forth by Abdullah Cevdet in his periodical Ictihad, became part of the official 
ideology of the Kemalist state, including   
…the education of women, a basic suspicion toward the institution of the 
monarchy, an emphasis on the education of the masses, a materialistic-
biological approach to the universe, a hostility toward Islam insofar as it 
was believed to inhibit progress, an admiration for the “classics” of 
Western literature, and a belief that modernization was primarily 
dependent upon changing one's pattern of thought.87  
 
The (re)formation of the public sphere in the Republican era 
 Although the official history of Turkish modernization prioritizes a clear 
break with the Ottoman past, the emergence of alternative histories in the second 
half of the twentieth century shows significant connections between the Ottoman 
practices and the formation of the founding principles of the Turkish Republic.  
The official state ideology of Turkey was given a concrete body in 1937, 
fourteen years after the establishment of the new nation-state. They were 
formulated into six principles based on the political, social, and economic reforms 
of Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) during his lifetime presidency of the Republic of 
Turkey. These six principles, -republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, 
etatism, and revolutionism- were made into the official ideology of the state when 
they were added to the constitution during the single-party regime. Although 
Kemal Atatürk showed the Western civilization as the ideal to achieve, his 
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principles were a selective reading of the West, as he excluded democracy, 
liberalism, and most importantly capitalism88 from his principles. The reason for 
this exclusion should be sought in the historical context and ideological and 
sociopolitical grounds on which Kemalism and the Kemalist state were 
established.  
Alev Çınar suggests that it is a Eurocentric approach to see Turkish 
modernization as an external imposition from the West or the Westernized elite 
with no indigenous grounds for modernization. She sees the Turkish case as 
clearly showing that “modernity is neither exclusively Western nor Eastern, 
neither foreign nor local, neither universal nor particular, neither historical nor 
atemporal, neither old nor new, but at times it can be all at once, or emerge in 
between these binary oppositions.”89 Although she affirms that official Turkish 
modernity was based on the negation of the ancient regime, and the adoption of 
Western mode of modernization, she rejects the idea that “it represents a blind 
submission to Westernism” or “totally imitative and inorganic adaptation from 
Europe.”90  
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Similarly, Ibrahim Kaya defines Turkish modernity as “later modernity,” a 
term he developed to refer to projects of modernity that happened where direct 
colonization was absent –like the socialist project of modernity, or Japanese 
modernity, and Turkish modernity in contrast to the forced modernization of 
Algeria by the French.91 Both Çınar and Kaya believe that together with the 
Ottoman state tradition, Turkish society had its own ground for modernization 
that is utilized by the modernizing elite.  
Furthermore, the modernization process of Muslim states, including 
Turkey, should not be considered as “failed attempts at creating an endogenous 
modernity” but as an effort of transforming their selves in the structural 
conditions of modernity, “an effort that is always painful and never fully 
successful.”92  
During this painful transformation, Atatürk tried to replace the spiritual 
capital of Islam with that of nationalism and modernism. However, as Şerif 
Mardin says, what Kemalist modernization deprived people of was a value 
system, “a fund of symbols”93 in which they found meaning for their lives. Many 
other scholars94 supported Mardin’s claim that secular nationalism of the 
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Kemalist ideology could not fill in the spiritual void that religion was fulfilling in 
people’s everyday lives. Even though Kemalism turned itself into a religion-like 
entity through creating its own times and spaces,95 presented itself to the public in 
the form of a cult96 or a civic religion,97 it was not successful in replacing religion 
totally, which was most clearly seen in the Islamic revival that gained prominence 
in the 1980s.  
The Islamic revival in the public sphere 
The second half of the twentieth century proved wrong the secularization 
theory’s assumption that religion would become “ever more marginal and 
irrelevant in the modern world.”98 The secularists in the Islamic world saw quickly 
that expelling Islam out of the public sphere resulted only in the return of Islam to 
the public sphere more radically, now called “Islamism,” as seen in the Islamic 
revolution in Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the National View (Milli 
Görüş) movement in Turkey.  
Seeing that various secular ideologies such as socialism and nationalism 
failed to solve the chronic problems in Muslim countries, these “Islamists” turned 
Islam into a political discourse as an alternative to secular ideologies. Although 
their views and methods vary greatly, Islamists, as Talal Asad says, “relate 
themselves to the classical theological tradition by translating it into their 
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contemporary political predicament,”99 therefore claim the political, economic 
and social arena in the name of Islam. Although Islamism is often related to 
fundamentalism or the aim of implementing the Islamic law (Sharia) as a regime, 
in the context of a strictly secular country like Turkey, the word “Islamism” refers 
to any attempt to pull Islam into the public sphere, which was denied to it by 
secularism.  
Since the Kemalist state adopted the French version of secularism as one 
of its fundamental principles, it tried to get religion under its control gradually 
and present an official Islam to the public. Hence, the public or popular Islam, 
which was the product of a long Sufi tradition, sought for new and alternative 
ways to survive especially during the harsh single-party regime between 1923 and 
1950. 
Because of this strict dominance of the official Islam, which was defined 
by the secular state, the popular Islam had to follow a path that was compatible 
with the modernist and secular policies of the state. So, it found mainly two ways 
to express itself within the secular state. On one hand, the tarikat orders that had 
to go underground when they were banned in 1925, cemented their secret 
networks and solidarities and carried out their social activism through the 
foundations (vakıf). On the other hand they participated in politics —only after 
the introduction of multiparty system in 1945—either actively by joining the 
Democratic Party (DP), which came into power in 1950 with an overwhelming 
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majority, or by simply supporting the party as a group. In this period between 
1950 and 1960, the marginalized sector of the Turkish society, those who were 
outside the urbanized bureaucratic class, were empowered by the urbanization, 
industrialization and education policies of the DP government; and thus Islamists 
started to participate in the system with educational and social activities in an 
attempt to carve up a space for themselves in modernity.  
Although, this religious activism and the first revival of Islamism was 
ended by the Kemalists and the military in 1960 coup, internalizing modernity 
according to its own norms appeared as a distinctive feature of Turkish Islamism 
in this period. In this context, the Nurcu movement that was named after the 
Kurdish Islamic scholar Said Nursi was becoming more and more influential in 
the country despite all the repressive actions of the state against the members of 
this movement. What made this movement so influential was Nursi’s attempt to 
reconcile science with religion, calling for cooperation between these two in order 
to protect their faith, and progress at the same time.  
Political Islam 
In politics, first organized in the Justice Party (AP), (successor of the DP), 
Islamism sought for a new platform through the end of 1960s, because of the 
“proindustrialist and state-centric policies” of the AP.100 The National Order 
Party (MNP) which was founded by Islamists in 1970, with the support of the 
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Nakşibendi101 order and the leadership of the famous Islamist politician 
Necmettin Erbakan, became the initiator of the “genesis of political Islam in the 
1970s.”102 With the leadership of Erbakan, Islamism was represented in Turkey 
with this political movement that named itself Milli Gorus (National View). 
Although MNP was banned by the constitution court two months after the 1971 
coup, the Islamists founded a new party in 1972, and Erbakan carried out the 
leadership of this party which was named National Salvation Party (MSP), until 
the last military coup of 1980 closed down his party again.  
On 12 September 1980, the military decided to intervene in the long 
lasting chaos in Turkish society, which “was shattered by ideological polarization 
and strife-ridden communal violence.”103 It was a very important date for 
Islamism in Turkey, giving birth to the Welfare Party (RP) that became an 
important actor in political Islam, as well as enabling the tarikats and new Islamic 
movements to flourish economically and politically in the last two decades.  
Although the junta was expected to adopt a harsh policy towards religion 
after closing down the MSP claiming that it was following an anti-secularist 
policy, it regarded Islam as a guard against communism, a tool of legitimization, 
and a means of making people more obedient. Under the leadership of the 
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military, the number of Qur’anic schools and Imam Hatip High Schools (the 
schools that combined religious and secular education) increased; religion was 
made a compulsory course in the curriculum.104 Furthermore, “mosque-building 
activities increased steadily both by the state and by conservative groups and 
individuals;” and “religious foundations and tariqas began to rise both in number 
and in influence.”105  
These examples clearly show that, the generals introduced a Turkish-
Islamic synthesis rather than the strict secularist Kemalist ideology. In order to 
prevent communism and radical Islam and to protect the secular state,  
the leaders of the military coup, ironically, depended on Islamic 
institutions and symbols for legitimization; fusing Islamic ideas with 
national goals, they hoped to create a more homogenous and less political 
Islamic community. Islam, in this radical departure from the military’s 
past practices, offered a way to reduce or even eliminate the cultural 
differences that led to the polarization of Turkish society. Moreover, the 
leadership of the 1980 coup considered Islam a pacifying and submissive 
ideology preferable to the threat of communism.106  
 
When all the pre-coup leaders disappeared either by imprisonment or by 
expulsion, the political arena was left to Turgut Özal, a former MSP member, 
former chief of privatization in AP government, and a member of the Nakşibendi 
order. He founded the Motherland Party (ANAP) and won the 1983 elections, in 
which none of the former parties were allowed to participate. His leadership 
changed the face of Turkey in many ways, like the “steady increase in the 
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standard of living” going in parallel with “the increase in the obvious symbols of 
adherence to Islam.”107  
Özal encouraged Islamic movements during his time in power, by 
encouraging the foundation of Islamic banks, and allowing religious press and 
publications, as well as radio and TV channels to be opened.108 This expansion of 
mass communication for the Islamists “played a critical role in the public 
emergence of an Islamic identity in the late 1980s” which was “consolidated and 
promoted to the policymaking level by the formation of a new elite and the 
processes of democratization…by the Motherland Party of Özal and the Welfare 
Party.”109  
The process of economic liberalization and democratization in Özal 
period created an Islamic bourgeoisie, which financed the Islamist organizations, 
the tarikats and the RP in turn. Consequently, Islamism was carried “from the 
periphery to the center of the political forum.”110  
Turgut Özal has been the most important factor behind the rise and 
flourish of Islamism in Turkey in the last two decades, both in public and in 
politics. Soon after his death in 1993, the RP, which was founded after the 1980 
coup as a successor to the MSP, came to power to carry on Özal’s mission.  
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Unlike the conservative MNP and MSP which addressed to only the small 
business owners in the rural areas and the followers of tarikats, the RP also 
managed to get votes from the poor people of the urban areas —formerly who 
voted for the socialist democratic parties— the newly emerging Islamist business 
community and young Islamist professionals.111 This was a result of the evolution 
of the political Islam from a marginal and radical conservative movement to a 
mainstream and moderate liberal movement after the 1980 coup, which created an 
atmosphere of Islamic awareness and identity.  
As a result of its liberalization and the popularity of its call to return to 
traditional Islamic values, the RP, which was the major representative of political 
Islamism, saw that its electoral fortune had changed in the 1994 local elections in 
which it gained 28 mayoral seats including Istanbul and Ankara; and 1995 
general elections which made it the biggest party in the parliament with 21 
percent vote rate and 158 seats out of 550.112 On 28 June 1996, the RP leader 
Necmettin Erbakan became the first Islamist prime minister of modern Turkey, 
by making a coalition with Tansu Çiller, the leader of the pro-Western, secularist 
True Path Party (DYP). It seemed that Islamism finally succeeded —partly at 
least— in holding the power at the end of its thirty years of political struggle. As 
Yavuz suggests, 
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The electoral success of political Islam [was] an outcome of the state 
policies of Turkish-Islamic synthesis introduced by the 1980 military 
coup, of political and economic liberalization compounded by the 
emergence of a new conservative bourgeoisie…and by a new class of 
intellectuals based in the print and electronic media, and of the party’s 
internal organizational flexibility and ideological presentation of the ‘just 
order’ (Adil Düzen). 113 
 
However, after they came to power, the Islamists showed tendencies 
towards giving up their moderate ideas and started to put forward projects such as 
building a great mosque in the Taksim Square, “a symbolic center of Kemalism, 
the focal point of which is a statue commemorating the founding of the 
Republic.”114 Some hypothetically proposed projects also included “banning the 
charging of interest” and “replacing the Turkish lira with an Islamic dinar.”115 
Furthermore, Erbakan declared the Imam Hatip Schools to be their backyard, 
which mounted the criticisms of the secularist part against these schools. His 
foreign visits to Arab countries and his ceremonial pilgrimages to Mecca with all 
his family members were too much for the Kemalist elite. A “Jerusalem Night 
event” in the Sincan municipality of Ankara, during which anti-secularist and 
pro-Islamist words were chanted, caused the military tanks to pass the streets of 
Sincan as a warning. So many religious symbols and explicit displays of Islamism 
led the military and secularist state to take steps against the rise of Islamism in 
Turkey. Consequently the resolutions of 28 February came in 1997.  
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The generals did not overtake the government, but forced Erbakan to sign 
the document which contained extremely heavy precautions against all Islamist 
organizations; that’s why it is called a soft or post-modern coup. Three months 
later, a case for the closure of the RP was opened in the constitutional court, and 
on 18 June 1997 Erbakan resigned from his post as prime minister with the 
expectation that the duty of forming the government would be given to his 
coalition partner Tansu Çiller. However, the President Süleyman Demirel, most 
probably by the influence of the military, gave the duty to the Motherland Party 
leader Mesut Yılmaz.  
After their party was banned, the ex-Welfare Party deputies were 
permitted to retain their seats as independents, and soon they formed a new party 
as a successor to the RP, by naming it Virtue Party (FP). As political Islam was 
taking its power from a social movement, it was not difficult for them to form a 
new party; no matter how many times the secular state closes them. The new 
party entered the general elections on April 18, 1999 and came third despite all 
the repressive actions of the military against the Islamists since February 28, 
1997. However, the chief prosecutor Vural Savaş wanted this party to be closed, 
too, because of the headscarf that was banned in all public areas without any 
written law. Having elected as a deputy from FP, Merve Kavakçı refused to put 
off her headscarf as she entered the new assembly for the parliamentary oath 
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ceremony, and therefore was banished from the parliament, and later from the 
country as well.116  
It was during the FP period as the main opposition party that Erbakan, 
who was banned on politics for five years, started to lose control of the ropes 
within the party leadership. He continued to try to run the new party from behind 
the scenes through the figurehead party leader, Recai Kutan; but Kutan lacked the 
charisma that could attract masses, unlike the younger, and popular leader Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, who was the mayor of Istanbul at that time.  
Moreover, when Erdoğan was imprisoned for reciting a poem from a 
leading nationalist poet Ziya Gökalp, his popularity among the public grew 
increasingly, which was contrary to what the secularists aimed at imprisoning 
him. The last congress of FP, before being closed down in 2001, witnessed the 
separation of the Milli Görüş movement into traditionalists and reformists. The 
reformists with the leadership of Erdoğan directed towards the urban, educated, 
middle class Muslim voters and adopted democratic reforms and EU membership 
as their main goal instead of political Islam. They abandoned Islamist policies 
and gave priority to improving democracy for the Muslims to enjoy their long-
time existence in the public sphere. While their AK Parti117 (Justice and 
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117 “Ak” means “white” in Turkish, implying purity and lack of corruption; 
therefore the opponents of the AK Parti prefer the abbreviation of AKP (standing 
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Development Party) gained 35% of the votes, the traditionalists’ SP (Felicity 
Party) could only get 2% in the 2002 elections. This electoral success was 
repeated twice in 2007 with 47% and in 2011with 49% in the face of the rising 
counter-pressure from the constituents of the Kemalist establishment such as the 
military, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy, which had to go through profound 
transformations and reforms as AK Parti solidified its rule with the consecutive 
electoral victories.  
Cultural Islam (the pietist movements) 
Contrary to political Islamists, pietistic movements are based on positive 
action rather than simple reaction to the modern norms. Instead of being 
oppositional, reactionary, and conflictual, these movements promote positive, 
altruistic, and peaceful action. The difference can be clearly seen in the case of 
the Egyptian da’wa movement as described by Saba Mahmood118 and Charles 
Hirschkind119 which stands in contrast to the militant wing of the Muslim 
                                                                                                                                
for the capital letters of Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) as a pejorative statement. 
This is also preferred by many academics and intellectuals who claim that using 
the AK Parti abbreviation implies support for the party, while the other one 
implies an unbiased and independent position. I have doubts about the possibility 
of attributing unbiasedness to that term in the current political climate of Turkey, 
as it implies an opponent position rather than being impartial. Since I see no 
difference between a supporter and an opponent position in terms of intellectual 
and scholarly analysis, I prefer to call the AK Parti in the way they name 
themselves in their official documents. 
118 Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: the Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).  
119 Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic 
Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
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Brotherhood, or the Malaysian piety movement as described by Sylvia Frisk120 in 
contrast to the Jihadists in South East Asia. In other words, these are driven by 
individuals who want to participate in the public sphere to create opportunities for 
being a pious Muslim, rather than establishing an Islamic state, or imposing the 
implementation of traditional Shari’a law.  
The practices of these pietistic movements, as Mahmood says, “are 
provoked by a specific problem, namely, the concern for learning to organize 
one’s daily life according to Islamic standards of virtuous conduct in a world 
increasingly ordered by a logic of secular rationality that is inimical to the 
sustenance of these virtues.”121  
Contrary to Casanova’s contention that in going public, religion 
would/should not disturb structural differentiation, these movements do disturb 
the differentiation by claiming a say in matters of economy, politics, science, 
education, and so forth. This is not because pietists set out to do so, but because 
their very existence in the public sphere as religious people affects how these 
issues are handled in the modern secular societies in which they actively 
participate. In this case, religion is not acting as an agent in and of itself, but 
rather, its influence is propagated by individual agents whose like-minded actions 
will invariably affect practical outcomes in the public sphere.  
                                               
120 Sylvia Frisk, Submitting to God: Women and Islam in urban Malaysia 
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2009). 
121 Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 56. 
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The Hizmet (or Gülen) movement stands out as the most effective cultural 
Islamic movement in shaping the public sphere in its own setting when compared 
to the da’wa movements in other Islamic countries, which primarily seek the 
cultivation and dispensation of individual piety in society without much concern 
for state legitimization. The Hizmet Movement is different from other movements 
in the sense that it is actively involved in modern secular institutions, and thus 
seeks legitimacy with respect to the official ideologies of secularism and 
modernism. In other words, the participants of Hizmet have a much more intricate 
relationship with the norms of the secular modern public sphere, which requires 
them to do more than gathering in mosques and disseminating Islamic 
pedagogical materials. The Hizmet participants follow a more “modern” 
methodology in order to act piously in a modern secular setting by developing a 
work ethic that can be compared to Weber’s ideal type of inner-worldly 
asceticism, something which he saw as the catalyst−if not the foundation−of the 
capitalist mode of production in the West.  
The Hizmet movement is led by the Islamic scholar, Fethullah Gülen 
(1938- ), who now acts as the spiritual head of a loose network of millions of 
people, including active volunteers and sympathizers. The case of Gülen’s 
followers provides a perfect example for the transformation and social change 
achieved through cultural Islamism, rather than political Islamism; and also for 
the ease of seizing political power after achieving the widespread dissemination 
of Islamic values in the public sphere. In other words, the Hizmet, which started 
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as a humble quest for achieving piety in modern life, ended up with the 
accumulation of an immense amount of power, almost enough to create its 
alternative public sphere with media institutions, schools, financial institutions, 
marketplaces, and living areas.  
The followers of Hizmet are not the only representatives of religious 
tradition in the Turkish public sphere. But the influence they created among the 
public grew remarkably as they adapted themselves well into the structural 
differentiation of the public sphere in three decades. The political Islamist group 
in Turkey, the National Outlook (Milli Görüş) movement, struggled 
simultaneously to gain political power against the secular elite, for thirty years, 
and lost four of its political parties to the official secular system each time 
increasing their vote rate fairly. The gradual growth in the vote rate of Islamist 
parties corresponded with the growth of the Islamic middle class. In the year 
2002, the Islamic alternative public sphere was developed to such an extent that 
the Islamic-oriented Justice and Development Party gained the majority of votes 
by addressing at the demands of the new public. What has made followers of 
Gülen so influential in the public sphere is the work ethic defined by Gülen, who 
packed it in a religious frame and presented it to his audience within the concept 
of hizmet (altruistic service) as the highest form of worship.    
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Born in Erzurum on April 27 1941122, Fethullah Gülen received an 
education untouched by the harsh secular laws of the new nation-state. He was 
born in a religious family, and he received his religious education from his parents 
and from the renowned Sufi masters in the area. He did not become the disciple of 
a specific Sufi order, but he read extensively from early and modern Sufi thinkers 
of Islam, as well as from Western classics. There were three major thinkers whose 
writings were especially influential for Gülen’s ideas: Ahmad Sirhindi (the 
importance of following the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad in the cultivation 
of spiritual endeavors), Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi (the importance of 
incorporating Sufi learning into the framework of traditional Islamic teachings) 
and Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (the compatibility of science and religion and the 
importance of education to cultivate and spread knowledge based on the marriage 
of faith and reason).  
When he became a preacher in the 1960s, he already had the ideal of 
educating students who would combine scientific and religious thought, follow the 
Sunnah of the Prophet and the ideals and principles of Sufism in their modern 
daily lives. In other words, he believed in the necessity of a “golden generation” as 
                                               
122 This is his official birth date. However, a rumor circulates among his followers 
that his actual birthdate is November 10 1938. the same day when Atatürk, the 
founder of the modern Turkey, died, Neither Gülen nor his adherents openly 
affirm this date, except for a brief info on the Turkish website about Fethullah 
Gülen that only affirms the year 1938 as Gülen’s actual birth year (See “Hayat 
Kronolojisi: 1941-1959 (His Life Chronology: 1941-1959),” Fethullah Gülen, 
June 10, 2006, accessed 21 January 2011, 
http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/3502/128/). Despite the lack of any open 
affirmation rather than the year of 1938, this rumor functions as a mythical feature 
in the minds of the followers to add to Gülen’s innate charisma. 
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opposed to the “lost generation” which was driven towards increasing anarchy and 
communism. As he became more popular, and as more and more people came to 
listen to his Friday sermons, he used his oratorical skills to cultivate a deep love 
for the Prophet and his Companions in people’s hearts, and make them believe in 
the importance of creating a “golden generation” which would be the projection of 
Islam’s golden age in the twentieth century: 
The world is to be saved by that 'golden' generation who represent the 
Divine Mercy, from all the disasters, intellectual, spiritual, social and 
political, with which it has long been afflicted…In order to awaken the 
people and guide them to truth, the awaited generation, those young 
people who implant hope in our hearts, enlighten our minds and quicken 
our souls, will suffer with the sufferings of humankind and 'water' all the 
'barren lands' with the tears they shed over centuries-old miseries. They 
will visit every corner of the world, leaving no-one not called upon, and 
pour out their reviving inspirations into the souls of the dumbstruck 
people.123  
 
This ideal implied doing more than observing the five principles of Islam, 
or being the disciple of a Sufi order for personal spiritual development. Gülen 
was redefining piety in a way that allowed individuals to take responsibility for 
the enlightenment of other souls as well as their own souls. Creating a golden 
generation required actual work to be done in the public sphere, which had been 
used by the nation-state to create its own generation. Therefore, Gülen had to 
direct people around him to an urban, modern piety, which carried great 
similarities with the inner-worldly asceticism of Protestantism as defined by Max 
Weber as a religion which  
                                               
123 Fethullah Gülen, “The Awaited Generation” in Towards the Lost Paradise. 
September 13, 2001, accessed March 12, 2009, 
http://www.fethullahgulen.org/gulens-works/towards-the-lost-paradise.html 
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demanded the believer, not celibacy, as in the case of the monk, but the 
avoidance of all erotic pleasure; not poverty, but the elimination of all idle 
and exploitative enjoyment of unearned wealth and income, and the 
avoidance of all feudalistic, sensuous ostentation of wealth; not the ascetic 
death-in-life of the cloister, but an alert, rationally controlled pattern of 
life, and the avoidance of all surrender to the beauty of the world, to art, or 
to one’s own moods and emotions. The clear and uniform goal of this 
asceticism was the disciplining and methodical organization of the whole 
pattern of life. Its typical representative was the “man of a vocation,” and 
its unique result was the rational organization and institutionalization of 
social relationships.124  
 
The concept of hizmet (service) comes out as the essence of Gülen’s ethic, 
urging the believer to take up a role, a “vocation” in the public sphere, and do it 
as best as he/she can in order to show others that one can be a good Muslim and a 
good teacher, engineer, businessman, etc. at the same time. This entails serving 
fellow human beings —Muslim or non-Muslim—purely for the sake of God. 
 In this sense, Gülen entails the idea that participation in the public sphere 
is essential for the ideal Muslim; it is even preferable to the Sufi dervishes who 
attain spiritual perfection through isolating themselves from society. When his 
followers asked Gülen whether it is correct for a Muslim to isolate himself/herself 
from society, he quoted this verse from the Qur’an: “Men (of great distinction) 
whom neither commerce nor exchange (nor any other worldly preoccupations) 
can divert from the remembrance of God, and establishing the Prayer in 
conformity with all its conditions, and paying the Prescribed Purifying Alms; they 
are in fear of a Day on which all hearts and eyes will be overturned.”125 Then he 
                                               
124 Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, [1963] 1991), 
183. 
125 Qur’an 24: 37. 
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continued with a Hadith, which set the essence of piety: “The most favorable of 
human beings is the one who is most beneficial to people.”126 The inner-worldly 
ascetic of Weber becomes the “human of willpower” —irade insanı— in Gülen’s 
formulation, meaning a human who can use this faculty in the best way to give up 
any worldly desire in his service to other people. He lists five obstacles for this 
person, which are stunningly similar to Weber’s description of the demands of 
inner-worldly asceticism: “self-indulgence, hankering after fame, erotic desires, 
glory and pride, and fear.”127  
However, he always bases his arguments on examples from the Qur’an 
and the Sunnah. In other words, Gülen sets this notion of piety parallel to 
Weberian Protestant ethic right within the most sacred sources of Islamic 
discourse, thereby securing it from any claims of imitation of the West, or 
Protestantization of Islam. Although the socio-economic process that gave rise to 
the Islamic middle class came with the adoption of the Western liberal economy 
model, the response of Anatolian Muslims to this process was derived from the 
main sources of Islam through the charismatic leadership of Fethullah Gülen. 
From the beginning of his preaching career, Gülen focused on reforming 
the souls of individuals and therefore reforming the normative order through 
these reformed souls instead of capturing political power. He did not meddle in 
politics, but instead, he created a work ethic for individuals to seek for piety in 
                                               
126 Al-Suyuti, al-Jami` al-Saghir, 2: 9, in Fethullah Gülen, Yol Mülahazaları 
(Contemplations on the Road) (Istanbul: Nil, 2008) 22. 
127 Gülen, Yol Mülahazaları, 47.  
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that secular setting, and named that policy as hizmet (service). Because his focus 
has been on the public sphere, and the public roles fulfilled by his supporters, 
Gülen’s movement still constituted a threat to the established structural 
differentiation of the secular public sphere in their attempt to create their own 
space.  
Similar to the motivation provided by the Protestant ethic in the rise of 
capitalism as explained by Weber, the Islamic ethics of hizmet formulated by 
Fethullah Gülen motivated the channeling of newly emerging Islamic capital to 
reshape the secular public sphere into a more accommodating one. In other 
words, although the followers of the Hizmet movement do not aim for a large-
scale transformation of the secular state, with their individual acts, and their very 
human desire to create their own space within the secularized public sphere, to 
“make itself heard” in Asad’s terms, they have disturbed the structural 
differentiation of the modern public sphere by forming their alternative 
institutions parallel to the secular-modern ones.  
Starting with schools, their media institutions, banks, social aid 
foundations, hospitals, universities, research centers, and business organizations 
transformed the structure of the Turkish secular public sphere into a more diverse 
one. The result of participating in the public sphere while seeking for piety and 
Allah’s consent has been a profound transformation in the structure of the public 
sphere. With their simple life choices, like performing ritual prayers during work 
hours, wearing modest dresses, etc., Gülen’s followers holding public roles, 
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gradually transformed and challenged the monopoly of the official secularist 
discourse on religion and modernity, and created a discursive space within the 
secular-modern public sphere for the pious modern subjects.  
The questioning of secularism 
The rising middle class, the influence of the Hizmet movement and other 
religious communities in the public sphere, and the successive election victories of 
the AK Parti created a huge anxiety among the guardians of the Kemalist state, 
which was established on the principle of secularism, the definition of which has 
only been able to be questioned with the rise of the new Islamic middle class that 
wanted to share the public sphere. Actually, as Çınar suggests, “the growing 
popularity of Islam served to reveal secularism as an autonomous movement 
rooted in the society.”128  
The presidential elections in 2007 became the battleground for determining 
Turkey’s identity, and also determining the content of the principle of secularism 
—whether it meant freedom for or freedom of religion. The desire of the AK Parti 
to see Abdullah Gül as the next president of Turkey, after the staunchly secularist 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer, received a backfire from the secularists because of the 
headscarf worn by his wife Hayrünnisa Gül.  The public rallies against Islamism 
were followed by an online statement by the army on April 27, 2007, reminding 
the government that they are the guardians of secularism. Erdoğan’s party had no 
chance but to reaffirm its popularity among the masses through declaring an early 
                                               
128 Çınar, Modernity, 20.  
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election, which was held on July 22, 2007. The 47% vote rate clearly reestablished 
the legitimacy of the AK Parti government, and they passed a legislation removing 
the headscarf ban in universities with the support of the nationalist party in the 
parliament. However, this triggered the opening of a closure case against AK Parti 
by the secularist Chief Prosecutor, who reiterated the same claim made against the 
previous Islamist parties: being a focal point for anti-secularist activities.  
Secularism is clearly the fundamental aspect of Turkish modernization and 
the ultimate determinant in the formation of the modern public sphere in Turkey. 
Despite its enormous importance in the nation-building process of the Kemalist 
regime, there has never been a consensus on the proper definition of secularism, or 
how it should be implemented in a Muslim society. In the first half of the 
twentieth century, the Kemalist ruling elite was sharing the certainty of the 
Western secularization theory, that it was a universal process and that religion 
would be erased from the public sphere totally and be a private matter instead. 
However, a quick genealogy of secularism and the concept of the secular suffices 
to display their Western and Christian origin and the complications of transferring 
it to a Muslim body.  
The basic definition given for secularism is the separation between Church 
and state−or, in a country where there is no Church, it is the separation between 
religion and politics. More and more recent scholarship on the category of 
religion, however, indicates that the very differentiation between “religion” and 
“politics” and various other categories, is the production of a specific context of 
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Western Christianity.129 Thinking that secularism is based on the public/ private 
binary of human social world, many scholars have recently come to recognize that 
non-Western and/or pre-modern cultures did not carve up the world according to 
this binary. 
This important attempt to historicize, or in Talal Asad’s terms, to 
“anthropologize” Western secularism both stems from and contributes to the 
debates on the definition of religion, as it helps us to understand that the very 
attempt to define religion “is founded on a secular Enlightenment approach.”130  
However, this does not mean that the secularists were the only ones 
promoting the definition of religion to keep it in the margins of the society. The 
differentiation between religion and politics was also of interest to liberal 
Christians or Protestants, who wanted to protect their new religion from the 
intervention of the state. Asad calls it “a happy accident” that secularism which 
pushed religion out of “politics, law, and science —spaces in which varieties of 
power and reason articulate our distinctively modern life” actually started as part 
of “a strategy… of the defense of religion.” 131  
                                               
129 Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India, and the 
“Mystic East” (London; New York: Routledge, 1999); Tomoko Masuzawa, The 
Invention of World Religions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Talal 
Asad, Genealogies of Religion:  Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity 
and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) and Formations of 
the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press,2003); Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 2007) 
130 King, Orientalism, 10. 
131 Asad, Genealogies, 28.  
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Charles Taylor also hints at this kind of “happy accident” in his award-
winning book A Secular Age when he puts the modus vivendi of secularization as 
a process of “religionization” −or the attempt to change the locus of Christianity 
from clergy to the laity.132 For Taylor, the uniquely Western aspect of the 
secularization process is the disenchantment of the worldview, separating 
between transcendent and immanent, and seeing the world within an immanent 
frame, which  
involved denying —or at least isolating and problematizing—any form of 
interpenetration between the things of Nature, on one hand, and ‘the 
supernatural’ on the other, be this understood in terms of the one 
transcendent God, or of Gods or spirits, or magic forces, or whatever.133  
 
  Taylor thinks that what brought this form of disenchanted worldview was 
the “growing concern with Reform” in Latin Christendom, “a drive to make over 
the whole society to higher standards”134 by making Christian doctrines available 
to everyone outside the borders of the Church so that the laity could attain human 
flourishing and beyond. 
Just as its initial emergence, the concept of secularism had its later 
development in a uniquely Christian context, too. The four developments listed by 
Jose Casanova as “the carriers of the process of secularization” are distinctly of 
Western and Christian origin: “the Protestant Reformation; the formation of 
                                               
132 Taylor, A Secular Age, 63. 
133 Ibid., 15-16. 
134 Ibid., 63.  
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modern states; the growth of modern capitalism; and the early modern scientific 
revolution.”135  
Similarly, the contemporary classification of secularism is based largely 
on American secularism and French laicism, which is frequently accompanied by 
accommodationist / separationist binary, ascribed to each of them respectively. 
Elizabeth Hurd, for example, takes secularism in two strands: “a laicist trajectory, 
in which religion is seen as an adversary and an impediment to modern politics, 
and a Judeo-Christian secularist trajectory, in which religion is seen as a source of 
unity and identity that generates conflict in modern international politics.”136 She 
does not clearly explain why she prefers the term “Judeo-Christian” other than 
saying that this term was coined “later,”137 which corresponds with Noah 
Feldman’s statement that in  
By the 1950s, with Jews increasingly present in elite universities as 
students, and gradually as faculty, the time had arrived for remodeling the 
ideology and rhetoric of non-sectarian Christianity. Not long before, it had 
been confidently said that America was a Christian nation. Now in the 
1950s, our heritage was reinvented as inclusive: America had been built, it 
was now increasingly said, on Judeo-Christian roots.138  
 
Even though “the laicist trajectory” and “the Judeo-Christian secularist 
trajectory” are “not mutually exclusive … [and] there is no strong or necessary 
                                               
135 Casanova, Public Religions, 21.  
136 Elizabeth S. Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 23.  
137 Hurd, Politics of Secularism, 6. 
138 Noah Feldman, Divided by God: America’s Church-State Problem —and 
What We Should Do About It (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 166.  
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dividing line between them,”139 Hurd still makes a clear distinction between them. 
She claims that while the laicist trajectory seeks to force religion completely out of 
politics and confine religion to the private sphere, the Judeo-Christian secularism 
seeks to accommodate Judeo-Christian values within its political system arguing 
that “Western political order is grounded in a set of core values with their origins 
in (Judeo)-Christian tradition.”140  
The usage of the term “Judeo-Christian” is peculiar to Hurd, but the 
dualistic categorization is not. Joan Wallach Scott compares the American and 
French model of secularism as such: 
In America, home to religious minorities who fled persecution at the 
hands of European rulers, the separation between church and state was 
meant to protect religions from unwarranted government intervention …. 
In France, separation was intended to secure the allegiance of individuals 
to the republic and so break the political power of the Catholic Church 
…. In France, the state protects individuals from religion; in America, 
religions are protected from the state and the state from religion.141  
 
Whether we take secularism as for or against religion, one thing always 
remains that secularism is directly linked with Christianity, and especially 
Protestantism, which has been used synonymously with “Americanism” in a way 
to indicate “how a simplified narrative of secularization may in fact work to 
strengthen the hold of a particular strain of conservative Christianity in American 
                                               
139 Hurd, Politics of Secularism, 23. 
140 Ibid., 38.  
141 Joan W. Scott, The Politics of the Veil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2007), 91-92.  
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public life.”142 Even in the USA, which is known commonly as “the land of 
freedom” elsewhere, the religions that are accommodated —even at varying 
degrees—are quite limited. Fessenden gives a rough map of religious 
accommodation as “broadly accommodating of mainstream and evangelical 
Protestantism, minimally less so of Catholicism, unevenly so of Judaism, much 
less so of Islam, perhaps still less so of Native American religious practices that 
fall outside the bounds of the acceptably decorative or ‘spiritual’.”143 
Seeing this implicit Christian bias in the theory of secularization, admitted 
by all these scholars and many others, how should the process of secularization in 
Turkey —a country with an overwhelmingly Muslim majority—be seen? Is it 
simply an importing of French laicism? Does it fall into the category of 
accommodationist or separationist form of secularism? What kind of “local 
appropriations, contestations, transformations, and even head-on collisions”144 
took place during the vernacularization of the secular/religion divide in Turkey? 
The Turkish secularism 
The Turkish case of secularism shows that these two models are not 
mutually exclusive but exemplary models to choose at necessary situations. 
Furthermore, the secularization case in a Muslim country cannot only be described 
                                               
142 Tracy Fessenden, Culture and Redemption: Religion, the Secular, and 
American Literature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 3.  
143 Fessenden, Culture and Redemption, 3.  
144 Linell Cady & Elizabeth S. Hurd, eds., Comparative Secularisms in a Global 
Age (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 9-10. 
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or understood with these ideal types which have clear Christian bias in their 
conceptualization as the above analysis indicates. 
The most important characteristic of Turkish secularism is the fact that it 
has been implemented in a Muslim society with a six-century history of Islam-
state relationship that built elaborate theories on Islamic governing. Keeping this 
fact in mind, one should not expect a full adaptation of secularism —either in the 
French model or American model— in the context of Turkey. And yet, it can be 
definitely claimed that what was aimed by the founders of modern Turkey 
corresponded to the separationist model of secularism in France, which was 
named laïcité. The abolishing of the caliphate, the closure of all medreses 
(Islamic higher education institutions) and tarikats (Sufi religious orders), and the 
adoption of European codes of law were all designed to serve this aim of 
separation between state and religion.  
On the other hand, the establishment of the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs, and the state project to offer an “official Islam” to the public by cutting 
off the power of autonomous religious organizations, and educating all the 
religious officials by the state’s hands do not fit into the separationist paradigm, 
as it includes a direct intervention of the state on religion− specifically Islam.  
Having said that, it cannot either be claimed that this model fits into the 
accommodationist paradigm as in the USA. Yes, the Turkish secularism, or 
laiklik, is not separationist either in theory or in practice; but the alternative 
paradigm that can replace a separationist account is not an accommodationist, but 
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rather a “control account” as proclaimed by Andrew Davison.145 In the control 
account, the state does not aim to reduce religion into an affair of the individual, 
because it needs religion as a tool in the process of nation-building. Besides, 
Islam in the post-Ottoman context was “too intrinsically institutional and operated 
within a framework in which the distinction between public and private and 
between religious and cultural was much less evident” than in Western 
Christianity.146 Therefore, the primary policy of Turkish secularism was not 
privatizing religion, but instead laicizing the clergy and putting it under direct 
state control. 
According to Davison, “secularism in Turkey did not result in a structural 
differentiation as separation between political and religious spheres.”147 This is 
the key point where Turkish secularism diverges from the Western account of 
secularization, as explained by Casanova (1994).  For Casanova, religious 
decline, differentiation, and privatization constitute the trivet of the secularization 
thesis; and even though the first and third items can be refuted, the second item 
—structural differentiation— will be enough to keep the secularization thesis 
alive.148  
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From this perspective, one can conclude that the secularization thesis in 
Turkey was born dead, as it has always lacked these three characteristics since its 
introduction to the country by the Kemalist regime. Just as the Kemalist state did 
not aim to repress religion all at once, neither did the religio–political forces 
“inevitably assume their place in the private sphere.”149 In other words, as long as 
the clerics “accepted the Kemalist terms of laicism,” they “were allowed to 
assume a new place within the state’s religious institutions.”150 Thus, the 
differentiation and privatization accounts of secularization theory do not work in 
Turkish secularism. As for the religious decline, it was largely limited to the elite 
urban class without any profound effect on the rural areas. According to Davison, 
the expectation of structural differentiation as the founding principle of 
secularization theory is part of “modernization prejudgments” (like privatization 
and religious decline) which do not adequately “capture the institutional frame of 
power that shaped Kemalist possibilities.”151  
And yet, this does not mean that Turkey has never gone through a process 
of secularization− a process of “the transformation of persons, offices, properties, 
institutions, or matters of an ecclesiastical or spiritual character to a lay, or worldly 
position” as defined by the famous Turkish sociologist Niyazi Berkes.152 However, 
this process of transformation is not limited to the Republican era (1923–) as the 
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secularization process had already started in the Westernization policies of the late 
Ottoman governments. 
 Indeed, even the pre-modern Ottoman era cannot be claimed to lack the 
idea of secularism. Although the official secularist discourse defines the Ottoman 
State as a theocracy governed by Sharia, the Ottoman model of governing did 
have room for secularism. The Islamic world never had a Vatican; the religious 
leadership was at the hands of the Sultan as he carried the title of the Caliph153, 
and he appointed the Sheikh al-Islam who checked the compatibility of Sultan’s 
decrees with Islamic law. The Ottoman state system was a synthesis of pre-
Islamic Turkish, Persian, and Byzantian models, and the Sharia law was practiced 
in local courts mostly in family affairs rather than being the constitutional law of 
the state. Furthermore, the millet system, which categorized the subjects of the 
Empire in religious terms, allowed for the relatively peaceful existence of 
different religious communities in the Ottoman lands, as each community was 
free in practicing their religion and pursued their own religious law in their 
private affairs.  
                                               
153 In fact, according to Egyptian al-Azhar scholar Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, who 
published his work about the Islamic justification of secularism in 1925 (one year 
after the Turkish parliament abolished the caliphate), the institution of caliphate 
was not even a religious concept, since in his view, Islam in its essence endorses 
secularism, i.e. the separation of religion and the state. For a detailed and close 
reading of his ideas, see Souad T. Ali, Religion, Not a State: Ali 'Abd al-Raziq's 
Islamic Justification of Political Secularism (Salt Lake City: University of Utah 
Press, 2005).  
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In a more general sense, the formation of Islamic law itself was mostly the 
product of human reasoning, and it strictly repelled magical elements from the 
Islamic religion. Therefore, the case of disenchantment that paved the way 
towards secularization in Western Europe did not take place in the Islamic world. 
Neither did they have the binary of the clergy (religion) vs. the laity (secular) 
because of the lack of clergy in Islam. So, secularism in the case of Muslim 
Ottomans did not develop at the same conditions with Europe where it was 
originally theorized. 
 However, the decline of the state against the Western Europe was 
interpreted as a civilizational decline by the intellectuals who were sent to Europe 
for education starting with the eighteenth century. These intellectuals brought the 
ideas of democracy, equality, progress, and science to the Ottoman capital. It was 
during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1785-1839) that European-modeled 
secular institutions, including the professional army were introduced in the 
Ottoman State. However, it must be noted that even though the reforms towards 
secularization were made with European influence, the Ottoman administration 
was very careful to present those reforms to the Muslim people within an Islamic 
framework. In other words, the institutions ensuring flexibility in the Shari’a such 
as örf (custom), maslahat (public interest), and zarûret (necessity) were utilized 
to justify the reforms made in, for example, family law, the secular schools 
opened for girls, women’s holding professional jobs, and finally making Muslims 
and non-Muslims equal citizens with the Tanzimat reforms in 1839.  
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This reveals, first of all, a cavity in the progressivist thesis that Islamic 
law became stagnant after the twelfth century —a thesis that reflects in Asad’s 
words, “the more general notion that ‘the traditional’ is opposed to ‘the modern’ 
as the unthinking and unchanging is to the reasoned and new.”154 It also explains 
the relative smoothness of the secularization process during the late Ottoman era, 
as it was justified to the people within Islamic terms. That is why secularization 
has mostly been associated with the Republican era, because the transformation in 
the Ottoman era had been much smoother, allowing the accommodation of both 
traditional and modern worldviews within the borders of the empire.  
In contrast to the accommodationist model of the Ottoman State, the 
Republican regime followed a separationist model in its policy of secularization, 
and thus modernization. The Republican era started in the context of a nation 
state that turned its face to the West; therefore, no Islamic justification was 
needed in westernizing the country. However, the new state was still built upon 
the Ottoman state tradition and the symbiotic relationship between religion and 
politics was not abandoned altogether. Even though the new state followed a 
harsher policy of transformation of the society with the abolishment of the 
caliphate, the closure of Sufi tarikats and medreses, the replacement of Arabic 
script with the Latin script, the abolishment of the Shari’a law in favor of Swiss 
civil code, and the translation of Islamic call to prayer into Turkish, Islam was 
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still needed as a nation-building tool, but only in the official version put forth by 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs.  
 Performative secularism  
 
The never-ending debates on secularism in Turkey are usually thought of a 
struggle between secularists versus anti-secularists. However, the debates, 
especially in the last decade, are not about whether we should have secularism or 
not. Instead, the debates take place around the proper definition and practice of 
secularism and the role of religion (i.e., Islam) in the public sphere. There seems to 
be two general options or ideal types to choose: the French laïcité adopted by the 
Kemalist establishment and the Anglo-Saxon secularism proposed by the ruling 
AK Parti. In other words, the Kemalist interpretation of religion seeks freedom 
from religion, while AK Parti —representing the conservative and devout people 
of Turkey—seeks freedom of religion that would allow religious people to share 
the power that had been denied to them by the Kemalist bureaucratic elite. 
Therefore, the contemporary polarization around religion in Turkey is caused by a 
disagreement over the definition rather than the necessity of the principle of 
secularism.  
 One thing common for both sides of the argument is that neither do want a 
“passive secularism” as coined by Ahmet Kuru, where the state completely retreats 
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from religious affairs or imposing “any established doctrine that defines the ‘good’ 
for its citizens.”155  
As I have mentioned before, the Turkish state tradition has a very long 
history of symbiotic relationship with religion, which would render the hopes for 
shifting into a “passive secularism” in Turkey unrealistic. Neither the Kemalist 
state nor the conservative democrats of AK Parti would prefer to completely 
withdraw from religious affairs whether their intention is to control or serve the 
people through religion. Thus, Turkish secularism defies any categorization within 
the separationist/accommodationist paradigm, as it is both. In fact, the only 
element that makes Turkish secularism seem accommodationist is the existence of 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and the Imam-Hatip schools established by 
the Kemalist party in the single party era. The rejection of Alevi gathering houses 
(cem evi) as legitimate worship houses, the prevention of non-Muslim minorities 
from being state officers, the banning of Islamic headscarves from all public 
institutions are examples of a separationist and assertive paradigm.  
This assertiveness not only shows itself in barring religion from the public 
sphere, but also pretentiously displaying what are commonly accepted as secular 
symbols such as drinking alcohol, mixed-sex social gatherings, unveiled women, 
etc. In this sense, assertive secularism can also be described as a performance, 
while passive secularism is more about indifference and non-action. Performative 
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Justice and Development Party,” in The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy 
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secularism is peculiar to Muslim societies as the visible symbols of drinking 
alcohol or unveiling women do not constitute any distinctive point as to whether 
one is secularist or anti-secularist in a Western society. These symbols are 
preferred by people who want to assert their secularist political view in a way 
similar to the headscarf preferred by Islamists to show their political identity. 
“The woman question” 
All Turkish feminists agree upon the fact that the Kemalist state saw 
women’s emancipation at the core of its modernization, secularization, and 
nation-building process. Deniz Kandiyoti claims that starting from the Ottoman 
era, the attempts of “liberating” women by the modernizing elite did not result 
from their concern with gender-equality or women’s rights per se, but from the 
need to create “the new woman” who would accompany “the new man” that was 
already modernized. She gives an account of the debates among leading male 
intellectuals of the late Ottoman era regarding the issues of veiling, polygamy, 
and women’s public roles, emphasizing that in these debates women “remained 
surprisingly passive onlookers.”156  
The Kemalist reforms aiming to encourage women to appear in the public 
sphere with their Western outfit were largely internalized by women especially 
around the network of military-bureaucratic elite, who accepted the role of being 
the representatives of Kemalism in the public sphere. Atatürk personally glorified 
this new Republican woman by adopting girls and raising them as the ideals of 
                                               
156 Deniz Kandiyoti, ed., Women, Islam, and the State (Philadelphia: Temple 
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emancipated women: one of his adopted daughters is Afet Inan, a history teacher 
who established the Turkish History Thesis, under the direction of Atatürk, which 
claimed that the supremacy of Turkic nature was deteriorated by their conversion 
to Islam. And another one among his adopted daughters is Sabiha Gökçen, who is 
the first female combat pilot in Turkish history, whose first mission was to bomb 
the Kurdish city of Dersim (which was given the Turkish name Tunceli by the 
Kemalist state) in order to suppress a Kurdish uprising. Ayşe Gül Altınay reveals 
that Atatürk gave Sabiha his gun to kill herself if she is caught by the enemy. She 
sees this case as a manifestation of Atatürk’s consideration of Sabiha’s vulnerable 
female sexuality as the vulnerability of the honor of the nation-state, showing that 
Atatürk carried the traditional mentality against women’s sexuality despite his 
claims in favor or women’s emancipation.157 
 According to Nilüfer Göle, for the Republican women, emancipation 
came with the cost of “desexualization” in a way to hide their femininity, and 
have a gender-less appearance in the public sphere:  
the cost of women's liberation may be witnessed in the repression 
of her "femininity," which is perceived as a threat to the existing 
social order, and even of her "individuality," in both urban and 
public realms (education, labor, and politics).158 
 
She talks about the formulation of the ideal “Anatolian woman” in 
contrast to the “Ottoman woman” whose experience of Westernization was 
criticized for being purely cosmetic and based on selfish interests. The Anatolian 
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woman, on the other hand, was self-sacrificing, motherly, and eager to embrace 
modernism to serve her nation.159 Therefore, the Sabiha Gökçen example was an 
exception to the idealized professional roles for women, which were more 
commonly teaching and nursing (a continuation of the Ottoman educational 
reforms for women which was limited to teacher and nursery colleges).  
Esra Özyürek comes at a similar conclusion about the desexualization of 
Republican women in her interviews with some women from the first generation 
of the Republic, as they narrate the official Republican history instead of their 
personal stories. In her ethnography on the devout Kemalists in the 1990s, 
Nostalgia for the Modern, Özyürek explains how these women from the first 
generation of the Kemalist Republic see the single-party era as a Golden Age 
where they, as “daughters of the Republic” were sitting to close to “their father 
(Atatürk)”, creating the imaginary of the early Republic and the nation as the 
children of the loving father Atatürk (which literally means father of the Turks), 
which totally contradicts with the emergent alternative accounts of history told by 
Islamists and Kurdish nationalists.160 
Women and their headscarf 
The iconic role of women in the official modernization project was 
mirrored in the Islamist project, making the women’s headscarf the most explicit 
symbol of the Kemalist vs. Islamist rivalry. The headscarf of Merve Kavakçı in 
                                               
159 Ibid., 64.  
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Politics in Turkey (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). 
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1998 brought the end of the FP, and its modernist successor AK Parti came to the 
brink of closure ten years later after passing the legislation in the parliament that 
removed the headscarf ban for university students.  
The reason why headscarf is considered such an enormous threat can be 
found in Asad’s description of the type of religious freedom that is allowed in 
secularism. According to Asad, a “public expression of religious belief and 
performance of religious ritual…[that is] a probable cause of a breach of the 
peace…[and] as a symbolic affront to the state’s personality”161 cannot be 
considered within the framework of religious freedom. In other words, by 
secularists, headscarf is loaded with a symbolic meaning that undermines the very 
founding idea of Turkish secularism, which is, the invisibility of religion in the 
public realm.  
Furthermore, the headscarf stands out as the greatest puzzle for secular 
feminists in Turkey, who decided to side themselves with secularism, to prevent 
the Islamist wave that threatened women’s emancipation accomplished through 
Kemalist reforms and also the newly forming independent women’s movement in 
the 1980s.    
The latest feminist movement that was able to challenge the state-led 
feminism was headed by scholars like Şirin Tekeli, Feride Acar, Yeşim Arat, 
Ayşe Saktanber, and Binnaz Toprak, who by and large saw the Islamist 
movement as a threat to women’s emancipation –and their efforts of constructing 
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an independent women’s movement- as they considered Islam inherently 
misogynist. Yeşim Arat and Binnaz Toprak, for example, argue that Islam’s 
misogynist status cannot be changed because it is based on Holy Law, while 
secular law respects individual autonomy, and based on choice.162  
On the other hand, Nilüfer Göle argues that Islamist women “are 
empowered by an Islamism that assigns them a ‘militant’, ‘missionary’, political 
identity, and by secular education, which provides them a ‘professional’, 
‘intellectual’ legacy.”163 This double empowerment, however, is bound to be 
transformed in time, as the secular wing of the empowerment would put the 
religious wing into questioning. In other words, the missionary role given to 
Islamist women would be questioned as veiled women go through individual 
experiences under the secular professions they take at the end of their secular 
educations.  
Kenan Çayır’s analysis of the Islamist novels in the 1980s and 1990s 
indicates this transformation quite clearly. In Islamic Literature in Contemporary 
Turkey, Çayır distinguishes between the collective identity in the “salvation 
novels” of the 1980s and the individual identities in the “self-reflexive and self-
critical novels” of the 1990s.164 He interprets this difference as a transformation 
from the Islamist identity toward a Muslim identity, as the Islamism of the 1980s 
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loses its revolutionary fervor and the Islamists in the professional life come to 
terms with real life and focusing on the individual conflicts of being a Muslim in a 
secular modern ground. The veil, or headscarf, and the “militant” and 
“missionary” role given to Islamist women, which are considered to be 
“empowering” by Göle, becomes a great burden for the female protagonists of the 
self-reflexive novels in the 1990s.  
Furthermore, the commodification of Islamist symbols, from the 
perspective of an Istanbulian Jewish anthropologist Yael Naravo-Yashin gives a 
larger picture of the conflicts and concerns that arise when Islamism becomes a 
mainstream phenomenon in the modern public sphere rather than a marginal 
revolutionary ideology. She draws attention at the transformation of the headscarf 
from being a symbol of religiosity to being a signifier in-and-of-itself, being 
made into an object of commodification with the proliferation of a fashion 
industry built on the veil:  
The headscarf has been interpreted by Islamists as a representation of 
Islamic chastity, the holy past, and Turkish local culture. That the 
representation does not neatly pair up with the ideal is obvious to many 
women who cover....The veil has a ‘social life,’ a different one, now, as 
signifier. It does not simply refer to female religiosity or belief. Now the 
veil has gained meaning in-and-of itself, it refers to politics of identity in 
relation to secularists and the secularist state.165  
 
The commodification of the headscarf and Islamic apparel has come to 
such a point that an Islamic fashion magazine was published for the first time in 
Turkey, in 2011. The Âlâ magazine has quickly become the best-selling fashion 
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magazine in Turkey, indicating the extent to which “the new elite” has actually 
created a space for itself in the public sphere, making themselves comfortable in 
the secular public sphere, which was a foreign land for them three decades ago. 
The ten-years of AK Parti rule in the country witnessed the appropriation of the 
secular sphere by the Islamic elite, who were not “newcomers” anymore. 
The post-Islamist condition 
The political power Islamists gained in the 1990s becomes also the testing 
ground for the assertive claims of Islamism, which they finally are forced to 
negotiate with the secular state. As Berna Turam (2008) argues in Between Islam 
and the State, the experience of Islamists in the political arena and other parts of 
the public sphere brought the self-criticism and self-reflexivity to Islamists who 
gradually chose to engage with the secular state rather than confront it.  
The current political party in power since 2002 (the AK Parti) and the 
most powerful Islamic movement in Turkey with a transnational network (the 
Gülen movement) are the results of this politics of engagement which softened 
the sharp edges of the secular state and the Islamist movement.  
However, neither Islamism nor the state is a fixed and monolithic entity in 
this context. As mentioned earlier, the Islamist movement was comprised of at 
least two different modes typified by the Islamist and non-Islamist scholars. 
Named as “political Islam” by Nilüfer Göle, this form of Islamism believes in the 
primacy of capturing the state in order to reform the society. On the other hand, 
there is the other form of Islamism that aims to reform the society by spreading 
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individual piety, and taking the socio-cultural realm as the acting ground, what 
Göle called “cultural Islamism.”  
In this case, while the AK Parti can be considered the modified form of 
political Islamism, the Gülen movement can be considered the modified form of 
cultural Islamism. However, this does not mean that AK Parti has no interest in 
the socio-cultural morality or the Gülen movement totally excludes the political 
realm. It is more about the primary ground of action through which Islamist 
actors try to provide solutions to modern problems. In this sense, the Islamist 
movement is considered to be a modern movement, and a certain secularization 
of Islam can be claimed to have taken place as both the AK Parti and the Gülen 
movement gave precedence to secular global terms like human rights and 
democracy in order to defend their claims.  
The Kemalists, on the other hand, are in the defensive position today as 
they found Islamism as a genuine rival to the monopoly of Kemalism on the 
definition of modernity, and as Özyürek (2006) and Çınar (2005) claim, the 
weakening of the secularist state establishment gave birth to civil claims to the 
protection of the Kemalist principles –mainly secularism and nationalism. It can 
also be claimed that Islamism unearthed a strong civilian support for Kemalism 
especially during the AK Parti reign after 2002.  
However, I think Navaro-Yashin’s skepticism about the boundaries 
between the state and civil society is worth being considered here:  
Even though Atatürkist officials and the mainstream secular press 
presented Republic Day 1994 as "a day orchestrated by civil society", as 
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my ethnographic account illustrates, it is not easy to distinguish 
empirically between the state and society on the site of this event, any 
more than it is difficult and unwise, I argue, in many other cases. I will 
suggest that this was neither the state nor society, problematizing the 
analytical distinction state and society. What was, however, possible to 
illustrate empirically, is that Atatürkist officials, like the governor of 
Istanbul, were attempting to manipulate the term "civil society" for their 
own ends. There was, then, a discourse of society, and many people did 
attend the celebrations. Yet those among the audience who had not come 
merely for a free concert were there to stand for one (Atatürkist) as 
opposed to another (Welfarist or Kurdist) face of the state. One should 
perhaps be cautious in identifying this scene as an illustration of a reified 
notion of a public sphere or the organization of civil society in Turkey. 
Here, as in other ethnographic sites, it is unclear where the state ends and 
society begins, and vice versa.166  
 
Three years after the large-scale “Republican rallies” orchestrated in 
several cities of Turkey against the appointment of an Islamist president in 2007, 
the court cases against illegal groupings within the state organism revealed that 
those civilian rallies were organized by military officers by using non-state 
organizations as a disguise. In other words, it is not easy to distinguish between a 
state intervention and a non-state opposition when the Kemalist state is today 
embodied by people on the street who act as the state, just like the first-generation 
republican women who equated their private life stories with the official history 
of the Republic of Turkey.  
Or, to put it differently, we can say that where there is so much 
politicization of people’s mundane activities (such as drinking alcohol, clothing 
preferences, the words they use, their ways of entertainment, not to mention the 
books and newspapers and websites they read), it is impossible to draw a line 
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between state and society, or individual and the community. The everyday life of 
each citizen in Turkey is a site of political analysis, which is more so for the 
highly-educated professional Muslim women who carry the traces of all the 
foretold processes in their everyday life conditions.  
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Chapter 3 
INDIVIDUAL ROUTES TO PIETY 
This chapter is designed to give an account of the diverse ways in which piety is 
conceptualized and cultivated by highly-educated Muslim women in Turkey. 
These women hold active positions within the secular-public sphere while trying 
to keep their aim of becoming pious in their own way, in relation to their 
subjective understanding of piety.  
I will start this chapter by talking about my own story of getting to the 
field site, and making myself comfortable in the field, even though I chose the 
sites I had some affiliations with. My experiences with readjusting to my old 
places after five years of living abroad for my graduate study, turned out to be part 
of my research, the reasons of which will be reveled in the following pages.  
After explaining how I started and conducted my fieldwork, I will start 
narrating the stories of various journeys to piety. I have roughly organized these 
stories along two lines of family backgrounds: secular and religious. Among the 
secular families, I have identified two types of secularities: the ultra-secularist 
families that are hostile to religion, such as Esra’s family; and the moderately 
secularist families that are indifferent to religion, such as the families of Rüya and 
Edibe. The religious families, on the other hand, were described roughly in three 
lines of identification: the politically active Islamist family, as told in the stories 
of Zeliha and Neslihan; the nationalist-religious family, like Ceren’s; and 
traditionally religious families like that of Hilal, Buse, and Zuhal.  
  104 
As you read through the stories of these different passengers on the piety 
train, you will come to realize that in these stories, each subject, within the 
particular regimes of truth and knowledge, bring their own knowledge and 
language of piety, as well as their own subjective relations to piety. And each 
story evokes major points to rethink about our conceptions of the subject, agency, 
freedom, and submission, without mentioning any of these words openly.  
Even though I tried to capture as many diverse stories as possible, I was 
limited with the scope of a dissertation. Therefore, I tried to bring up the most 
striking examples to contribute to my aim of showing the diversity of the 
conception of piety, as well as the pursuers of it, contrary to the hasty 
categorizations of “covered women” (they are not all covered), “religious 
women” (they do not necessarily have the same conception of religion), or 
“conservative women” (they are not conservative in their worldviews). 
Furthermore, I believe that the stories of these pious women will add a new 
dimension to the understanding of a particular kind of Islamic revival in the case 
of the Turkish public sphere, without containing the Islamic actors in the category 
of Islamism or any specific Islamic movement.  
With these stories, I also aim to portray different types of secularities, and 
religiosities, as well as the blurring of the line between religious and the secular in 
the everyday lives of the common people of Turkey.  
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The beginnings 
At the beginning of my fieldwork, I was looking for a place to start –a 
place which would provide me a part time job so that I could get to know more 
women, with diverse experiences yet with a common concern to become pious. I 
already had a natural network from my college life that I had left behind five 
years ago. I also had small academic network of pious friends whom I met in 
London, and I managed to keep in touch with them when they also finished their 
studies and returned to Turkey.  
Knowing that I did not have a sufficient range of stories to knit up a 
meaningful pattern, I wanted to familiarize myself with the contact lists of some 
non-governmental women’s organizations that helped pious women to socialize 
with like-minded people. Among many others,167 it was the Women’s Platform 
(WP) under the Journalists and Writers Foundation that took my attention first, 
because I was already familiar with the foundation as the most prestigious voice 
of the Hizmet movement.168  
                                               
167 In Istanbul only, there are over fifty pious women’s NGO’s in different sizes, 
specialized in different aspects of social work. The umrella organization called 
Gokkusagi (Rainbow) Women’s Associations Platform (GIKAD) has been 
bringing together local small-sized women’s associations since 1995, and 
coordinating their activities to bring a greater effect in society. The founder of 
GIKAD, Dr. Gulsen Ataseven, has been involved in the founding of many of 
these pious women’s associations since 1964. She is also the first medical school 
student who wore the headscarf in Turkey. She was given the Outstanding Service 
Award by the Turkish parliament in 2009.  
168 It was established in 1994 with the initiative of Fethullah Gülen to promote 
“tolerance and dialog” within the Turkish society. The foundation became popular 
in Turkish media in the late 1990s with its iftar dinners and award ceremonies that 
gathered celebrities, businessmen, religious leaders, politicians, and journalists 
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After failing in my initial attempt to find a part time job in the media 
group of this pietist movement, and having to look for a job for two months with 
no success,169 I finally went to the Journalists and Writers Foundation and asked 
for a part-time job as well as permission to do my fieldwork there. We agreed, and 
thus I started to work as a part-time project coordinator at the WP. But soon after, 
I realized that there were too many projects for the three of us –Mualla, the 
general secretary, Ceren, her assistant, and myself– and I already had started 
working six days of the week from 9 am to 7 pm. It was the newest platform of 
                                                                                                                                
with the theme of “hoşgörü ve diyalog” (tolerance and dialog) in luxurious 
venues. It grew gradually to include seven platforms specialized in different 
aspects of building dialog (See http://www.gyv.org.tr/ for more information about 
the foundation and the platforms operating under it). 
One might think that their idea of tolerance was the product of a specific context, 
when they themselves were the minority within the larger society. In that sense 
one might argue that they promoted tolerance because they needed it for 
themselves in the first place. On the other hand, this feeling of being a minority, 
might also have helped them to empathize with the other marginal and oppressed 
sections of the society, even after they have gained the mainstream dominant 
position within Turkish society almost a decade after their establishment. 
169 I had made a job interview with the Zaman newspaper to work at the foreign 
news department when I went to Istanbul for fieldwork in August 2010. I was told 
to provide necessary documents and start the next month, but before two weeks, 
they had changed their minds for some reason still unknown to me. Thus, I had to 
search for a job for the first time in my life, which took two months with no 
success. I had to find a short term, and also part-time job to be able to do my 
fieldwork at the same time. The best option for me was to teach English, but it 
was not available for me because of my headscarf. I was always aware of this fact 
that I cannot work with my headscarf in a secular institution, even the privately 
owned ones; but being told this directly to my face was much more painful than 
simply knowing of that fact. This two-month period of job search as a highly-
educated başörtülü woman taught me why they were doomed to work in so-called 
conservative institutions with lower wages than they would get in other 
institutions without their headscarves (See TESEV’s report on “The Headscarf 
Ban and Discrimination: Headscarved Women in the Labor Market” prepared by 
Dilek Cindoğlu in October 2010).  
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the JWF, and thus needed extra work for achieving to build a network similar in 
number to the other platforms’ networks.  
Our target was the prominent women in business, academia, media and 
press, civil society, politics, and arts. Our method was to meet these people from 
diverse views, either by visiting them or hosting them, or attending in events 
where we can meet these prominent people. The other method we were following 
was educating foreigners170 about any type of misinformation or stereotype 
regarding Muslim women by allowing them to pose their questions directly to us.  
On the other hand, we were providing informal educational settings for 
women to be able to listen to lectures by prominent scholars in their own fields.171 
With these reading groups, female volunteers were sought who would be 
sophisticated and critical thinkers, intellectually curious, and self-learned 
individuals, who could establish dialogue with the secular-liberal intellectuals and 
                                               
170 The foundation was having foreign visitor groups from different countries 
around the world, who were brought to Turkey by the local Hizmet volunteers 
abroad. Each group was given a brief presentation about the foundation, and the 
rest of the conversation was carried out by any staff of the foundation from one of 
the platforms. The visitor groups from Europe and the US were mostly interested 
in hearing about the Women’s Platform, assuming it to be an achievement in their 
own standards towards the “emancipation” of Muslim women. Our mission was 
usually trying to explain how the WP was not a feminist organization, though it 
did not remain indifferent to gender issues.   
171 When I started to work at the WP as a project coordinator, my main task was 
to organize the reading groups formed in five disciplines: Literature, History, 
Sociology, Science and Technology, and Women’s Studies. For each of these 
disciplines, a professor was asked to be the consultant and prepare a reading and 
seminar syllabus to be followed. For these seminars, participation was free and 
voluntary, without any credits or grades given at the end. In this way, we could 
see who was really interested in learning and improving their knowledge on an 
area they like. The Women’s Studies seminars will be analyzed in a more detailed 
way in the next chapter.  
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scholars. It was, in some ways, an attempt to prove to the secularists that people 
could be both pious and modern at the same time, that women who wear the 
headscarf are actually capable of critical thinking and intellectual reasoning.  
Adjusting to the linguistic economy of the field site 
In many ways, working at the WP during my pre-research period helped 
me to calibrate my initial plans about my research that I had developed when I 
was in the US. In my effort to explain my Turkish friends and colleagues –who 
had almost equal higher education degrees with me- I realized how the language I 
was using was different from the way they understood it. What Bakhtin described 
as heteroglossia was right in front of my eyes, as I was constantly struggling with 
the different meanings springing from the word dindar and dindarlık in spite of 
what I intended them to mean.  
 One day at the WP, for example, I was reading through an American-
Jewish friend’s master’s thesis on the love of God, and muttering to myself: 
I personally know this person, and I would never imagine such an author 
for such a deep and touching text. Is this my failure in knowing people? 
Do I have too many prejudices? Am I taught so? How did I get to know 
this person? Well, she was always dressed up very indecently according to 
my ethical codes (almost showing her breasts and quite a large part of her 
legs all the time), in no way modest in our standards. But this woman is 
pious (dindar was the word I used), yes she is! She speaks of God as much 
as she speaks of sex. She has Hebrew hymns as well as one night stands in 
her songs. This woman smashes the “either/or” view in my mind. But how 
can she carry these two modes at the same time? Or how come do we 
think that these two (immodesty and piety) cannot go together? 
 
“What you are talking about is not dindarlık,” said Ceren, “that is iman 
(faith). Dindarlık equals to ibadet (religious practice).” Once again, I thought I 
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was unable to convey the meaning I had in my mind with the word dindar, as I 
meant “This woman is pious” but Ceren thought I was saying “This woman is 
religious.” With dindar, I meant my friend's connection with God and her deep 
concern about God in her daily life, despite lacking the modesty standards in my 
own mind. And Ceren thought of it as fulfilling the prescribed practices of her 
religion. Suddenly I realized that we were both judging from within our own 
tradition: I was surprised at her deep connection with the God despite lacking the 
kind of modesty I was familiar with in my own tradition. Most probably, that was 
my moment of questioning the possibility of a universal concept of modesty and 
its role in cultivating piety.  
For Ceren, though, it was important to differentiate between iman (faith or 
belief) and din (religion), as she believed that belief is only one part of religion, 
which is not complete without practice. But from within her own tradition, she 
made the judgment that this American-Jewish woman lacked religious practice. In 
fact, her objection was towards all forms of Protestantized religions, which, she 
claimed, “reduced religion into belief, while belief is only a part of religion.” Her 
displeasure with the erasing of practice from religion “as a general trend of 
modernity” had made her embrace a stronger position towards practice, and come 
to the point of claiming that “Dindarlık equals to ibadet.”  
On the other hand, my own experience with the conception of dindarlık in 
Turkey had brought me to the point of exhaustion with the strong emphasis on 
practice, until I got into the concept of “piety” in a specific context informed by 
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the ideas of anthropologists like Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood, and Charles 
Hirschkind. In one sense, the line between religion and the secular was removed 
for me in my exposure to these works of anthropology, since they had a direct 
influence over my conception of my relationship to God, to the rules of my 
religion, and to my society. This exposure allowed me to develop a wider sense of 
piety that could not be reduced into any of these, while learning to appreciate any 
kind of connection with God in relation to the sacred sources of one’s specific 
religious tradition. In that sense, I was able to connect my Jewish friend’s 
relationship to God to my understanding of piety, because I had witnessed her 
appropriating the Torah in her everyday language and activities like songwriting. 
Contrary to what Ceren thought, I did not reduce piety into belief; instead, I 
expanded the conception of religious practice in a way that would include singing 
for God, and writing about God.  
This experience made me realize that each person I interviewed would 
have their unique form of being informed about the concept of dindarlık. Some 
would emphasize the practice aspect, and some would emphasize the belief. For 
some, it would mean a good character, and for others it would evoke narrow-
mindedness and intolerance. Dindarlık did not have a singular meaning, either. 
There were layers of this conception: dindarlık according to me, according to the 
society, according to such and such religious leaders, etc. Considering this 
complexity within my native language, I decided to wait and see what my 
interlocutors understood with the word dindarlık, before I asked them questions 
  111 
about their experiences that would reveal if they agreed with my conception of 
piety as becoming. In other words, this language problem turned out to be a useful 
tool in understanding whether my interlocutors' conception of dindarlık was faith-
oriented or practice-oriented, or which was more influential than the other. 
Getting to know more field sites 
After spending six months at the WP, the general secretary, Mualla told me 
that the Hizmet volunteers are opening a new university in Istanbul, which would 
focus on social sciences. I went to talk with the general secretary of the university, 
and found it hard to say no when he offered me a position in the department of 
sociology. For him, I was the ideal candidate for the academic positions regarding 
the material qualities (BA, MA degrees and a future PhD degree from the US), 
and the spiritual qualities (I was recommended by a prominent Hizmet volunteer, 
I graduated from the first university established by the Hizmet volunteers, and I 
was wearing a headscarf: enough to make him think that I was a pious woman).  
The way I was hired was so arbitrary and quick that I could not have a 
moment to hesitate and put forward conditions other than not being hired as a 
research assistant, but as a lecturer before I get my PhD degree. However, I ended 
up being hired as an RA, which, they said was a temporary action for they could 
not find anyone else to fill that position. They wanted to make sure that not any 
applicant with officially required qualifications could claim the academic 
positions; so the written exam for all applicants was made too hard. I hardly 
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passed it for sociology was not my major, and the other candidates were too far 
from getting the required score. 
 I was too naïve to know that the hiring system in Turkish universities was 
not necessarily based on academic references, but more on the worldviews, 
characters, or the ideologies of the candidates. That is why, I remembered, when 
we graduated from university in 2005, two of my friends went to the oral exam 
for the graduate school of METU172 by dressing up in hipster clothes and wearing 
appropriate make-up and hairdo in order to hide their pious identities (in addition 
to taking off the headscarf which was banned). So, this had been the system since 
time immemorial, and the pietists were now utilizing that same system according 
to their own criteria.  
Living inside that system for all their lives, nothing about this established 
practice seemed wrong to the people in Turkey, as they believed in their right to 
be able to prefer people who share their values over those who do not. In fact, the 
Hizmet volunteers were much tolerant than some secularists, for their 
fundamental criterion in hiring was seeking for people who were tolerant of their 
values rather than a supporter of them. This selection preference turned out to be 
quite beneficial for my research, as I had the chance to meet women who did not 
identify themselves with any movement, and yet claimed a desire for becoming a 
pious woman.  
                                               
172 Middle East Technical University in Ankara, which is known to be the home 
of leftist and secularist ideologies, both for the academic staff and the student 
body.  
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But, I still was limited with the Hizmet framework in my list of 
acquaintances, regardless of their nature of relationship with the movement 
individually. Therefore, I decided to have a closer look at the other women’s 
associations that WP desired to build dialog with. Among them, the Meridyen 
Association173, and specifically the Meridyen Circle174 possessed the kind of 
audience that was of interest to me: highly-educated, urban, professional, and 
pious at best, or religion-friendly at worst.  
It struck me with its success in attracting the most well-known and 
strongest women figures of the ruling AKP, such as the wives of the president, 
prime minister, and other ministers in the cabinet in addition to covered novelists, 
columnists and authors who got popular in the Islamist and conservative circles.  
                                               
173 The Meridyen Association is a non-governmental organization established in 
December 2010 with the aim of contributing “to the creation of a genuine 
tradition of language and thought by merging the universal heritage of knowledge 
with social values.” “About Us,” Meridyen Association, accessed April 23, 2011, 
http://www.meridyenassociation.org/?page_id=2. 
In other words, it was established to promote the formation of a new intellectual 
tradition that would adopt “a position in society that is both comprehensive, yet 
independent, maintaining equal distances from all social dynamics” (Ibid). They 
deliberately did not use the word “Islamic” in describing their missions, for they 
aimed to be claiming for a mainstream position in society, mirroring the ten-year 
shift of Islamism from the periphery to the center in Turkish social and political 
life.  
174 Meridyen Circle defines itself as “a special academically supported unit that 
brings together Turkey’s intellectual female resources. Formed with an 
international vision, this group aims to bring together young women who are 
conducting academic work abroad with female authors and academics who shape 
the intellectual discourse in Turkey with its goal being to collaboratively create 
projects.” “Meridyen Circle” Meridyen Association accessed April 23, 2011, 
http://www.meridyenassociation.org/?p=956. 
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What was shared by the WP, the university, and the MC was a strong focus 
on social sciences, which was seen as the basis of development contrary to the 
commonly held belief in the importance of science and technology. On the 
website of the Meridyen Association, it is explained that social sciences is 
“accepted to be one of the important parameters of development at an 
international level” and their society aims to “contribute to subjects such as the 
compatibility of the established areas of study in social sciences in Turkey with 
the actual problems of the society, the question of which discipline has gained 
significance and investigating the paradigms that are dominant in these 
disciplines.”175 In this context, the Meridyen Circle stands out as the key 
constituents of this organization, which aims to promote the highly-educated part 
of the new Muslim elite to engage in the study of social sciences that had been 
established and so far maintained by the secular West outside, and its supporters 
inside Turkey.  
The method 
Attending the meetings of both the WP and the MC, and working full time 
at the social-science focused university of the pietist Hizmet movement, I 
managed to meet, become friends, and interview with around fifteen women 
throughout my field research.  
They were academics, media members, NGO workers, authors, and 
clinical therapists –areas of profession that have been and are still dominated by 
                                               
175 Ibid. 
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secular voices that are intolerant of religion. In addition to the diversity of their 
professions, I was struck by the diversity of their family backgrounds, and 
experiences with coming out to be who they are today.  
I realized that my story was just a simple and unimportant one among 
many striking and interesting piety stories to be told. In the rest of this chapter, I 
will try to give a sense these diverse stories: how they are unique and peculiar to 
their protagonists and yet altogether constitute the collective story of an entire 
society. I will analyze the family backgrounds of my protagonists and discuss the 
different types of secularities and religiosities they experienced in their families as 
they were getting ready to get on their own piety train. 
Diverse backgrounds, diverse paths  
I believe that piety is a journey, and naturally people depart from different 
points, and follow different paths which sometimes converge with the path of the 
others, or diverge from the larger path at some points. In this section, I have tried 
to come up with some models of these departures to provide the readers a kind of 
map that they can follow while reading the scattered stories that have found their 
ways to this research.  
Emerging out of secular families  
The first of these models is the “secular family-religious child model,” 
which emerges as a pattern in these stories of those who are raised in a secular 
family and became pious later in their lives.  
  116 
There are two distinguishable patterns in this “secular family-religious 
child” model: two types of secular family. The first type of secular family can be 
described as ultra-secular, who are ideologically against any form of visible 
religiosity towards religion. Kemalism is the ideology they are adhering to, and 
they think Islam is incompatible with Western modernity and thus should be left 
behind in the process of modernization. This secularist ideology was already 
discussed in the previous chapter, with its ramifications in the political and 
intellectual realm. The way this ideology is manifested in the daily lives of 
common people is rarely talked about, except Esra Özyürek’s mentioning of her 
own Kemalist parents and how they adopted the Kemalist ideology in their private 
sphere in the face of the rise of Islamism in the public sphere.176  
Since I chose most of my interlocutors around my age, they were the 
children of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which happened to be the formative 
years of Islamism in the socio-political arena. To some extent, it can be claimed 
that Turkish society was not polarized as much as in the 2000s, for Islamism and 
pietism were still in the periphery and could still not rival the mainstream 
secularist view. That view was so dominant in schools, in media, in politics, and 
in culture politics that being a religious person inevitably carried the risk of being 
ostracized by the members of that circle. Being from a traditional, rural family, I 
always thought religion as a natural part of our life, except when I entered into the 
realm of the secular school. But for some of my interlocutors, religion did not 
                                               
176 Esra Özyürek, Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday 
Politics in Turkey (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). 
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exist at all–either deliberately been erased, or simply forgotten and ignored in 
their urban, secular, modern families.  
An unlikely saint: Esra 
 An example to the emerging of a pious woman from a Kemalist family is 
Esra, my co-worker in the university. Her parents are both retired teachers, 
educated in the village institutes (köy enstitüleri) which were established by the 
single-party regime in order to cultivate secularist, nationalist, and modernist 
citizens for the new regime.177 “My family has nothing to do with religion” she 
said, “I have never lived in a religious setting in my childhood.” 
 I interviewed with Esra after knowing her for six months, and she had 
already been a kind of saint in my eyes, when she initially told me that she quit 
her job as a financial analyst in an international cosmetic company to work at this 
university as a research assistant in the Business department for a third of her 
previous salary, in addition to commuting from the west end of the European side 
                                               
177 “These institutes emphasized learning by doing. The curriculum combined 
academic, agricultural, and technical subjects. The institutes would train villagers 
to return to their villages as teachers and community leaders, spreading new skills 
and improving rural life. A central goal was to elicit enthusiasm and volunteerism 
for the exertions that the program required. The local villagers were expected to 
provide land for their institute at low prices and work twenty days a year for it. 
The students were expected to provide labor for making improvements, 
cultivating crops, and tending animals. The institutes were expected to promote 
nationalism and Kemalism and to Turkify the peasants. Institute programs 
included creative efforts to appeal to young people. Reciprocal visits among 
institutes and group trips to other parts of the country broadened students' national 
awareness.” Carter V. Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A 
History, 1789-2007 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 46. 
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to the east end of the Asian side –a two hour travelling with normal traffic 
conditions.  
What could possibly have made her give up a bright career and consent to 
do the chores of a research assistant?178 I myself showed patience to all the extra 
chores (extra according to what I experienced in the US) knowing that it was a 
temporary position I needed in order to complete my fieldwork and eventually get 
my PhD degree, which would change everything if I ever came back to that 
university. For Esra, it was a permanent decision for the sake of being there at any 
cost.  
Esra’s Prophetic dreams 
Esra told me that it was a dream that made her decide to take this job. It 
was the first time she shared her –what seemed like- prophetic dreams179 with me; 
                                               
178 Being a research assistant (RA) in Turkish universities does not necessarily 
entail doing research, as it is mostly seen being an “assistant” rather than a 
“researcher” as far as I can tell from my nine-months of experience. Particularly, 
a newly establishing university is the least advantageous place to be an RA. In the 
absence of students and classes (they must wait for the national university exam 
placement results to have students) the administration does not feel the need to 
hire more than minimum administrative staff, as they think that the RAs can work 
as department secretaries and even as faculty secretaries. Esra and I had to spend 
days and weeks trying to learn the bureaucratic language of higher-education 
administration, for we were responsible for the official correspondence of our 
entire faculties in the first five months.  
179 According to Islamic tradition, there are three types of dreams: 1) what is 
called true dreams, or visitational dreams, or Prophetic dreams, 2) bad dreams, the 
whisperings of the Devil to drive believers into despair, 3) dreams related to daily 
activities, i.e. secular dreams. This classification is based on this saying of the 
Prophet Muhammad, narrated by his companion, Ebu Huraira: “Dreams are of 
three types: one good dream which is a sort of good tidings from Allah; the evil 
dream which causes pain is from the satan; and the third one is a suggestion of 
one's own mind.” (Sahih Muslim, 29: 5621) 
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she probably felt the trust with me that I could make sense of the stuff she was 
going to say. She was a devout volunteer of the Hizmet, and she deeply believed 
in the notion of service to humanity being equal to service to God. My previous 
connection with the WP had given her the confidence that she could share this 
dream with me: 
I saw this dream when I was working at the cosmetic company, and there 
was no mentioning of this school yet. In my dream, I am in a village in 
Kastamonu. I see a huge mountain and a lighthouse on top of it. There is 
an old woman beside me who is living in that village. I ask her:  
 –What is that lighthouse? 
 –Bediüzzaman lives under that lighthouse, she says. 
I get surprised. Then I see a well in front of us. I throw a stone into the 
well. Then I ask the woman:  
 –What will come out of this well? 
 –Medresetüz-zehra will arise, she says. 
Then Mualla abla180 called me about the school, and I went for the 
interview. After that, I gave this not-so-rational decision and quit my job of 
4000TL (approximately $2,500) salary and came here.181 
   
The contents of this dream are very much related to the life story of 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, and very well-known among most Hizmet volunteers, 
who have taken Nursi’s and Gülen’s works as their essential daily readings. 
Kastamonu is one of the cities in the north-west of Turkey, where Nursi spent 
some of his exile years (1936-1943). 182 Nursi’s dream of establishing an Islamic 
                                               
180 Abla means older sister in Turkish. It is used for respect for elderly women in a 
community, and it has a technical meaning in the Hizmet community, meaning a 
spiritual guide or helper for a certain group of Hizmet women. Referring Mualla 
as an abla was an informal way of showing our respect to her. The title hanım 
which we used in formal settings, on the other hand, implies no kinship or age 
difference.  
181 The RA’s were paid approximately $1000 monthly. 
182 Nursi was arrested in Van after a Kurdish-Islamist revolt against the secular 
nation-state in 1925, together with all religious figures in the region regardless of 
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madrasah, which he named medresetüzzehra, would combine the teaching of 
religious and positive sciences. Gülen and his followers have taken up the task of 
realizing this dream by establishing elementary and secondary private schools183 
as early as the 1980s. However, the main focus of the movement in the recent 
years has been on universities, the first of which was established in 1996. 
Between 2007 and 2010 more than three universities were established in different 
cities of Turkey with the donations of the local sponsors. This one was going to be 
the second university of the movement in Istanbul, and it was going to focus on 
social sciences in order not to impede the student enrollment of the other 
university.  
This dream of Esra was certainly of those “that mattered” in Amira 
Mittermaier’s words, “in the sense of having significance in people’s lives and, 
                                                                                                                                
his involvement with the revolts. He was sent to exile to Western Anatolia, to live 
in absolute isolation; and yet, he managed to write his six-thousand-page 
collection of Risale-i Nur (The Treatise of Light) during his exile and 
imprisonment in the cities of Burdur, Isparta, Eskişehir, Kastamonu, and Afyon. 
For Nursi’s biography, see Sukran Vahide, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi: The Author 
of the Risale-i Nur (Selangor, Malaysia: Islamic Book Trust, 2011). 
183 These schools followed the secular syllabus of the Ministry of National 
Education, however, the teachers were trained to be pious men (and women, after 
the 1990s) who were to be spiritual guides to the students outside the school 
hours. Most of these schools were boarding schools to enable the best the spiritual 
guidance. In the 1940s, the Kemalist single-party regime introduced Imam-Hatip 
schools, the particular secondary schools to raise imams and clergy for the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs. Their curriculum included Islamic sciences like 
kalam, tafseer, fiqh, hadith in addition to regular national curriculum. Although 
the conservative people embraced these schools quite warmly, the followers of 
Nursi and Gülen never saw these as the fulfillment of Nursi’s dream of enabling 
the reunion of mind and heart.  
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more literally, in the sense of having an impact on the visible, material world.”184 
This dream made me think that Esra was very much informed about the spiritual 
teachings of the Hizmet, and she had a deep level of devotion its dava, or mission. 
While listening to her story, I had an angel on my right shoulder telling me how 
God has bestowed her with blessings, and Freud on my left shoulder telling me 
how she was so much into the discourse of the Hizmet, and she saw this dream 
because of her intensive relationship with the movement in her everyday life. This 
double-mode continued as she kept telling me about the other prophetic dreams 
she saw, making me more curious about the rational explanation behind this 
routinizing of “otherworldly” experience.  
How could it be possible that a 14-year-old girl with no religious 
inspiration in her family could come up with such reasoning upon seeing a pollen 
flying outside the window, when she is travelling on a bus?   
Even this tiny pollen has a purpose in life. What is my purpose? If I am 
going to die and everything will end, then why am I struggling for? 
 
I never felt the need to question the meaning of life, as I was raised up as a 
believer in the existence of God, and I was told that we were created to worship 
God. Everything was so simple: if you worship God you go to Heaven when you 
die; and if you do not worship God, you will end up in Hell. My struggle was to 
find ways of worshipping God among all the distractions of the modern life. For a 
moment, I felt a subtle envy about the fact that thought was granted to Esra just 
                                               
184 Amira Mittermeier, Dreams That Matter: Egyptian Landscapes of the 
Imagination (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 2.  
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because God wished so –in other words, piety was created inside her ex nihilo, 
without the involvement of her self-cultivation. So, I asked: “how was it possible 
for you to come up with such reasoning? Were you reading stuff about that?” Her 
answer gave me some relief from a possible resentment towards God (for not 
choosing me for such spiritual experiences if it had nothing to do with one’s self-
disciplining); at least it reaffirmed my conviction  that care for the self is 
definitely involved in receiving grants from God in the process of becoming 
pious:  
I was reading the booklet called “The First Word” by Said Nursi.185 My 
sister’s religion teacher had given it to her as a gift after she was 
successful in something –I don’t remember now. My father was very angry 
at the teacher for giving Nursi’s booklet; he didn’t want her to read that. 
He was shouting “Do you know who this man is?” So, I was very curious, 
and I was reading that booklet secretly. 
 
After this moment of epiphany, she starts to perform the ritual prayer once 
in a while, and reading more about the religious concepts she learns in the 
compulsory religion classes at school. In this process, she is simply on her own, 
because her mother was so lacking in knowledge about religion that when Esra 
wanted to see what the Qur’an is like, she showed her a hadith book that came as 
                                               
185 In this booklet, Nursi talks about the importance and the meaning of the phrase 
“In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate” which is called besmele 
and repeated as a formula in beginning any type of work. In this treatise, Nursi 
explains the relationship between all the creatures and God, and tells the reader 
how each creature acts in the name of God. See, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, “The 
First Word” in The Words: The Reconstruction of Islamic Belief and Thought 
(New Jersey: The Light Inc., 2005), 3-12.  
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a promotion of a mainstream newspaper.186 In fact, she was not completely alone 
in her struggle of habituating herself for doing the prayer five times a day, for she 
again received divine help through a dream: 
I am in a very crowded conference hall; it is a huge closed complex. Our 
Prophet (pbuh) gets to the stage with shouts of applause. He fixes his eyes 
on me, and looks directly into my eyes. He leans his head to the right with 
a smile on his face. After that I started to perform namaz. It was a very 
strong reason for me.  
 
At this point, my skeptical mind started questioning if it really was 
Prophet Muhammad whom she saw: 
–How did you know that it was him? 
–His face was very bright, very white, and very beautiful; I felt that it was 
our Prophet. 
 
Why was I skeptical? Maybe I needed that barzakhian perspective that 
Amira Mittermaier talked about “to think beyond the present and the visible.” 
Maybe I lacked the “insight into modes of being in the world that might not be 
intelligible from within rationalist, secular vocabularies”187 even though I claim 
the belief in them. The fact that I had never experienced anything beyond the 
thick walls of the material world had made me oblivious to the intricacies of 
experiences beyond those walls. Furthermore, this lack had created a desire to go 
beyond the visible boundaries and jealousy for those who actually could do that. 
A subtle jealousy that stopped me from believing in the divineness of that 
                                               
186 The mainstream newspapers are secularist in their viewpoints, however, they 
give out religious books as promotion every year in the month of Ramadan. This, 
mostly, had been how religious sources found their way into the houses of many 
secularist families.  
187 Mittermeier, Dreams, 4. 
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experience and led me to look for explanations to prove the constructedness, the 
worldliness of that experience…Thinking back now, I have a better understanding 
of “the notion that narrated dreams are powerful” which “is also underlined in the 
Quran, where Yūsuf is warned by his father not to tell his dream to his brothers so 
as not to evoke their envy.”188 
My concerns were not directly related to the dilemma between my 
researcher identity and my Muslim identity, like Abdellah Hammoudi experienced 
in his anthropological study of the Hajj as a secular Muslim, for he was 
“privileging a particular means of gaining knowledge,” even though he claimed 
the Muslim tradition as his own, and took its discourse as his starting point.189 
There was a certain influence of my secular training in religion, language, and 
gender theories in my embracing of Freudian and Lacanian conceptions of dreams 
and subjectivity before embracing the Islamic conception that affirms the 
existence of a particular realm for the dreams outside the dreamer. Whereas, my 
conception of dreams corresponded with what Mittermaier described as “insisting 
                                               
188 Ibid., 74. Mittermeier also talks about the reservations on narrating a 
visitational dream in the Islamic tradition, which recognizes dreams as powerful 
agents in the real life. Not telling a dream has several functions, one of which is 
containing “its performative potential” (Ibid.). The greater function is as is told in 
the Qur’an regarding the dream of Prophet Joseph: not evoking envy among 
people for the very blessing they have received by having a visit from the Prophet 
Muhammad, and also for the message of the dream that promises a good fortune. 
This is also related to the idea of “evil-eye” and the need to be protected from it 
by keeping the good things hidden from the gaze of others. In that sense, the 
negative power of the dream does not have to be about an absolute Other (like 
jinn or the Devil), but it is very much related to the immediate others surrounding 
the subject/object of the dream in real life.  
189 Abdellah Hammoudi, A Season in Mecca: Narrative of a Pilgrimage 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 135. 
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on locating the dream's origin inside the dreamer” through which “one overlooks 
the possibility of other subjectivities, other dreams, and other imaginations.”190 
 Even though I believed in the authenticity of those Prophetic dreams in 
theory, my lack of experiencing it had led the secular training to overrun this 
perception, and prevented me “to move beyond psychologizing and functionalist 
explanations, or at least to recognize them as historically and geographically 
specific.”191  
The problem also lied in my conception of the subject “as an autonomous 
and self-mastering subject of consciousness, or as an interiority that would be the 
private space of individual perception,”192 which made me question her 
background information about the contents of her dream and try to make a 
correlation between her desires and her dreams. I was not necessarily looking for 
the unconscious, as I was more interested in the part of her dream when she was 
conscious: i.e. when she woke up. For the dream part, I could understand that she 
was, for that moment, “a subject inscribed in a network of symbolic debts, and 
defined in relation to that Other Scene, Freud and Lacan call the unconscious; a 
subject that speaks through the unmastered realms of dreaming, the lapsus or the 
joke, and manifests itself fugitively –an opening of shutters that immediately 
close up.”193 
                                               
190 Ibid., 15. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Stefania Pandolfo, Impasse of the Angels: Scenes from a Moroccan Space of 
Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997),  5.  
193 Pandolfo, Impasse, 5. 
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Mittermaier says that the visitational dream “exceeds and ruptures” both 
models of “embodied practice” and “abstract reasoning” and, I would claim, the 
above subject modals they assume. She claims that  
the dream-vision can be invited through certain communal practices and 
technologies of the self, but the source of its ethical imperative is held to 
be a locus outside the individual and the visible social realm. By way of 
the dream, an Other addresses the dreamer. Far from being the dreamer’s 
unconscious, this Other is the imaginary interlocutor that the dreamer 
encounters in the dream-vision.194  
 
Acting on dreams 
However, this also did not mean that the person who saw these dreams 
herself placed her subjectivity in that realm of non-self, for she was still 
responsible for her decisions about the ways she could handle the message of that 
dream in her daily life. In other words, it is her way of interpreting this dream –
even though she has her dream interpreted by someone she trusts– in deciding 
how to act on this prophetic dream.  
Mittermaier sees the ethics of visitational dream as a “spiritual 
mechanism” described by Marcel Mauss, “that obliges a person to reciprocate the 
present that has been received.”195 She claims that visitational dreams in all these 
cases bring with them obligations. Each dream-visitation is simultaneously an 
invitation.”196 However, this contrasts with the commonly circulated saying 
among Turkish Muslims that “Rüya ile amel olmaz” meaning “You should not act 
                                               
194 Mittermeier, Dreams, 141. 
195 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic 
Societies (New York: W.W. Norton, [1964] 2000), 7. 
196 Mittermeier, Dreams, 170. 
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on a dream.” Fethullah Gülen explains that even the visitational-dreams should 
not be acted upon if the action they invite you is against the sacred sources:   
In Islam, the states like sleeping and fainting have been left outside the 
realm of responsibility (mükellef). Therefore, they don’t have any aspects 
to be taken as basics for any religious rulings. In that context, one does not 
become an apostate if he/she utters a word of disbelief, as he/she is free 
from any responsibility during that state of unconsciousness. When you 
look at the issue from this perspective, neither the good tidings nor the 
warnings that come through a dream can be thought to have any objective 
value. Therefore, they cannot be considered as binding proof or evidence 
for an action. But it is possible for these dreams to give a particular 
message to the person who has the dream –unless that message contradicts 
with the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Apart from these cases, dreams have no 
value to themselves.197  
 
Following this commonly held principle in her Hizmet community, Esra 
thought very carefully on her dreams, and she shared them only with a close 
friend and elder sister to her, not a Sufi sheikh, nor even having any religious title. 
She was just an editor at a publishing company. Yet, Esra thought that she had a 
profound sense of piety and connection with God, which gave her the confidence 
to share her prophetic dreams. But at the end of the day, it was still her decision 
that mattered, because there was no objective authority that could judge her for 
the way she acted on her dreams.  
She could have just ignored the authenticity of her dream (that it was 
something totally outside of herself) and interpreted it as the manifestation of her 
thoughts about the Prophet, or other religious information she was receiving 
through her readings. But she interpreted it as a particular message to her given by 
                                               
197 Fethullah Gülen, “Rüya ile Amel Edilir mi? (Should we act on dreams?),” 
Kürsü (The Pulpit), August 7, 2002, accessed October 27, 2012,  
http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/11935/18/ 
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the Prophet. She could have interpreted it as a message to be an appreciation by 
the Prophet –as that gesture normally implies, rather than a request by him to 
perform her ritual prayers regularly. And she would probably not directly look for 
a newly opening university after her dream, if someone she respected had not sent 
her to the job interview. In other words, she herself was in a constant mode of 
negotiation with the imaginary and the corporal realms, and yet she never gave up 
her own self in following the message of her dreams: 
–Let’s assume that you have witnessed something unpleasant about the 
community you are affiliated with, and you want to leave. But in your 
dream, you saw Prophet Muhammad and he told you not to do so. Would 
you act according to your dream and stay inside the community despite the 
bad scene you have witnessed? 
–Yes, I usually see such dreams when I criticize something or decide to do 
something. Sometimes they are in the form of warning, and I act 
accordingly. Let me give you an example: I criticized someone at school in 
my mind. That night I saw that person in my dream. And an outside voice 
told me this: “I have appointed them to that position, they are rıfat.” I did 
not know what rıfat meant, and I looked it up in the dictionary as soon as I 
woke up. I learnt that it means “one who is elevated.” On another case, I 
saw the school in my dream when I expressed a criticism about it. At each 
floor, people are performing the ritual prayer in rows. There is a green 
cloth with gilded inscriptions on it, which is hung at the door of the 
administrative head of the school. How amazing, isn’t it? Maybe this is 
how our school is reflected in the imaginary realm (misal alemi), and 
maybe, we are not able to see it with our blackened hearts. 
  
 3D piety: the individual-the community-the divine 
It was amazing, indeed, how Esra had cultivated a totally different 
subjectivity than her parents had ever thought or intended for her. Her father’s 
seeing religion as a weakness was surely not shared by this young woman. It was 
through religion that she got the strength to change her life for a cause she 
believed in. While her parents saw themselves as the carriers of the beacons of 
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enlightenment –a role given to teachers by the Kemalist regime, Esra saw her role 
in serving God, and religion by using the same means of education. However, 
holding an opposite view of life with her parents did not make her turn her back 
towards them, as she still performs her prayers outside of their sight, and she does 
not wear the headscarf so as not to totally scare them off.  
This is a sign of how piety stands on a three dimensional relationship 
consisting of the individual, the society, and the divine. In this scheme, it is not 
enough to engage in individual worship and prayer to get close to God, as God 
also requires the believers to maintain good social relationships. Given the context 
of a young woman like Esra, there is an aporia to be solved each and every 
moment of interaction with her parents and many of her close family members: 
her individual pious performances have the risk of harming her social relations, 
and thus hindering her overall aim of becoming pious.  
A different model of secularity 
Another type of secular family in Turkey, which is more common but also 
complicated to deal with as a pious woman, is those who are simply indifferent to 
religion without a significant ideological bearing on it. They are not hostile 
toward religion but it is not part of their life. Part of the reason is that they don’t 
want it to be a part of their life due to the complications and controversies it will 
bring. It is also more based on the feeling of comfort and taste rather than being 
ideological. These families are usually fine with a basic level of religiosity: this 
religiosity rarely includes the ritual prayer except for the Friday congregational 
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prayer for men, and any visible marks of religiosity (i.e. clothing). Instead, it 
consists of fasting during the month of Ramadan, having religious rituals for birth, 
marriage and death, and it usually goes no deeper than that. Parents from such 
secular families do not want their daughters wear the headscarf because of the 
headscarf ban as well as the social stigma it carries.  
What is common for both types of secular families is that children from 
those families have no religious guidance or learning in their family environment. 
Interestingly, the religion classes in the national curriculum which were 
introduced by the military regime became the only door opening to religion for 
these children. Many Islamists, followers of certain pietist movements and 
tarikats criticize these religion classes to be shallow, based on memorization, and 
lacking any spirit in it; and their claim is that no one can be truly pious through 
those religion classes. However, what I have seen in the example of Esra, and 
many others I interviewed, is that religion entered their households through those 
classes. A particular political decision became a turning point in the everyday 
lives of many ordinary people, who barely make it to the grand narratives of 
political analysis. Those classes functioned as a trigger for many young people to 
get interested in religion and seek for more when they get to college and meet 
several Islamist and pietist groups. This was probably not the intention of the 
junta in the 1980, who simply wanted to curtail the power of communism and 
leftism threatening the state; and they certainly were not able to control how 
people would appropriate the content of those classes in their everyday lives. 
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Although they initially injected religion combined with nationalism and loyalty to 
Atatürk, these could easily be chopped off once the student was attracted to 
various religious groups with her interest in religion.  
An unlikely passenger on the piety train: Rüya 
Rüya, my other colleague in the psychology department, had her only 
connection with religion through those classes. She describes her family as 
“neither religious nor ultra-secular” just like the majority of secular Turkish 
families: “My father used to fast during Ramadan. We used to listen to the ezan 
(call to prayer) together. The spirituality in our family used to increase in 
Ramadan.” Even though her mother started to perform the ritual prayers at the age 
of 45 after having a uterus surgery, she did not feel the need to teach her children 
about religion, or encourage them to start doing the ritual prayer as well. In other 
words, her conception of piety did not have a missionary aspect in it.  
Rüya’s connection with religion was limited to what she learnt in the 
compulsory religion classes at school, until her elder sister, who was a 
communist, went to college and met a follower of the Hizmet movement, whom 
she would marry later on.  
My interest in religion actually started when my elder sister joined the 
Hizmet community. She had always been my idol, both when she was a 
communist and when she became pious. I started performing the ritual 
prayer at the age of sixteen. I never quit except for a short time in college 
when I went into depression.  
 
I still remember my astonishment at seeing her in the prayer room at the 
basement of the school, because I had got no clue whatsoever from her 
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appearance, her expressions, or her behaviors that she could be a pious woman. I 
was indeed very curious about the very process that brought her to that university, 
which turned out to be her sister’s recommendation, for she had a respected 
position within the Hizmet community. But still, she did not fit the usual Hizmet 
type around me, she was clearly different from Esra even though they were both 
“non-covered”: Esra would never show her arms, her legs, or her shoulders; and 
she would always wear a long tunic to cover her bottom. It was only the lack of 
headscarf that was distinguishing Esra’s outfit from my outfit as a “covered” 
woman.198 Rüya, on the other hand, dressed up in a more secular manner, with 
tight shirts, knee-length skirts, tight jeans, short-sleeve tees, and so on. She did 
have her modesty standards, but the divergence from the authorized Islamic 
clothing standards was much more than the headscarf. I wondered how she was 
attracted to religion: 
The answers you find to the most fundamental questions orient you 
towards religion. The fact that you find an answer to the question of “what 
is the meaning of life?” makes you attracted to religion. Maybe my sister 
had a small effect on me, but it was this questioning that brought me to 
this point. .. 
 
The intellectual stimulus 
 
In the lack of any social stimulus favoring religion, Rüya had clung to the 
intellectual stimulus, a kind of individual bond with the divine.  
                                               
198 The Islamic rules for covering are stricter for women than men. According to 
the Hanafi school of fiqh, women should cover all their bodies except their face, 
hands, and feet, and they must not wear tight or transparent clothes that would 
reveal the shape of their bodies.  
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You cannot find the meaning of life from another source. I think no 
answer exists to these questions except religion. I believe that everything 
has a cause, a purpose. A purpose for our development, and for our 
transition to the other side (the Hereafter) as purified.  
 
The satisfaction of her intellectual curiosity enabled her to move on with 
her journey on the path of piety. However, this journey was not smooth all the 
time, for she had new questions with new experiences she had in her daily life and 
mostly in her job as a clinical therapist: 
I think there is too much suffering in this world, no matter how much I 
believe that this is a test for humanity. There is this concept of “self-
actualization” that belongs to Karl Rogers, which can be the meaning of 
life. I made the connection in my mind with the idea of “the perfect human 
being,” that we must suffer for perfection, and I have accepted this 
situation to some extent. But because of my depressive nature, I keep 
struggling with myself about this. I ask if there was no other way for 
perfection. I ask, how God bears with this much suffering with all that 
mercy He has. I fear to offend God, but I sometimes ask myself if He is 
taking those sufferings of human beings lightly, which makes me feel a 
little bit angry (with God)… I just want God to love us dearly. This is 
where I get confused the most. For example, I cannot make sense of three-
year-old kids being sexually harassed. “What sort of a test is this?” I ask to 
myself. He is forced into this, and he is trying to live with its damage. Yes, 
his situation will be evaluated in the Hereafter accordingly, but why is it 
necessary? Estağfirullah,199 but is it really necessary to go through such 
heavy traumatic experiences in order to be purified?  
  
Rüya’s most important connection to piety was constantly being tested, 
reaffirmed, and requestioned in the course of her everyday life. Furthermore, she 
lacked the social motivation to keep her piety, for she had never been in a 
religious social setting, except for her sister, and her new colleagues in this 
                                               
199 Estağfirullah is an Arabic statement, used very commonly in Turkish when 
asking for forgiveness from God. It is also a statement of humbleness. In this 
situation, she feels that she has transgressed by questioning God’s actions, and 
uses this phrase to be secured from heresy in the eyes of God, as well as mine.  
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university. However, she still continued her profession as a clinical therapist, and 
she had to maintain her social relations with people most of whom see religion as 
a primitive phenomenon and describe themselves as “believing in God but not in 
religion.” And they certainly lack the kind of understanding to make sense of her 
aim to be loved by God: 
From all my friends around, only two of them know that I regularly do the 
ritual prayer. And for them, it doesn’t make any difference whether I take 
anti-depressants, do yoga, or do the ritual prayer.  
 
While ritual prayer is seen as the soundest indication of piety by this type 
of secular people, fasting is considered more mainstream, as it is tolerated within 
the religio-cultural atmosphere of Ramadan, and quickly forgotten and  disappear 
after that. So, she feels more comfortable to reveal her fasting practice to those 
friends. Her social circle in professional life, on the other hand, is still too 
secularist to tolerate even to the practice of fasting.  
Almost all my friends except those in my professional life know that I fast 
during Ramadan. People who work in this profession have not been able to 
accept everything. They have prejudices, too; and the community of 
psychologists has a serious capacity for gossiping. Since I know that I will 
not be understood correctly by these people, I do not want to be labeled as 
a dinci. Most of our profession is about referral, and that’s why I want to 
hide this as my private choice. I do not want my professors to learn that, 
because some of them are a kind of person that sees the prophets as 
psychotics. They might think that you are weak and you seek refuge in 
religion; so they might not refer patients to you. 
 
The question of belonging and affiliation is part of Rüya’s experience. The 
feeling of not belonging to anywhere has always been with her, for she has never 
fit into the conventional categorizations like conservative, modern, religious, or 
secular. She has always felt unique, sort of isolated because there was no one like 
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her around. “But then you realize that everyone is unique, not belonging to any 
group.” This is how she was able to negotiate with the question of belonging in 
the light of her professional learning and experience. 
A conversion story: Edibe 
 
Another colleague of mine in the political science department had a 
similar story of setting out for cultivating a pious self. She has a masters and 
doctoral degree from an American university, and she has lived in Dubai for two 
years because of her husband’s job. She is covered, always wearing business 
attire, with long jackets and pants or short jacket and skirt. She is also a devoted 
Hizmet volunteer, who has forsaken her prestigious job at the prime ministry to 
become a part of the academic staff of this university.   
She was the first female colleague I met, and she became a kind of mentor 
for me as I was struggling to motivate myself to move on with my fieldwork. Her 
spiritual as well as professional mentorship had made her a perfect pious figure in 
my head –perfect meaning everything I failed to achieve in my own process of 
cultivating a pious self: observant of required practices, full of motivation for 
work and productivity towards God’s consent, having a good education and 
simultaneously fulfilling her roles as a wife and a mother with two kids, and being 
able to give up financial and social privileges for a holy mission.  
When I finally got to sit for an interview with her, I realized that I knew 
very little about her, especially her youth. Because I respected and looked up to 
her so much during the nine months we spent together that I abstained from 
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asking her about too personal questions. Positioning her as an abla in my mind 
had created a kind of hierarchy between us, which could only be removed when I 
“officially” sat down to interview her with my voice recorder. At that moment, I 
felt myself as a researcher seeking for knowledge, rather than a seeker of spiritual 
guidance from a superior guide. So, that’s how I learnt about her past, which 
started in Germany in an immigrant family: 
My parents had no conception of religion at all. My father had graduated 
from a village institute and my mom’s knowledge about religion was just 
limited to what she had learnt traditionally. We were so-called Muslims.  
 
In her account of the past, it is clearly seen that memory is not functioning 
as a storage place from where you can retrieve a file which you saved before in 
the same way. That saved file gets manipulated, corrupted, or updated with the 
incoming of new processors and operating systems to the human mind. The fact 
that she remembers her parents having “nothing” to do with religion can be a 
result of having various experiences in her later life which gave her a new idea 
about religion; and that’s how she named the nominal affiliation with Islam as 
being “so-called Muslims.” Just from this entrance, I could see that a conversion 
story was coming forth:  
She returns to Turkey to live with her uncle’s family, because her parents 
want her to go Turkish schools rather than German ones.  
My first contact with religion happened when I was fifteen. I seriously 
believed that human beings originated from apes. My cousin was leaving 
some books here and there to educate me. After reading one of them, I 
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started to have doubts in my mind regarding evolution.200 I was already in 
a mode of ennui, because of being away from my family, and some heart 
breaking experiences pushed me to a spiritual void. I started to ask “is that 
all? What is this whole thing about?” I was seeking for a meaning in my 
life. A friend of mine gave me the novel Siddharta by Herman Hesse, 
which became a turning point in my life. But the neo-Buddhist philosophy 
still did not satisfy me. The point of Nirvana was not satisfactory for me, 
for I needed something more real. I had this feeling of self-loathe, and I 
said “I must make a new path for myself.” But I was afraid of Islam, too.  
 
 Her fear of Islam was to be ended when she chose the university exam 
preparation course provided by the Hizmet affiliates, simply because of its 
success in education. There, she saw “the profile of the educated pious woman” 
which was not scary at all. She preferred to stay in their dorm instead of living in 
her uncle's place. Soon after, she started praying five times a day, which changed 
her lifestyle totally: “When you pray regularly, you cannot do many things you 
did before, like drinking alcohol, or smoking pot...” she said. Here I exclaimed 
with a great bewilderment: “Smoking pot?” I was so naïve that the worst thing I 
was expecting from a non-religious high-school girl was drinking alcohol, and 
still that was something I had not witnessed even among the craziest girls in my 
high-school in Ordu. But Istanbul, apparently, was different from my small city, 
as Edibe said that smoking pot was very common among her school friends. Still 
today, I cannot imagine her smoking pot in the underground cafes of Kadıköy, 
with a Gothic make-up on her face. The transformation was simply unbelievable.  
                                               
200 The idea of evolution is not totally rejected by Muslims, as they believe in the 
constant creation of God, which leaves space for the idea of evolution of the 
creatures. However, the origin story of the evolutionists is not acceptable to the 
Muslim belief, which accepts Adam as the first human being created by God in 
“in the best mould” (Qur’an 95: 4). 
  138 
 After she quit these habits, and stopped wearing make-up, nail polish and 
revealing clothes201 because of the regular prayer, she realized that she had no 
reason to hold herself back from donning the headscarf. At that time the headscarf 
was large and covered the shoulders and the bosom, and it was paired with the 
long-coat called pardesü, and the decision to start wearing the headscarf mostly 
meant wearing the pardesü as well. She had the idea that “this is what fills the 
spiritual void inside me, so I must do it perfectly.” She devoted herself telling 
others about Islam in college, thinking that “if I prevent other people from falling 
into sins, maybe I could be forgiven, as well.”  
 A split of authority   
“I had to show extra effort for my sins to be forgiven. That feeling of 
inferiority due to my past sins has always followed me, even in my marriage” she 
says. Her experience in marriage adds a new dimension to the question of gender 
relations, and gender equality. Her marriage was an extension of these “extra 
efforts to be forgiven” as she saw it as a religious duty: She was told that a deeply 
pious man within the Hizmet network was going to the US for PhD, and he 
needed a wife who could speak English, and drive. That was how her marriage 
happened, which has been happily going on with two kids -a fourteen-year-old 
girl and a six-year-old boy.  
                                               
201 The ritual prayer has several obligations within itself which prevents the 
wearing of these: the ritual ablution requires washing the face, so she has to clean-
up her make-up each time. The nail polish prevents water from touching the 
finger nails, nullifying the ritual ablution. She has to cover all her body except for 
the face, hands, and the feet to perform the ritual prayer, so has to carry extra 
clothes with her if she is not already covering those parts when she is out.  
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Edibe respected her husband because of his piety, which was more than 
hers, she thought. Thinking of her past sins, she did not feel competent to strive 
for equality in her relationship with her husband; hence, she followed him like a 
spiritual guide. However, she also had to give up her individual practices of piety 
and self-disciplining, such as “sleeping on the floor” or “not sleeping without a 
headscarf and a skirt” which could not be carried on as a married woman. She 
said “marriage sweeps away innocence” and started crying as she remembered her 
performance of piety before marriage. “Our imagination was totally shaped by 
what we listened from the cassette sermons. Our horizon was as far as 
Hocaefendi202 drew for us.” In other words, she lived in an “ethical 
soundscape”203 filled with Gülen's voice; and she was solely focused on 
maintaining a pious and ascetic lifestyle and spreading this awareness to other 
people through speech (tebliğ) and embodiment (temsil).204  
She felt sad for breaking from this soundscape with marriage, but there 
was no regret involved in this sadness. At the end of the day, she shifted between 
the authority of her religious leader and her husband for the same purpose: to 
submit to the authority of God, which was above all sources of authority for her.  
                                               
202 Fethullah Gülen is referred as Hocaefendi by the people in Turkey who respect 
him as a religious scholar.  
203 See Charles Hirsckind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic 
Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
204 Tebliğ and temsil are the major principles of the notion of dava formulated by 
Gülen under the principle of “enjoining good and forbidding evil.” In fulfilling 
this ethical duty, tebliğ stands as the requirement to enunciate the truth, and temsil 
means the embodiment of the truth, sometimes replacing and sometimes 
strengthening the tebliğ.  
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Emerging from religious families  
 
The intensive, sort of missionized sense of piety yearned by Edibe, has 
also been happily left behind by others for several reasons. Those who graduated 
from the imam-hatip schools, for example, now look back those years with a 
sense of enlightenment, a de-radicalization in some ways. The common idea about 
these schools is that they give really good religious education, but that does not 
necessarily make one a pious person.  
The families who sent their kids to the imam-hatip school after the primary 
education, had different motivations and expectations: some genuinely wanted 
their kids to be well-versed in Islam, which would help them become a pious 
person; some were fearing that their children (especially daughters) would be 
corrupted in secular schools; some wanted to fight modernity, while some were 
simply afraid of it. In the 1980s, it was the breed of Islamist families that saw 
modernity as to be fought, or to resist its temptations. These families imagined 
their daughters as the soldiers of this fight, and their weapon was their headscarf.   
A story of disenchantment: Zeliha 
A striking example to this kind of de-radicalization is Zeliha, whose father 
was a close supporter of Necmeddin Erbakan for twelve years. He was a hafız, 
and he made Zeliha receive religious education from an early age, by sending her 
to the summer Qur’anic schools every year, and then sending her to the imam-
hatip school when she finished the elementary school. With all this intensive 
religious education, and indoctrination from her father, she comes to the campus 
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entrance of a Turkish university and she is forced to make a choice between her 
higher education and her headscarf. Her father tries to dissuade her from taking 
off her headscarf, telling her that “this is my dava”205 which, Zeliha replies by 
saying “This is not my dava.” 
I met Zeliha through the email group of the Meridyen Circle. I sent an 
email to this group explaining my project and asking for volunteers to share their 
experiences in the secular public sphere as a pious woman. Zeliha was among 
those who replied my email, and we met in Beyoğlu for a dinner. She was then 
working at the Beyoğlu municipality which belonged to the ruling JDP for more 
than ten years. Working there for nine years as a media and public relations 
officer, she had the chance to observe the transformation in the lifestyles of people 
like her father who shared his conception of dava: 
When I started working in the municipality nine years ago, there was a 
 more visible spirit of dava. In the recent years, people have been more 
 and more attending cocktails where alcohol is served. There is a 
 decrease in the number of women wearing headscarves, and they are 
 subjected to the glass ceiling phenomenon. Veiling (tesettür) has 
 become more of a fashion than a practice of piety. 
 
When she thinks back, she realizes that her father's approach to the 
headscarf, as well as all the other religious dogma, deemed a black and white 
situation, blind to the nuances of its reflection in the day-to-day life of the 
believers:  
                                               
205 The way Zeliha’s father used the word dava has a specific political implication 
here, as it was turned into the signpost of political Islam headed by Necmeddin 
Erbakan. 
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One learns that there are shades of gray in life as she gains experience. 
 This changes her way of questioning life as well. Nothing in Islam is a 
 black or white matter...There is something called homosexuality in real 
 life, go ahead and slaughter them all if you can! 
 
Piety and youthfulness: Neslihan   
Neslihan joined our team in the Women's Platform two months after I 
started there. She was going to be the special correspondent of the entire 
foundation: taking photos at the events and writing the news text to be published 
on the foundation's website. This meant that she had to attend all the activities 
organized by the different platforms. In other words, she was to be more visible 
than any other female volunteer in the foundation, which made me curious about 
the reactions of the male staff who were all pious men. Neslihan, though wearing 
a headscarf, was too beautiful206 and too lively to roam around any mixed-
gendered conservative circle as a single woman. Yet, she worked perfectly in this 
place without being intimidated for her way of fashionable dressing-up or her 
visibility in the male-majority settings. But she was also given the choice of not 
attending to the all-male events, where she was substituted by a male staff to take 
pictures.  
Neslihan saw this job as a way to overcome her sense of shyness in public, 
which partly resulted from being bullied in public by secularist people for being 
veiled:  
–When someone hurts me in some way, I usually think that it is 
 because I am veiled. But you can never know if this is true or not. 
                                               
206 She is of Albanian descent, with fair skin and blue eyes, which is the most 
favored beauty type in Turkey. 
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–Why do they hurt you? 
–Jealousy... 
–How? 
–I mean they will never be like me. I closed myself to everyone else at my 
most beautiful age; not everyone can manage to do that. 
–Do you think this is something they envy about? 
–They are not aware of their envy, but I believe that deep down it is there, 
because they themselves will never be able to do something like that. 
Because they only have a bodily existence; and their current unhappiness 
in life results from the collapse of their bodies...I wore the veil when I was 
only twelve, right after the earthquake in 1999. I don't think that anyone at 
the age of twelve would wear the headscarf willingly like I did. 
–And what made you to do that? 
–Fear of death.... 
 
This decision got more serious when her family made a ceremony out of 
this occasion; they invited their neighbors and relatives to celebrate their 
daughter's wearing the headscarf, i.e., carrying a sacred object on her head for the 
rest of her life.  
However, she was not even a teenager when she made this decision, and 
she started to feel the weight of it as she advanced to her adolescence, and the 
emotional burdens of teenage years added to her sense of responsibility.  
She said, at the age of fifteen, she fell in love and she thought that the guy 
would never like her because she is veiled and not dressing up according to 
fashion. This became a difficult moment for her as she seriously thought about 
taking off her headscarf. She managed to overcome that moment of doubt, yet it 
also showed her how strong the temptations are for a woman to remain pious in 
the modern world. She realized how piety is a constant process of struggle with its 
comings and goings, that one can never be sure of her piety just because of 
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performing the religious practices, for they are always prone to the temptations of 
the secular modern world.  
The trial of piety with existentialism: Hilal 
The temptations are not limited to heart affairs, as seen in the case of Hilal, 
who was hired to the WP to replace me when I started working at the university. I 
slightly knew her from college, who was in the same department with three years 
ahead of me. Therefore, I could identify with her engagement with the Western 
critical theories, especially existentialism. Having grown up in “a very 
conservative family” and with “a father who had strict rules” she also enjoyed the 
privilege of being the first daughter who went to college. She describes it as a 
“courage” shown by her father, who “can even be claimed to be a liberal man 
with this action.”  
However, she has questioned the conservative lifestyle many times during 
her teenage years. The serious questioning, on the other hand, started in her 
second year studying English language and literature at the university: 
–The readings on existentialism had a deep influence on me, 
 sometimes to the level of suspicion (about belief). I was seeking for 
 answers to questions such as “To what extent is this person right? To 
 what extent do I belong to this world (of existentialism)? Why am I 
 influenced so much?"  
–Why were you influenced? 
–I always had a dark side in my approach to life. I saw this dark 
 approach being confirmed in the writings of Sartre and Beckett, which 
 attracted me in the beginning.  
 
 Although this period of questioning and doubt led her to move away from 
religion –according to her definition-- as she started “performing religious 
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practices not out of love but out of obligation;” the aftermath of this crisis brought 
a new level to her depth of piety: 
 Then, Islam showed me that my existence had a meaning. Religious 
 practices became more meaningful for me. Both performing the ritual 
 prayer and covering my hair meant more than obligation for me.  
  
 Sacred household, profane land: Ceren 
Ceren, on the other hand, had experienced another form of awakening 
when she came to Istanbul to study International Relations in Boğaziçi University. 
She grew up in northern Cyprus,207 as the eldest of three daughters of an imam.  
“The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, also known as the Occupied 
Areas of Republic of Cyprus, is a state which is not a state. As a politically 
ambiguous space, the TRNC does not fit into the picture of a world of states as we 
currently know it.”208 Not existing officially, this is a place of betwixt-and-
between, where all the borders have to be drawn repeatedly and consciously. In 
the highly secular environment of this “filial homeland” Ceren's father was much 
more concerned with protecting his identity as a Turkish Muslim as against the 
highly secularized and Westernized majority.  
“A life in a religious family, in a place where religion did not exist” is how 
she defines her life in Cyprus. In that sense, Ceren's father needed a visible mark 
of religiosity that would distinguish his daughters from the non-religious. The 
headscarf, therefore, meant more for its outer meaning than its inner meaning for 
                                               
 
208 Daria Isachenko, The Making of Informal States: Statebuilding in Northern 
Cyprus and Transdniestria, Houndmills (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 9.  
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the wearer of it. For him it was the border that separated the sacred from the 
profane:  “My father had drawn some red-lines for us, and the headscarf was one 
of them. It was more symbolic to him than religious, for he wanted me to wear the 
türban209 style, not any other style.”  
She could only distinguish the difference in college, when she saw many 
different styles of covering, as well as many different types of religiosity 
advertised by various groups, networks, and organizations. The Hizmet network 
attracted her attention most, and she started familiarizing herself with the writings 
of Nursi and Gülen, which made her realize that her father's ideas were more 
nationalist, compared to the global vision the Hizmet draws.  
Stepping into diversity: Buse 
The trend of awakening to a new understanding of life after moving away 
from the family setting has been a clearly distinguishable pattern in all of my 
interviews. Among them, Buse's story reflects another dimension, as she was the 
only covered woman with a religious family background, and yet who has not 
affiliated herself with any group, movement, or ideology along the way to a more 
nuanced approach to piety.  
She went to an imam-hatip school, and the restrictions put on these 
schools in the university entrance exam (so as to prevent the graduates of these 
schools to get prominent jobs) forced her to study American Culture and 
                                               
209 Türban is specifically called for the style that covers only the head and the 
neck, while the headscarf also means covering the shoulders and the bosom with 
the same cloth.  
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Literature -again, in my university, but I had already graduated by then. I met her 
at a meeting of the Meridyen Circle, and she volunteered to be part of my project. 
After graduation from the university, she went to London, UK for her MA degree 
in Media and Communication.  
This was a time the Turkish media was being rescued from the monopoly 
of the Kemalist, and secularist media corporations. The Zaman media group of the 
Hizmet movement was gaining more and more power, being the best-selling 
newspaper in Turkey, and a wealthy conservative businessman had just bought the 
Turkuaz Media Group, owner of the mainstream newspaper Sabah, and the ATV 
television station. Buse had the chance to be recruited to ATV by the new owners, 
who decided to keep the old secularist staff and balance them with some religious 
staff. In some ways, they had to continue with the old staff, for the religious 
conservatives in Turkey were just beginning to be interested in media expertise. I 
asked her if she had any problem with practicing her religious duties, or 
maintaining a pious life in her workplace: 
I am working in the children's channel, so it is a safer environment. 
 There are no ultra-secular people in my group, I can spend time with 
 them. The distance with people in the other departments is more 
 serious. We have a mescit (prayer room), I can perform my prayers 
 there. I see some people in the mescit, whom I would never imagine to 
 be a pious person. So, we also have prejudices against them. 
 
Before working in this secular workplace, she had a more formalist idea of 
piety, which is no more predictable to her based on the looks:  
The formalist, taboo-oriented understanding of piety which I received 
 in my family and the imam-hatip school is now changing. Our  
 conception was too much based on fiqh (Islamic law), which is very 
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 much focused on the forms. However, I see that every human being 
 experiences religion in her own way. Still, my parents do not think in 
 the same way I do, because they have never stepped outside of their 
 protected environments. They have always lived with people like them.  
 
This kind of family is the most common one in Turkey, both in the sense 
of being religious or secular. These traditional families, who are usually religious, 
manifest a generational gap especially with the rise of higher education rates in 
Turkey. While the parents remain in the hometown, financially supporting their 
daughter's education, the young girl explores into a whole new world unknown to 
her parents. As in the case of Buse, Hilal, Zeliha, and Ceren, their religious 
formation at their parents' home goes through a deep transformation to a more 
diverse and nuanced understanding.  
Yet, another case with this kind of traditional families is the lack of 
religious literacy, and depending on memorization and hearsay in the religious 
formation. In the lack of direct access to main sources, they have to rely on the 
local imams or any other religious scholar who can guide them.  
New religious voices 
As the monopoly of the Diyanet in the religious sphere declined with the 
rise of the tarikats and cemaats in the public sphere, secular education became the 
primary ground of contact with the younger generation and non-official religion. 
The university exam preparation courses are the first step of this contact, which is 
continued and consummated with recruitment to the group at the university.  
What these cemaats and tarikats do is to prove their claim that the official 
Islam of the Diyanet is shallow and lacking the spirit of dava, and to instill a kind 
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of “learned piety” in the hearts of the individuals by showing the real meaning of 
worship and religious practices. They think that the religious education given by 
the Diyanet is a sequel to the kind of modern Islamic education described by 
Robert Hefner in Schooling Islam: 
The rise of modern Islamic education brought about a shift in the 
distribution and style of Islamic knowledge. The earlier pattern of 
informality…gave way to classrooms, fixed curricula, examinations, and 
professional teachers. In these relatively depersonalized settings, many 
believers came to view their faith as a subject which must be “explained” 
and “understood” on the basis of formal doctrinal canons…210 
 
The dava conception these tarikats and cemaats rise upon, on the other 
hand, aims to bring back this earlier pattern of informality and personalized 
education. They focus on the concepts of humility, fear of God, and sincerity, as 
they prioritize the individuals being moved rather than being persuaded.  
The difference between the tarikats and cemaats is the scope of their 
mission: Tarikats have always been major actors of public piety and social 
cohesion both in the Ottoman Empire (publicly) and in the Republican Turkey 
(privately); in some ways, they can be claimed to be the pioneers of the dava in 
Turkey, since they functioned in exactly the same way the modern da’wa 
movement in Egypt does:  
Da’wa does more than simply enforce a normative moral order. It makes 
that order dependent upon the activities of ordinary Muslim citizens acting 
within changing historical circumstances in such a way that mediates 
against claims to closure and certainty.211  
                                               
210 Robert Hefner “The Culture, Politics, and Future of Muslim Education” in 
Schooling Islam, eds. R. Hefner and M.Q. Zaman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 33. 
211 Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape, 137. 
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When their power in the public sphere was seriously curtailed by the 
Kemalist regime, the tarikats had to go underground and continue their existence 
in small, private circles. The cemaats, on the other hand, revived the social 
activism of the old tarikat tradition, and appeared as Neo-sufi movements in the 
secular public sphere with an ability to easily disguise as civil society movements. 
They also criticized the tarikats for their loss of dynamism and ability to read the 
spirit of the time. Thus, while the tarikats were solely focused on traditional 
religious education, providing Qur’anic schools to the younger generation, the 
cemaats took up secular education as a pious act and a tool of dava, providing 
secular facilities such as university exam preparation courses, private schools, and 
universities.  
From folk piety to authenticated piety: Zuhal 
It is through one of these secular facilities that Zuhal and her husband got 
to establish a closer relationship with religion. Zuhal was the public relations 
officer at the Journalists and Writers Foundation, who, later on started work at a 
public university in the international relations department. She describes her 
family as secular, by which she means “neither lacking religion nor fulfilling its 
requirements.” Her mother used to recite the Qur’an, and occasionally do the 
ritual prayer, and her father prayed less often than her. This kind of a family van 
be easily described as a traditional mildly religious family, rather than a secular 
one; but to Zuhal’s current standards, it was a secular family. Because, she 
considered their relationship with religion as a cultural adherence, and thus she 
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thought it did not have a significant value. She was able to make this distinction 
when she was introduced to the writings of Nursi and Gülen through her brother-
in-law, when he went to the Hizmet’s university exam preparation course 
(dershane).  
This distinction between cultural Islam and authentic Islam is one of the 
major messages of Gülen, and the other pietist networks as a matter of fact. It was 
Nursi’s initial goal to instill iman-ı tahkiki (authenticated faith) in the hearts of 
believers instead of iman-ı taklidi (imitative faith) which had caused the Muslims 
to lose power against the non-Muslim powers in the last three centuries. Nursi 
describes the ideal form of faith as something beyond the limits of knowledge; it 
should be so strong that “the spirit (ruh), heart (kalp), inner heart (sır), soul (nefs) 
and other subtle faculties (letaif)” must each receive “its share according to its 
degree” just like “when food enters the stomach, it is distributed in various ways.” 
Thus, if each of these faculties does not receive their share, it means the faith is 
weak.212  
Similarly, Gülen reiterated in many of his writings and sermons that 
Muslims should seek for ascertained faith and go beyond hypothetical (nazari) 
knowledge and living religion as a culture. He described imitative faith as one’s 
believing in something as it is, without feeling any need for inquiry, and thus 
adjusting his/her behavior accordingly. “This kind of behavior,” according to 
Gülen, “lacks any questioning and thus ascertained knowledge;” hence “it can be 
                                               
212 Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, “26th Letter,” in The Letters (Ankara: Ihlas Nur 
Nesriyat, 2009), 384. 
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subject to frequent shifts and changes according to the flow of the masses or the 
override of other external influences.” Furthermore, people with imitative piety 
“cannot resist the flow of heresy and disbelief resulting from science and 
philosophy.” Gülen claims that “the only reason most of these people have 
become Muslims is because they were born under the shadow of a mosque and 
within a strong Muslim society.”213  
The call for questioning and seeking ascertained knowledge in Islam might 
initially sound similar to the authentication process, which, Lara Deeb defines in 
her observations about the pious Shiite al-Dahiyya society in Lebanon. It is true 
that a similar kind of authentication process is promoted by Gülen and other 
prominent religious figures who want to raise people with sound faith for their 
dava; and there is a call for a shift from “a traditional milieu to an Islamic one,” 
where,  
value is not placed on the completion of religious practices merely as an 
end in itself, but rather on the completion of religious practices as the end 
result of correct religious understanding. Beyond fulfilling one's religious 
obligations correctly, it is also important to seek knowledge necessary to 
obtain this correct understanding, and to contribute to the authentication 
process itself.214  
 
However, the serious case to address about the Turkish society is more 
about promoting the completion of religious practices than putting the completed 
practices through an authentication process. Gülen says that in today’s society, 
                                               
213 Fethullah Gülen, “Sığlık, Durağanlık ve Tevbe (Superficiality, Stagnation, and 
Repentance,” Bamteli, May 15, 2011, accessed September 13, 2012, 
http://www.herkul.org/index.php/bamteli/bamteli-arsiv 
214 Lara Deeb, An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi'i Lebanon 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 128. 
  153 
religious practices are widely neglected and ignored, which prevents the 
hypothetical knowledge from turning into ascertained faith. The laxity in 
practicing the religious knowledge in day-to-day life leads one to live Islam as a 
form of culture in the case of fairly observant Muslims, and to disbelief and 
heresy in the case of the non-observant ones. In this sense, what these pietist 
movements are trying to address are both secularization of the society, and the 
“folklorization of worship” that Saba Mahmood has drawn attention in her 
analysis of the women’s mosque movement in Egypt. The participants of this 
movement also complain that  
ritual acts of worship in the popular imagination have increasingly 
acquired the status of customs or conventions, a kind of “Muslim folklore” 
undertaken as a form of entertainment or as a means to display a religio-
cultural identity.215  
 
A good example of the display of a religious act as a religio-cultural 
identity is the practice of abstaining from pork, which is not tolerated even by 
nominal Muslims, while they see it completely fine to drink alcohol. As a 
religious rule, both of them are openly forbidden in the sacred texts (both the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah); however, one is seen as a marker of being non-Muslim, 
while the latter is at most considered a bad habit of a Muslim. Zuhal’s family is 
but one of these examples, and even though her parents were engaged in some 
religious practices, Zuhal did not consider these practices as a sign of “realization 
                                               
215 Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 48. 
  154 
of one’s religion” 216(dinini yaşamak); because in her understanding of worship, 
“rituals are performed as a means to the training and realization of piety in the 
entirety of one’s life.”217 
Although I was limited by the scope of this dissertation to share all the 
stories I have listened during my fieldwork, I tried to reflect as much diversity as 
possible within the details of each story I told in this chapter. There is, of course, 
much more insights to be learned from these stories, including the contours of 
their self-cultivation process within a particular framework of piety, which will be 
examined in the next chapter.  
                                               
216 “dinini yaşamak” might also mean to live or experience, or practice one’s 
religion. It is a much commonly used phrase in Turkish, meaning that Islam is 
something to be lived through rather than just to be believed in.   
217 Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 48. 
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Chapter 4 
BUILDING A PIOUS SELF 
In the previous chapter, I have explored the various journeys to piety taken by 
women with diverse family backgrounds, ages, social status, education levels, and 
areas of profession. Now, I will explore which path of virtue-formation they take 
in these journeys, and how they negotiate between the dynamics of the body and 
the mind, along with the different conceptions of agency, freedom, and 
submission informed by the secular-liberal and Islamic economies of ethical 
behavior.  
If the realization of piety is a process of becoming, it requires the 
utilization of various devices and tools to move along in this process. In this 
context, Foucault’s formulation of the “technologies of the self” is a helpful 
conceptual tool to understand how exactly rituals are performed to cultivate a 
pious self by the Turkish women acting on secular grounds.  
Even though I will use the word “ritual” in this chapter, it is only for the 
purpose of incorporating this debate with the larger scholarship known as ritual 
studies. In fact, the concept that would be appropriate for the Islamic context is 
ibâdet, to which, the closest English word would be worship.218  
                                               
218 As Talal Asad suggests in Genealogies of Religion, the category of ritual, may 
not be appropriate to non-Western and non-Christian cultural milieus, because of 
its origin and development in Western Christianity. He claims that the category of 
ritual is to a great extent the construct of Western academia, which, in turn created 
a shared sense of ritual as a symbolic act in Western religiosity: “The idea that 
symbols need to be decoded is not, of course, new, but I think it plays a new role 
in the restructured concept of ritual that anthropology has appropriated and 
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İbâdet (‘ibâdât in Arabic) is a much wider concept than ritual (ritüel in 
Turkish), for it involves all acts of worship and servitude to God, ranging from 
praying five times a day to going to work in order to earn one’s living in the 
world.219 While it can “refer to the whole range of appropriate acts for conforming 
life to God’s will (shar), “it is most often used specifically to designate the legal 
category in Muslim jurisprudence (fiqh) to which belong the major ritual and 
religious duties of Muslims.”220  
Thus, within this space between the narrow and wide definition of 
religious practice in the Islamic sense, I will explore how the understandings of 
piety are determined in the way bodily acts are performed in the particular 
contexts these journeys to piety take place.  
Utilizing the “care of the self” as the main analytical tool, I will trace the 
milestones of cultivating piety within the Islamic tradition, particularly through 
the works of Mohamed Al-Ghazzali, who laid down the technologies of self-
                                                                                                                                
developed from the history of Christian exegesis.” Talal Asad, Genealogies of 
Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 60.  
Catherine Bell agrees with Asad that the “scholarship on ritual as a universal 
construct has succeeded in creating the beginnings of a shared sense of ritual in 
many religious and civic practices of Euro-American culture,” and she accepts 
that “we may well be in the very process of actually creating ritual as the 
universal phenomenon we have long taken it to be.” in Catherine Bell, Ritual: 
Perspectives and Dimensions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 265. 
219 In Turkish, there is a common saying: “Çalışmak ibadettir. (Working is 
worship).” It is supported by another common saying: “Allah boş duranları 
sevmez. (Allah does not like idle people).” In this context, ibâdet means any act 
that Allah likes a servant (kul in Turkish; ‘abd in Arabic) to do.  
220 William A. Graham, Islamic and Comparative Religious Studies: Selected 
Writings (Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 94.  
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disciplining and becoming perfect in his works The Alchemy of Happiness, and 
On Disciplining the Self.  In doing this, I will engage in a dialogue with Saba 
Mahmood and Talal Asad in relation to their conceptions of virtue-making and 
agency, and see how the women in this particular case negotiate with their 
theories unknowingly while they are on their way towards building a pious 
modern self.  
At the end of the chapter, I will examine the particular contexts and 
happenings that are paving the way for a particular type of piety, including the 
easier access to Islamic pedagogical sources, the ease of travel, and the 
availability of new religious communities that appeal to some of my interlocutors 
for various reasons. In other words, I will try to portray a picture of the particular 
realities concerning the everyday life conditions of these highly-educated 
professional Muslim women, which are overlooked in the bulk of scholarship on 
Muslim women that are submerged in the debate over Muslim women’s 
oppression, and lack of rights which have long been enjoyed by their Western 
counterparts.  
Technologies of the self and virtue-formation 
Foucault contextualizes “technologies of the self” within three other forms 
of “technologies” used by human beings to understand themselves.  
(1) technologies of production, which permits us to produce, transform, or 
manipulate things; (2) technologies of sign systems, which permits us to 
use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification; (3) technologies of power, 
which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain 
ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject; (4) technologies of the 
self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the 
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help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and 
souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves 
in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, 
or immortality.221 
 
These technologies of the self are closely linked with the process of 
becoming, and the care of the self (mentioned in chapter one), which provides a 
better framework to understand the ritual practices and all other performances of 
Islamic conducts and behaviors as they are manifested in the day-to-day lives of 
these Turkish women.  
I believe that understanding a bodily practice as “both an expression of, 
and a means to, the realization of the subject” in Saba Mahmood’s words, would 
do more justice to the people who perform these bodily practices than 
approaching these practices as a symbolic act222 which “presumes a different 
relationship between the subject’s exteriority and interiority.”223 Mahmood 
explains that the latter approach stems from the conception of a “secular 
religiosity” by which she means “the Protestant conception [which] presupposes a 
                                               
221 Michel Foucault, “On Technology of the Self,” in Technologies of the Self: A 
Seminar with Michel Foucault, ed. L. Martin, et al. (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1988), 18. 
222 Mahmood’s argument here is built on Talal Asad’s reconception of the 
category of ritual where he rejects the idea of studying ritual as interpretation of 
symbols: “If there are prescribed ways of performing liturgical services, then we 
can assume that there exists a requirement to master the proper performance of 
these services. Ritual is therefore directed at the apt performance of what is 
prescribed, something that depends on intellectual and practical disciplines but 
does not itself require decoding. In other words, apt performance involves not 
symbols to be interpreted but abilities to be acquired according to rules that are 
sanctioned by those in authority: it presupposes no obscure meanings, but rather 
the formation of physical and linguistic skills.” Genealogies, 62. 
223 Saba Mahmood, preface to Politics of Piety: the Islamic Revival and the 
Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [2005] 2012), xi.  
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distinction between a privatized interiority that is the proper locus of belief and 
public exteriority that is an expression of this belief.”224 
 This conception sees rituals and bodily practices as markers of belief, 
rather than makers of it. It is heralded also by “many contemporary Muslim 
reformers writing under the rubric of ‘liberal Islam’ ...to establish this distinction 
by grounding it in the resources and scriptures of Islam.”225 For example, Amina 
Wadud writes in her feminist rereading of the Qur’an, that although “the Qur’an 
acknowledges the virtue of modesty and demonstrates it through the prevailing 
practices [of veiling and seclusion in the elite Arab tribes]” what is important is 
the principle of modesty “not the veiling and seclusion which were manifestations 
particular to that context.”226  
What Saba Mahmood places at the opposite of this approach is the 
“positive ethics” shaped by the Aristotelian conception of virtue-making, which 
strictly combines bodily acts and virtues together. In this conception, character, 
good or bad, “is the result of the repeated doing of acts which have a similar or 
common quality” –i.e. “habituation” as Aristotle names it: 
Such repetition acting upon natural aptitudes or propensities gradually 
fixes them in one or other of two opposite directions, giving them a bias 
towards good or evil. Hence the several acts which determine goodness or 
badness of character must be done in a certain way, and thus the formation 
of good character requires discipline and direction from without.227 
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226 Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Women: Rereading Sacred Text from a Woman’s 
Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 10. 
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The agent is not left totally out of this process, but its beginning is 
dependent on guidance. Aristotle believes that the process of virtue-making 
“cannot be entrusted to merely intellectual instruction” as it is a process “of 
assimilation, largely by imitation and under direction and control.”228 At the end 
of this habituation process, the agent gains a “growing understanding of what is 
done” and chooses to do it for its own sake since it has by now turned into a habit, 
easier and more pleasant to be done –like a second nature. At this point, the agent 
does not need outside guidance anymore, as he/she “acquires the power of doing 
them freely, willingly,” and from within.229  
In this Aristotelian way of ethics, then, the modesty principle cannot be 
acquired through reason alone as an abstract principle, since it needs to be taught 
to the agent through habituation, which requires specific bodily forms to come 
into existence.  
Whereas the modern thought, shaped by the Kantian ethics, sees reason 
itself as determining the will, without the intervention of any bodily experience, 
“only because it can, as pure reason, be practical, that it is possible for it to be 
legislative.”230 Contrary to the need for outside guidance, Kant argues that we 
become directly conscious of the moral law.  In that way, the liberal reformers can 
claim that bodily forms are not essential to virtues, for virtue-making occurs from 
interior to the exterior, according to what Kant says: 
                                               
228 Aristotle, Ethics. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Thomas K. Abbott, 
(Public Domain Books, [1788] 2004), Kindle edition.  
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We can become conscious of pure practical laws just as we are conscious 
of pure theoretical principles, by attending to the necessity with which 
reason prescribes them and to the elimination of all empirical conditions, 
which it directs. The concept of a pure will arises out of the former, as that 
of a pure understanding arises out of the latter.231 
 
Virtue-formation in the Islamic tradition: Al-Ghazzali 
 
Neither of these models can be isolated in order to understand Muslims’ 
rituals and bodily practices, since the Qur’an carries the traces of both. In many 
verses, the Qur’an invites human beings to use their reason to find the truth, the 
signs of which are already given to them by God: 
Thus does Allah make clear to you His verses that you might use reason.232  
 
Even the performance of bodily rituals is related to the use of reason, 
because it is the essential faculty God expects human beings to use: 
And when you call to prayer, they take it in ridicule and amusement. That 
is because they are a people who do not use reason.233  
Indeed, the worst of living creatures in the sight of Allah are the deaf and 
dumb who do not use reason.234  
 
However, in line with the Aristotelian model of ethics, the Qur’an also 
frequently reiterates its order to perform ritual prayers with care and conduct 
righteous deeds: 
Maintain with care the [obligatory] prayers and [in particular] the 
middle prayer and stand before Allah, devoutly obedient.235  
Indeed, those who believe and do righteous deeds and establish prayer and 
give zakah will have their reward with their Lord, and there will be no fear 
concerning them, nor will they grieve.236  
                                               
231 Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason.  
232 Qur’an 2: 242. 
233 Qur’an 5: 58.  
234 Qur’an 8: 22. 
235 Qur’an 2: 238. 
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The Qur’an’s emphasis on both the reason and practices has produced 
theories of self-disciplining and cultivation of piety which carried traces of both 
models in the Islamic tradition. Al-Ghazzali’s formulation of a pious or perfected 
self was based on the goodness of four powers in the human self: “the power of 
reason, the power of anger, the power of the carnal appetite, and the power of 
preserving equilibrium among the other three.”237 
In his topography, there are more than two paths along which the virtue-
making happens; that is, it is not a “from interior to exterior” situation, nor simply 
the other way around. The habituation principle, for him is a self-cultivation 
method embedded in the Religious Law (Shariah), since “a good disposition 
appears in anyone who has made a habit of good works” and  
the inmost mystery of the command of the Religious Law to perform good 
works is that its purpose is the transformation of the soul from an 
unseemly form to a good form. Whatever habit a person does by 
compulsion becomes his nature.238 
 
Good works include both the prescribed rituals as well as good deeds done 
for the sake of God, or the abstaining from bad deeds, again, for the sake of God. 
In that sense, ritualized behavior can be considered “one among a continuum of 
practices that serve as the necessary means to the realization of a pious self,” and 
                                                                                                                                
236 Qur’an 2: 277. 
237 Abu Hamed Muhammad Al-Ghazzali, On Disciplining the Self, trans. Jay R. 
Crook (Chicago: Kazi Publications, Inc., 2011), Kindle edition. 
238 Al-Ghazzali, On Disciplining the Self. 
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“regarded as the critical instruments in a teleological program of self-
formation.”239  
The Turkish women’s headscarf, and its relationship to other ritual 
practices, particularly the five daily prayers, had never been discussed during all 
these years of political struggle between the secularists and the Islamists, 
presuming that women were always siding themselves with either front. I, now,  
want to explore how Turkish Muslim women, who want to become pious and also 
a part of the modern secular public sphere, have made sense of these two practices 
that are popularly seen not befitting to the image of the ideal modern woman. 
Headscarf and ritual prayer 
Everyone in this research has a unique story with the headscarf, whether 
they have worn it or not. Most of these stories are not so pleasant thanks to the 
unique structure of the public sphere in Turkey. This uniqueness also makes it 
complicated when one needs to decide whether to give a symbolic meaning to the 
headscarf, or to consider it as an expression and a means to piety. 
In Zeliha’s case, it is hard to see the headscarf only as an exterior symbol, 
equivalent to the cross worn by Christians or the kippa worn by Jews.240 She went 
                                               
239 Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 128. 
240 I am making this claim in particular historical context, considering how the 
headscarf has acquired an existential meaning for Muslim women, unlike any 
other religious symbol in Christianity and Judaism have attained so far. The 
headscarf in general has multiple meanings for people; some see it as a symbol of 
religiosity; some see it as a fashion; and for some people it is much more complex 
than both of them. Because of all these complexities, wearing the headscarf is 
loaded with a much longer list of meanings and implications than what wearing 
the cross or the kippa are entailed with.  
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to her classes for four years by uncovering her hair each time at the campus 
entrance. It was too much for her to bear the curious and mostly unfriendly eyes 
around her, as she had to take off her scarf in public.241 She fell into depression, 
and received medical help for some time; and during this process she had her hair 
cut very short, which was up to her waist before.  
The lack of no religious symbol would create such a traumatic effect, let 
alone a political symbol. It might be argued that she saw the headscarf as 
indispensable to her religious identity; but this is not true, as she had already told 
her father that the headscarf was not her dava (at least in the sense that her father 
used the term). The headscarf, for Zeliha, was one of the techniques that she used 
to attend to herself and transform herself into an ideal model of piety; and the 
forceful loss of it created a fragmentation in her conception of the self, which 
pushed her to the edge of mental breakdown.  
It is generally thought that the victims of the headscarf issue have been 
women who wore it, while those who did not wear it remained unaffected by the 
political storms created around the headscarf. Gül, my colleague in the Turkish 
literature department has also suffered the headscarf debates because she did not 
wear it. She worked at an imam-hatip school for a short while in the beginning of 
                                               
241 In my university, a special place was built at the campus entrance for us to take 
off our headscarves. Actually, it was designed like a big dressing room with 
mirrors and hangers, and chairs to sit, etc. Thus, we did not feel that shame of 
uncovering our head in public, which was more difficult for those who cared 
about aesthetics, as the hair does not come out under the scarf as wavy and 
soigne. One should not underestimate the humiliating impact this experience can 
create for a young woman.   
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her post-graduate career. She says people around her did not believe in her 
sincerity when she went to the mescit to pray: 
They told me that I was praying to show off, so I stopped praying after that 
incident. They cannot associate performing the ritual prayer with not 
wearing the headscarf. They thought that I was not pious because my head 
was uncovered. An uncovered woman for them is uncovered in all aspects.  
 
“They” in this context refers to the self-acclaimed religious people, as she 
cannot see herself belonging to that group. She feels in-between, in a limbo, as 
she is not accepted by the religious-conservative section or the “modern” section 
as she describes the secularists: 
–The modern section thinks that you are just like them: one who drinks 
alcohol, and has no (religious) restrictions. And the covered ones directly 
say that “you are not one of us” when they see me. I feel really torn apart 
in that matter. 
–Do you think you can appear as you are?242 
–No, this appearance is not me. 
–What prevents you (from appearing as you are)? 
–My education, my career. The secular environment does not let you to 
realize what you believe in.  
 
Interestingly, the covered women that she had around, shared the view of 
the secularists that headscarf was a symbol, though not political, but a religious 
symbol. So, they did not consider Gül as a pious person. When I think about my 
own astonishment at seeing Rüya praying in the school mescit, I realize that the 
political indoctrination from both the Islamist and the Kemalist parts for the last 
thirty years have indeed planted the seeds of this modernist view into my mind. 
Seeing the headscarf as an end result of an inner piety, rather than a means to it, 
                                               
242 Knowing her interest in Sufi literature, I referred to the famous saying of 
Rumi: “Either appear as you are, or be as you appear.” 
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had actually been the dominant view in the popular imagination, giving way to the 
claim that those who wear the headscarf are pious and those who do not wear it 
are not.  
For Esra, wearing the headscarf is only a part of a broader concept of 
tesettür (covering), which has two sides: attitude and outfit. And the headscarf is 
just a part of the outfit, as she still tries to follow the rules of tesettür without 
covering her hair: 
I never wear short-sleeves, nor shorts or mini-skirts. I don’t swim in the 
mixed-gendered places even with the Islamic bathing suit. I only go to a 
women-only swimming pool, and even there I cover my legs down to my 
knees. 
 
But in the popular imagination, the attitude of tesettür is not conveyed to 
the others around without the headscarf, which can be imagined like the cap of a 
bottle: no matter what you fill in that bottle, it will all be spilt without the cap. So, 
no matter how much she cares about embodying tesettür with her behaviors, it is 
not seen by the others: 
I don’t shake hands with men unless they initiate it. If you and I are 
standing side by side, a man would not attempt to shake your hand, but he 
would attempt to shake mine.243 
 
The modern conception of interior-to-exterior virtue formation is very 
strong in the popular imagination, and it gives way to two different reactions: For 
example, the religious-conservatives do not believe in the existence of the virtue 
of modesty unless they see the outer expression of it; whereas, the secularists and 
                                               
243 Although I have no problem with shaking hands with men, the conservative 
men never attempt to shake hands with me; and some are so sensitive that they do 
not talk to me unless I start the conversation.  
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the liberal Muslims do not take the practical sensitivities seriously, because they 
do not see them important as long as the virtue of modesty is in one’s heart.  
Therefore, when Esra goes to the secularist places, she cannot make 
people understand and act according to her religious sensitivities: 
When I go to the hair-dresser, I tell them that I do not want a male hair-
dresser. And they give me weird looks. My sensitivities in the swimming 
pool do not make sense even to veiled women. I did not want a wedding 
dress that showed my body parts, but I had to bow down to the pressures 
of both the wedding dress vendor and my family.244 I did not want to have 
nail polish after manicure, because I was regularly praying. But I could not 
tell this to them, so they did not understand why I did not want nail polish.  
 
For conservative people, on the other hand, Esra’s bottle of piety is still 
empty because it lacks the cap on it:  
The headscarf has become an important symbol on itself. The comment I 
get from conservative people is this: “So, if you are doing all these things, 
then why are you not covering your hair?” 
 
Contrary to the popular imagination, though, the headscarf does not have a 
monolithic function and meaning for women who wear it, or who have worn it for 
some time. To some extent, it might be claimed that the public image of the 
headscarf had gained its own identity as an object independent of the private 
experiences of the “subjects” who appropriate it as a bodily practice.  
The public image in the eyes of the religious-conservatives says that all 
covered women believe that it is an order of God, and they believe that 
uncovering is a sin. On the other hand, the headscarf speaks to the secularists in a 
                                               
244 Her wedding dress had a low-neck cut, leaving her neck uncovered, and she 
covered her arms with long lace-designed gloves. 
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different language and tells them that it is a symbol of Islamism and the secret 
desire to bring back the Shariah rule.  
Yet, what my friend Sena wanted when she covered her head in college 
was completely far from both of these public images. I met Sena in college as a 
veiled woman, with non-fashionable modest clothes. For four years, she was a 
typical observant Muslim girl, who had a special interest in history and 
philosophy rather than Western literature and criticism that we were studying in 
our classes. She went to Germany for her master’s degree, and there she had a 
striking transformation, by taking off her headscarf and wearing fashionable 
clothes.  
We were surprised at this transformation, as we had known her to be like 
any of us: covered, and part of the Hizmet network. That is why some of our 
classmates clearly showed their discontent at her in their Facebook comments, 
saying that she had gone astray too much, when she criticized the Hizmet 
movement in her status update. The problem was that we did not know her; we 
had never known her. We just had assumed her to be the person we wanted her to 
be. Years later, I reached her for this research, and asked her to tell me about her 
story of piety:  
My mother is of Circassian origin, and they are traditionally on a very 
friendly basis with religion –a relationship established on love rather than 
commands and prohibitions. And my father was of a traditional Western 
Anatolian family, who had always followed the mainstream line of 
religiosity, driven by the state: Sunni, nationalist, and believing in 
privatized religion. My interest in the Ottoman-Turkish history from my 
childhood, created a desire in me towards religion. I made my college 
choice with a religious motivation, as I wanted to be in a pious network. 
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So, I wore the headscarf at college by my own choice. Not because I 
believed that uncovering was a sin, but because I wanted to become more 
pious…I do not care about reward or punishment. I do not like doing 
something without believing simply because I am afraid of the Creator.  
 
As our conversation went on, I learnt that she did not agree with the ideas 
of the people in the Hizmet network (which was stricter about a scripturalist 
reading and a focus on commands and prohibitions as part of the authentication 
process). So she decided to leave the network, and later on, the framework of the 
religion, so as not to fight against them. “Too much data entry” she thinks, is the 
reason why she lost the initial excitement about religion and piety, “because when 
you come across different views, and different religious conceptions, you realize 
that you are not special.” In summary, the headscarf did not help Sena cultivate a 
pious self, even though she meant it to do so.  
Another aspect of the headscarf issue that must be brought to surface is the 
ease or difficulty of wearing the headscarf, with the practical aspects and the 
socio-political complications. To some, the headscarf is/must be worn with pride 
and pleasure as it is “a verse of the Qur’an” while another section of the society 
thinks that it is an oppression on women, and wearing it must be like a torture for 
these women (especially in the summer days). So, what is it really like to be 
wearing the headscarf? 
 In my conversations, the comparison of it with performing the ritual 
prayer came out naturally. It is not surprising that for Zeliha, wearing the 
headscarf, or covering (tesettür) in general is much harder than regularly 
performing the ritual prayer: 
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I cannot think of a veiled woman who is not performing the daily prayers. 
Veiling is a harder practice than prayer, actually the hardest one in Islam. I 
find it hard to understand those who do not perform such an easy practice 
as prayer but wear the veil. 
 
A similar argument is traced in Esra’s insistence on performing her prayers 
in every situation, while she cannot find the courage to cover her hair, and 
become a başörtülü woman that would come with a package (conclusive of all 
implications). Despite the fact that she is the only one not wearing the headscarf 
in her close circle of pious friends, and despite the guilt she feels for not wearing 
it, she cannot run the risk of the social pressure it will bring. She cannot risk 
upsetting her parents by donning a “symbol” that is unbearable for her family 
members, mostly because of its social implications. In this sense, the inevitable 
visibility of the headscarf makes it more difficult than praying, which can be 
always done in a private place without being seen by anyone else: 
In all places I went for job interviews, I used to search for a spot where I 
could perform my prayers. In my previous workplace, I was using one cup 
of water to have ritual ablution, and I was praying in the room which was 
used for breastfeeding. I have never had an alternative like not performing 
the prayers. Even when I cannot do anything, I will still perform the prayer 
with my eyes.245 
 
In the case of Neslihan, who covered herself at the age of twelve, tesettür 
is easier than namaz (ritual prayer); because “tesettür turns into a lifestyle, it 
                                               
245 Normally the gestures and body movements in the ritual prayer are obligatory, 
but it is allowed to perform while sitting if the person cannot stand upright, or 
while lying down if the person cannot even sit, and even with moving the eyes if 
one cannot move his or her body at all. Although these accommodations have 
been developed for health reasons, some people appropriate these 
accommodations to situations where one cannot perform the ritual prayer openly 
because of social and political restrictions. 
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becomes a habit” while “there is no habituation of namaz, because the Satan 
pokes you each of the five times…Namaz is your visa to enter the Paradise, that’s 
why Satan fights with you more on this issue.” 246  
Although the ritual prayer is the condition for entering the Paradise after 
death, it is not necessarily seen as the ultimate point of piety –understandably 
because piety should not be equated with the desire to earn the Paradise. Ritual 
prayer, in and of itself, does not make one a pious person, “unless,” says Gül, 
“one can internalize the meaning of the prayer, and can establish a connection 
with God each time she bows down her head.” In other words, the bodily 
practices of standing upright, bending down, and prostration, should transform the 
self to a better condition in order to be considered a sign of piety. In her 
imagination, each prayer is like a rite of passage. Each time the believer must 
come out as a different person. In other words, for Gül, the ritual prayer should be 
both the expression and the means to piety, which is manifested with good 
disposition: “Of course Islam has five pillars that everyone must be doing; so this 
not an extra deed, unless it is embellished with good disposition.”  
I was surprised to hear the same comment from Firuze, a covered woman 
working as a newspaper editor in London, who is actually a hafız. In the standards 
                                               
246The Satan (Şeytan) is believed to be constantly trying to seduce the servants of 
God from following His orders, based on this verse in the Qur’an: “For he [the 
Satan] had said, ‘I will surely take from among Your servants a specific portion. 
And I will mislead them, and I will arouse in them [sinful] desires, and I will 
command them so they will slit the ears of cattle, and I will command them so 
they will change the creation of Allah.’ And whoever takes Satan as an ally 
instead of Allah has certainly sustained a clear loss.” (Qur’an 4: 118-119)   
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of the society, she would definitely be considered a pious woman. Yet she had 
different standards of piety in her mind:  
Piety means being close to God, having a good relationship with God, and 
doing everything for God, not his slaves. The role of worship and prayers 
(ibadet) is to keep the connection uncut. How would God measure our 
piety if he did not prescribe these practices of worship? They empower 
one’s faith, but they are not the essence of piety. Good disposition is the 
essence of piety for me.  
 
The difference of this approach from the “what matters is the belief” 
argument is that it does not negate the necessity of the bodily practices; indeed, it 
connects it to a system of bodily acts that can be determined as the components of 
a good disposition. It is not regarded as a replacement of prescribed ritual 
practices, but as an enhancer of them.  As Al-Ghazzali suggests, “With a good 
disposition, a person achieves the level of him (sic) who fasts by day and prays by 
night. He attains great degrees in the Hereafter, even though his worship is 
weak.”247 In other words, an agentive performance that transforms the self to a 
better position is much more rewarding than mere performance of the rituals.   
The subject between submission and agency  
The beginning of all (spiritual) happiness is taking pains in (the 
performance of) good deeds. The fruit of this is that the soul internalizes 
good qualities. Then, their light shines outside and good deeds begin to be 
accepted naturally and voluntarily. The secret of this is that connection 
which is between the soul and the body, for one affects the other and vice 
versa. It is for this that any act done negligently is in vain, for the soul has 
not given that act any part of its attributes because the soul was unaware of 
it.248 
 
                                               
247Al-Ghazzali, On Disciplining the Self. 
248 Ibid.  
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The awareness of the soul mentioned by Al-Ghazzali in his treatise on 
“disciplining the self,” is an important window to see the conception of agency in 
the classical Islamic ethics. He claims that any action without the awareness of the 
soul is in vain, as exercise of freewill is essential for a human being to be 
considered an agent. That explains why pursuers of authenticated piety condemn 
imitation, and require the use of freewill and critical thinking, as well as the 
embodiment of the truth reached at the aspired end of the authentication process.  
Talal Asad criticizes Western cultural theory for reducing agency into a 
“metaphysical idea of a conscious agent-subject having both the capacity and the 
desire to move in a singular historical direction: that of increasing self-
empowerment and decreasing pain.”249  
A similar reductionist conception can also be made for the Islamic subject-
agent; this subject is also conscious and has the capacity (fıtrat) and the desire 
(irade) to move in a singular metaphysical direction: to know God, and worship 
God.250 However, a closer look at these key concepts would indicate how this 
conception of agency operates on a complex ground of relationships between 
different forms of existence.  
In Islamic theology, fıtrat (Ar. fitrah) “is the immutable natural 
predisposition for good, innate in every human being from birth, or even earlier, 
from the pre-existent state in which the human soul enters into a covenant with 
                                               
249 Talal Asad, Formations, 79. 
250 “I created the jinn and the humankind only that they might worship Me.” 
Qur’an 51: 56. 
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God (Qur’an 7: 172). The term fitrah designates the human being's essential 
nature, moral constitution, and original disposition.”251 It constitutes the “spirit” 
in the topography of Ibn ‘Arabi that he defined for the human beings: 
 As microcosms, human beings contain the three created worlds: spiritual, 
imaginal, and corporeal. The spirit derives from the divine Breath, while 
the body is made of clay. The soul stands between the two and shares in 
qualities of both sides. Hence it is one like the spirit through its essence, 
but many like the body through its faculties.252  
 
  In this topography of the self, which is very similar to Freud’s scheme of 
id-ego-super ego, the soul starts its journey of becoming in an id-like state, which 
is described as “the soul commanding to evil” in the Qur’an253 and by the Sufis 
(nefs-i emmare). It gradually develops to the state of “the soul that blames”254 
(nefs-i levvame) or that holds itself accountable for its own shortcomings, which 
is actually the care of the self. Finally, the perfection is achieved at the stage 
where “the soul [is] at peace [with God]”255 (nefs-i mutmain). In this journey 
towards perfection, the soul is equipped with irade (freewill) to discipline its 
vehicle, i.e. the bodily faculties, and attain to the level of the spirit, which, “as the 
breath of God, already possesses the perfection of the fitra, the original human 
disposition.”256 
                                               
251 Oliver Leaman & Kecia Ali, Islam: The Key Concepts (New York: Routledge, 
2008), 40. 
252 William Chittick, Imaginal Worlds: Ibn-al ‘Arabi and the Problem of 
Religious Diversity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 99. 
253 Qur’an 12: 53. 
254 Qur’an 76: 2. 
255 Qur’an 89: 27.  
256 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 99.  
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In this economy of the self, then, the freewill is essential in becoming a 
pious subject, or a test-taker in this world in order to be rewarded or punished in 
the Judgment Day. That is why states of unconsciousness are excluded from this 
test by the jurisprudents. Hence, the subject in Islam is a test-taker, rather than a 
seeker of pleasure, considering the limits of this world. Its agentive action is 
needed to discipline the self (or the soul) in order to raise it to the level of “the 
soul that blames itself.” However, contrary to the secular Western perception of 
“increasing self-empowerment and decreasing pain,” the Islamic perception of the 
subject suggests otherwise.257 That is, the subject is expected to discipline her 
“evil-commanding” self by disempowering it, or giving it the opposite of what it 
wants, which means that decrease of pain is not necessarily the goal of the 
agentive action, since pain itself might be sought in order to discipline the self: 
Know that for whoever desires to expel his bad disposition from himself, 
there is only one way, and that is that he do the opposite of whatever that 
(bad) disposition commands him (to do). 258 
 
At least, when pain is afflicted on the agent, she259 is expected to show 
patience and thus convert that pain into pleasure in the Hereafter. With all the 
                                               
257 Although early Christianity had a great emphasis on pain and suffering, as 
Asad shows in Genealogies of Religion (1993), the modern notion of agency has 
become interestingly something that escapes pain. Even the common saying in 
English “no pain, no gain” is in contrast with the modern Western conception of 
agency.  
258 Al-Ghazzali, On Disciplining the Self.  
259 Although Al-Ghazzali’s and my usage of pronouns differ, we are both 
referring to the human being regardless of a specific gender. Al-Ghazzali 
continuously uses the male pronoun as in all classical scholarly works, including 
those of the Western scholarship, which deployed male pronoun to refer to the 
human being. Al-Ghazzali’s deployment of this pronoun does not necessarily 
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traumatic experiences she had, Zeliha confesses that “the headscarf is not 
something that you wear with pleasure;” yet she wears it because she believes that 
it is an order of God, “and it is worn to get closer to God.” Even though it is not a 
bodily pain, there is suffering caused by a bodily practice; for the conventional 
theory of agency in the secular-liberal realm, she must choose to end that 
suffering by not wearing the distressing object in order to display an agentive 
action. The other ways of action are not considered agentive, but manifestations 
of victimization either by the society or a higher power. However, that pain 
coexists with pleasure, as she thinks that “suffering gets to be pleasurable as you 
remember why you are suffering.”  
Talal Asad gives the example of sadomasochism to argue for the 
simultaneous existence of pain and pleasure in a bodily act, and asks “Why is 
sadomasochism not rejected by all moderns who condemn pain as a negative 
experience?”260 Asad uses that example to challenge secular-liberal people who 
reject religious pain and suffering on the grounds that it hinders agency since they 
are forced to inflict pain on themselves by a religious authority. All the religious 
                                                                                                                                
mean to exclude women from this process of subject formation. In Islamic ethics, 
as Asma Barlas says, “both women and men have the same capacity for moral 
agency, choice, and individuality,” which is evident from two facts according to 
her reading of the Qur’an: “First, the Qur’an holds both men and women to the 
same standards of behavior and applies the same standards for judging between 
them; that is, it does not sexualize moral agency. Second, the Qur’an appoints 
women and men each other’s guides and protectors, indicating that both equally 
are capable of attaining moral individuality and both have the same function of 
guardianship over one another.” Believing Women in the Qur’an: Unreading 
Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur’an (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2002), 140.  
260 Asad, Formations, 119. 
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restrictions one puts for herself in her day-to-day life can be considered an 
example of pain and pleasure coexisting in a bodily practice; and if there needs to 
be a calculation made, the amount of pleasure in return for the amount of pain in 
sadomasochism is quite insignificant, compared to the infinite pleasure the 
religious subject is promised in return for a finite pain.  
This religious subject, then, willingly accepts to subject herself to the 
restrictions of the religion, as indicated in Ceren’s words:  
I don’t agree with the idea that you should do nothing against your will. 
Isn’t that what self-disciplining is all about? I would like to be a diplomat, 
but I could not realize this dream because of the headscarf. But the 
headscarf is an indispensable part of me; I cannot give it up for any reason.  
 
Furthermore, the habituation process complicates the idea of agency and 
being aware of the bodily practices; because, habits, by their very nature, happen 
without the control of the subject, and transform the subject in return for its 
agentive action. For example, when I asked Hilal to what extent religion restricts 
her life, she answered that living within the lawful circle (helal daire)261 has made 
her happier in the long term.  
The headscarf seems to be restrictive, but it is not. When you are 
conditioned in a certain way, your desires and aspirations are also shaped 
accordingly. I do not desire to drink alcohol, or go out at night, anyways.  
 
But overall, it can be claimed that the transformation from imitative piety 
to authenticated piety was based on the use of agency, which was associated with 
awareness, consciousness, reasoning, and responsibility.  
                                               
261 Helal daire is a statement of Said Nursi, who says that “the lawful (helal) 
circle is enough for pleasure, there is no need to transgress to the unlawful 
(haram)” 
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The act of interpretation 
An important part of this exercise of agency has been the process of 
interpretation, which came as a result of direct access to the primary religious 
sources and the pluralization of religious discourses. The critical thinking and the 
subsequent individualization of piety actually came as the unintended 
consequences of a simple desire: to cultivate authenticated faith in order to resist 
the temptations and challenges of the modern secular public sphere. This need to 
empower piety through knowledge, accompanied with the proliferation of Islamic 
pedagogical materials, and the later digitalization of primary religious sources 
have paved the way for the individualization of piety, which required a more 
intense engagement with the act of interpretation.  
 For example, Elif, a public-relations officer, who has been an affiliate of 
the Hizmet movement for long years, has developed her individual understanding 
of the practice of covering the hair with a headscarf: 
Not covering your hair does not mean that your hair is seductive. Being 
non-covered in our society is not the same as being non-covered in the 
Arab society...The purpose of veiling is not to attract attention and be 
seductive. But in fact, veiling is something that makes one more beautiful 
by covering the imperfections in one’s body.  
 
 The exposure to diverse realities in the everyday life has made Elif and 
others to seek for new interpretations in religion that would take these new 
realities into account.  
 
 
  179 
Travelling and reinterpretation 
 
A big part of this interpretation process is the extra careful usage of the 
Hadith, by subjecting them to critical thinking in the light of the new experiences. 
This stands out as a big challenge to deal with for Sümeyye, who is the chair of 
the Meridyen Association that has taken up the mission of advertising and 
promoting the life of the Prophet as a role model for the contemporary society at 
the national and global level.  
The website262 they have prepared for this purpose includes a diverse 
range of approaches to the life, character, and mission of the Prophet from both 
Turkish and non-Turkish scholars, which is a reflection of Sümeyye’s exposure to 
the non-Turkish Islam in her travels to the UK, Spain, and Malaysia. She 
compares her early understanding of piety at the imam-hatip school, with her 
current view shaped by her later experiences: 
In imam-hatip school, piety for me was based on the five pillars. After 
college –I don’t know if this is a loss or something better, but I realized 
that this thing (piety) could be stretched to include more than practicing 
the five pillars. 
 
 Travelling has had a remarkable impact on this expansion process, as 
seeing different practices of Islam in Europe, or in Malaysia, she “realized that 
many things we had been guarding by considering religious were actually 
cultural.” She gives the example of the popular belief that the month of Safar on 
the lunar calendar is baleful and brings trouble, so one must be extra careful and 
recite extra supplications in this month. She says, “when I was at college, we used 
                                               
262 http://www.lastprophet.info/  
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to question whether this was in the Hadith or in the Qur’an. But now, we are 
questioning whether that Hadith is authentic or not.”263  
Also, the main experience that taught Zeliha about the shades of gray in 
life has been her travel to the US, for a six-month language course in Washington, 
D.C.  She describes her experience as such: “I was in an aquarium before then. I 
saw the ocean when I went to the US; I saw thousands of different types of 
beings. I respect all of them, and I expect to be respected in the same way.” 
In essence, the act of travelling has been one of the oldest ways of 
acquiring wisdom and knowledge, but remained a privilege of men until very 
                                               
263 Questioning the Hadith is a double-edged sword for pious Muslims, especially 
for women who are not always happy with some Hadith attributed to the Prophet, 
such as “Those who entrust their affairs to women will never know prosperity” 
(Sahih Bukhari, Vol. 9, 88: 119) or, “Isn’t the witness of a woman equal to half of 
that of a man?...This is because of the deficiency of a woman’s mind.” (Sahih 
Bukhari, Vol. 3, 48:826). Unlike what Fatima Mernissi did in Women & Islam: 
An Historical and Theological Enquiry, these women do not necessarily embark 
on a scholarly journey to prove these types of Hadith wrong, especially when they 
are included in the Sahih collection; but they try to understand the larger context 
of these oral traditions, and try to discover what can be seen beyond the literal 
undertakings of them. This cautionary approach in dealing with the seeming 
problematic Hadith results from the widespread veneration of the Prophet among 
Muslims, especially in the context of Turkey where Sufism has been very strong 
for centuries. Annemarie Schimmel writes in The Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 
that “The personality of the Prophet became the medium of religious experience, 
although, phenomenologically speaking, the center of Islam is the Koran as direct 
divine revelation, not the messenger who brought it. But the Muslims felt that the 
figure of the Prophet was necessary for the maintenance of the Muslim faith in its 
“legal” aspect (as indicated in the second phrase of the profession of 
faith)…Muhammad constitutes a limit in the definition of Islam and sets it off 
from other forms of faith.” 214. In other words, they believe that their faith is at 
stake if they deny an authentic Hadith, and they try to avoid this risk as much as 
possible.  
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recent times because of the travelling conditions. The tradition of rıhle (rihla in 
Arabic) used to be the primary method of learning for the Muslim scholars until 
the modern schooling was introduced in the nineteenth century. According to this 
tradition, the students (talebe, which means one who demands) would travel long 
distances to study at the desk (rahle) of a teacher (üstad, or ustadh in Arabic, 
meaning the master) whose fame would spread through word of mouth. In fact, 
even before this tradition, travelling was considered to be source of enlightenment 
and opening-up of one’s worldview, for it was partly his experiences during his 
travels as a caravan driver that made Prophet Muhammad to retreat to a cave in a 
mountain to engage in deep “critical” thinking of the state of his own society.  
The reason why travelling and being in motion has such great contribution 
to one’s expanding her knowledge base lies in Michel de Certeau’s description of 
the act of walking: “To walk is to lack a place. It is the indefinite process of being 
absent and in search of a proper.”264 Lacking a place allows one to be exposed to 
infinite types of knowledge in her search for it; and finding a place would be the 
end of the passion for seeking knowledge and critical thinking of the already 
available ones in her knowledge base. Because, place means order, where 
everything is in its “proper” place, thus leaving no space for new data entry unless 
taking something out from the database. The place “excludes the possibility of 
two things being in the same location (place).”265 In such a case, critical thinking, 
                                               
264 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), 103. 
265 de Certeau, The Practice, 117. 
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where ideas could clash with each other becomes impossible; because “the law of 
the “proper” rules in the place: the elements taken into consideration are beside 
one another, each situated in its own “proper” and distinct location, a location it 
defines…”266  
During the course of travelling, or walking, between two places, on the 
other hand, one has the chance to experience the space, which “is a practiced 
place,”267that allows for variety, diversity, ruptures, clashes, and humility to 
cultivate deep and critical thinking. That is why, these young women have 
developed a critical and yet more inclusive approach towards religion and piety 
after they moved from their places of origin to receive their higher education, 
while their families remained at the same “place”. 
The adverse effects of critical thinking 
For Sümeyye, there is lightness, an ease of motion created by the 
proliferation of critical thinking: “Before, we used to obey more to what the 
scholars (alim) said, but now we see them as the personal interpretation of that 
scholar.”   
The same ease of motion, however, creates a void in terms of religious 
learning for others like Zehra, because she cannot go beyond the level of criticism 
anymore. She is also a graduate of an imam-hatip school, and she had to have her 
undergraduate and graduate degrees in London, UK, since she did not want to 
take off her headscarf at school.  
                                               
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid. 
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Interestingly, the Hizmet movement kindled the fire of criticism in her for 
the first time, as she was impressed by the critical reading of the religious sources, 
as part of the authentication process. Before that, she had two types of religion in 
her mind: the imam-hatip school type, and the tarikat type. The first one 
emphasized rules and principles which needed to be learnt and obeyed; while the 
latter was focused on personal worship and invocations within a very strict 
hierarchy, without any questioning.  
The piety movement, on the other hand, needed to open a space for itself 
between these two trends, which could only be possible through questioning the 
existing paths, and showing an alternative one to the public. The lack of a strict 
hierarchy and the accommodation of individual reasoning made this movement 
more attractive for the young, educated generation, who yearned for becoming a 
pious subject without having to align themselves with a political aim, or retreat 
into a private tarikat circle.  
However, that space of freedom for individual reasoning, together with the 
loss of confidence in the traditional sources as a result of questioning and being 
exposed to different conceptions of Islam abroad, have left Zehra in the middle of 
a void, where she has to rely on her agency in every step: 
At the moment, there are no religious sources that nourish my soul. I used 
to benefit from the ilmihal268 a lot in the past. I was not questioning their 
correctness at that time. Now I have this problem of not knowing which 
                                               
268 İlmihal: The type of book that explains the principles of Islam, and Islamic 
practices. The contents of these books are prepared from the classical sources of 
Islamic law, particularly the Hanafi school of law that is followed by the Muslims 
in Turkey.  
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source to trust. When I was reading Hadith in the imam-hatip school, for 
example, I used to think that they were all true. But now there is this 
question of being authentic or not, especially on some hadith about 
women. Critical thinking has also brought a kind of degeneration in my 
obedience and submission...For me, criticism has surpassed learning in 
religion. I must first be able to read and understand the Qur’an by myself, 
because I am not convinced yet about the resources that I can use to 
nourish my soul. I am not even sure about the mezhep (Islamic school of 
law) distinctions yet, I am not sure whether we have a mezhep or not. If it 
is a matter of içtihat269 then who will tell you about that içtihat if you 
already know the arguments and you have the education? So, I am 
questioning with my conscience; I am following a religious rule, not 
because so-and-so âlim said it, but because I find it reasonable or not. 
 
She gives the example of shaking hands with men: 
 
Who will I listen to in this matter? I decide according to the situation I find 
myself in. One who calls it haram, must persuade me about this. There 
used to be a series of rules, in the old days, which you would try to obey as 
much as you could. Now, I am not sure about the rules.  
 
Zehra is still wearing the headscarf, performing her ritual prayers 
regularly, and working for the Hizmet movement; in other words, her individual 
tide turns did not stop her from performing the bodily practices she used to do, or 
denounce submitting to a group. No matter how much doubt she has in her mind, 
she has no doubt about her aim of cultivating a pious self, a good character.  
Good character and the need for community 
Al-Ghazzali thinks that a good character consists of three aspects:  
One is that it is innate. It is a gift and a favor from God Most High for a 
person to be created with an innately good disposition. For example, one is 
created generous, another is created humble, and there are many like that. 
The second is that one can force oneself to become accustomed to doing 
good works so that it becomes habitual. The third is that one sees persons 
                                               
269 İçtihat: (Ar. Ijtihad) It has the same roots with cihat (Ar. Jihad), meaning to 
strive for arriving at a correct judgment on a matter that is not clearly settled in 
the Qur’an and the Sunnah.  
  185 
whose character and deeds are good. One should associate with them so 
that one may necessarily take upon oneself those attributes, even if one is 
not aware of (the transformation).”270  
 
The third aspect of a good character defies isolation and individuality in 
one’s journey to a pious self. Because of that, those who want to get closer to God 
in the perfect sense feel the need to be within a community and benefit from the 
good character of the people in that community.  
“It struck me as a community of good people in the beginning” said Esra, 
when I asked her what attracted her in the Hizmet movement: 
They do not act against the spirit of the time. You can both be an 
individual and a community. The possibility of transforming myself within 
the community has kept me here. 
 
For Sümeyra, the chair of a businesswomen’s association that belongs to 
the movement in Fatih, Istanbul, having good role models attracted her in the 
beginning. She was living in a public dorm at the university with all kinds of 
people: leftist, Islamist, Kurdish separatist, rich and poor girls from far-away 
cities, and some followers of the Gülen movement, who impressed her with their 
calmness, and dedication to practicing their religion without getting involved with 
any political groups. She trusted them because they supported their words with 
their practices: “My role models were very strong women, both in telling me 
about piety, and practicing what they told me at the same time.”  
Through their example, Sümeyra could see that it was possible to be a 
pious woman and living in the modern life without renouncing it. She compared 
                                               
270 Al-Ghazzali, On Disciplining the Self.  
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the ideas of Gülen about community271 with her father’s teachings of individuality 
and personal freedom. Then she saw her “weakness to cope with this life” on her 
own, and “felt the need for a network to remain pious” since she also had a hard 
time practicing her religion in her secular family. She does not see any restriction 
in belonging to pious community, because she believes that “every community 
you want to get in has their own rules and restrictions.” 
 For a pious woman who wants to be right in the modern secular life, the 
community of like-minded people appears as a pragmatic choice; as Zuhal says, 
being in a community provides continuity to pious practices and protection from 
the temptations of the modern life. That is also the reason why, Hilal sees the 
weekly gatherings with her friends within the community, as her main religious 
source, where they discuss readings from Nursi or Gülen.  
These discussions help her more than her individual readings, as the social 
support that she feels for her quest keeps her going. Because these gatherings are 
regular and consistent, they help her to constantly remember her motivation for 
piety amidst the haste of the everyday life:  
This is an ailment of the modern times: everything has to be perfect, and 
we are supposed to run after this concept of happiness that is imposed on 
us; and yet we forget what we are running after when we just keep 
running. 
 
                                               
271 Gülen says: “Islam can be practiced individually, and a person can be 
successful in performing their personal obligations. However, it is only through 
being in a Muslim community that God Almighty’s favors can be acquired in a 
general sense and these favors can be represented in a perfect way.” Reflections 
on the Qur’an, October 3, 2012, accessed October 23, 2012,   
http://en.fgulen.com/reflections-on-the-quran/4331-al-maedah-5-97.  
  187 
Mualla abla made a very similar comment about the modern city life and 
its effect on piety: “Because the mind is messy in modern life, one’s freewill 
(irade) to cultivate piety gets weaker.” Whereas “in small towns, you know the 
street you walk, the market you shop at.” Thus, your mind is more organized in a 
familiar setting, as it knows everything in its “proper place.” This means less 
challenge and threat for your motivation for piety, unlike the metropolis. While 
“there is more threat to your piety” in the metropolis, “when you can use your 
freewill, your piety becomes more intense and deeper,” which is also 
accompanied with a higher possibility of “failing against those threats.” Then she 
added: “A life that combines the positive opportunities of the city with the 
innocence of small towns is a utopia, and against the wisdom of our worldly test.”  
She knows that it is part of the test to live in a secular modern public 
sphere, and she is aware of the virtues of agentive action towards cultivating a 
pious self in such a challenging setting. Thus, instead of dreaming about 
rebuilding the Golden Age of Islam, or an Islamic state, she is working towards 
improving the present conditions in the public sphere to allow for a peaceful 
coexistence of pious and non-pious people, as the general secretary of the 
Women’s Platform under the Journalists and Writers Foundation.  
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Chapter 5 
(RE)IMAGINING THE MODERN LIFE 
This chapter talks about how modernity is viewed, lived, and shaped by Muslim 
women in Turkey, who want to become pious as highly-educated professionals 
living and working in the secular-modern public sphere. It aims to look at the 
process in which these passengers in various piety trains perceive the modern life 
which they are passing through, and how they rearrange certain things along the 
way according to their own tastes and needs.  
Unlike the ideal type of the “Republican women” that was endorsed by the 
Kemalist state in the formative years of the secularist nation-state of Turkey, these 
women have a claim for both piety and modernity. In the wake of the rise of the 
public appearance of religion since the 1980s, these women rejected to be passive 
onlookers of the public sphere; instead, they wish to be active participants and 
hosts of this space, which took them three decades of struggle to access. Hence 
they are genuinely and deeply concerned with the questions brought by the 
modern age, and finding a path to walk between the Islamic and liberal-secular 
ethics.  
Although they each follow individual paths to cultivate a pious self in a 
modern-secular framework, they also try to develop a collective attitude towards 
the issues like gender and sexuality from their unique positions in the public 
sphere. Both the Women’s Platform (WP) and the Meridyen Circle (MC) have 
been involved in this attempt of constructing a collective attitude towards 
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modernity in general and the question of gender in particular. Through seminar 
series and various conferences they have brought together students, academics, 
independent researchers and authors with similar concerns of piety and modernity 
with the aim of developing a new discourse in response to the secular-liberal one: 
one that is neither apologetic nor militantly progressive at the expense of turning 
down tradition completely. In other words, by taking a fresh look at the liberal-
secular ethics on which the ideas of gender and religion are built, these women’s 
organizations take the pains to carve a space for pious modern women in the 
public sphere. 
In this chapter, I will give special attention to the Women’s Studies 
seminar series organized by the WP, which took place on a monthly basis from 
December 2010 to November 2011. These free and open to public seminars were 
led by Nazife Şişman, a freelance writer, translator, and sociologist, who did not 
have a post at a university because of the headscarf ban. She was the first covered 
woman who graduated from the Boğaziçi University in 1984, with a BA degree in 
Economics, and she received her MA degree from Istanbul University in 
Sociology in 1997.  She was chosen for leading these seminars because of her 
expertise and previous writings on the women’s issues in the light of the Muslim 
experience in modern periods.272  
                                               
272 Her works include: Yeni İnsan: Kaderle Tasarım Arasında (The New Human: 
Between Destiny and Design), Istanbul: Timas Publishing, 2012; Sınırsız 
Dünyanın Yeni Sınırı: Başörtüsü (The New Border of the Borderless World: The 
Headscarf), Istanbul: Timas Publishing, 2011; Emanetten Mülke: Kadın-Beden-
Siyaset (From Trust to Property: Woman-Body-Politics), Istanbul: Iz Publishing, 
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In the monthly seminar series of the WP, ten-to-fifteen women with 
different educational backgrounds read the books in the syllabus prepared by 
Şişman, and attended the meetings each month to discuss the readings. The ideas 
raised in these seminars ranged from Orientalism to the question of bioethics 
within the context of reimagining the secular-liberal ethics from their unique 
position and their unique concern: how to live as a pious Muslim woman in a 
secular-liberal realm (i.e. the academia, the media, the civil society, and any other 
position taken in the public sphere).  
After discussing the main ideas raised in these seminars, I will give an 
account of the gender relations within the Hizmet community as manifested in the 
everyday life experiences of some participants in these seminars. I will try to 
compare the textual evidence that is present in the writings and sayings of the 
spiritual leader of the community with the actual practices in a particular portion 
of the community; in this way, I will discuss the possibility of creating a change 
in the lives of Muslim women by way of (re)interpretation of the canonical texts.  
At the end of this chapter, I will discuss how the pious female scholars and 
intellectuals under the roof of the Meridyen Circle divert their cumulative power 
of producing and governing knowledge to different fields rather than religion in 
order to create this change on the lives of Muslim women. Drawing from my 
                                                                                                                                
2003; Global Konferanslarda Kadın Politikaları (Politics of Women in Global 
Conferences), Istanbul: İz Publishing, 1996. She has also translated many books 
into Turkish, including: Amina Wadud, Kur’an ve Kadın (Qur’an and Woman), 
Istanbul: Iz Publishing, 1997; Martin Lings, Hz. Muhammed (sav)'in Hayatı (The 
Life of Prophet Muhammad), Istanbul: Insan Publishing, 2003; Sachico Murata, 
The Tao of Islam (forthcoming).   
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notes in the annual meeting of the MC in December 2011, I will highlight their 
ideas on pious women’s role in the social sciences, and the possibility of carving 
out a space for them, a kind of safe passage through the modern public sphere that 
would lead them to their ideal stations of piety.  
Negotiating with the secular-liberal ethics 
The ground on which these discussions take place is the secular-liberal 
ethics, which constitutes the backbone of modern states with its basic principles: 
secularism, the rule of law, equal rights, moral autonomy, and individual liberty. 
Although the liberal ethics claims itself to be universal, it cannot be detached 
from its historical and geographical origin, which is roughly defined as “the 
West” both by the proponents and the critics of it.  
What makes this base a challenging ground to act is the “basic premise of 
liberal secularism and liberal universalism that neither culture nor religion are 
permitted to govern publicly; both are tolerated on the condition that they are 
privately and individually enjoyed.”273 As women who take Islamic practices of 
veiling and ritual prayer seriously for their cultivation of a pious self, they are 
challenged with this presumption of the liberal-secular ethics that “culture [and 
religion] must be contained by liberalism, forced into a position in which it makes 
no political claim and is established as optional for individuals...and be shrunk 
into the status of a house that individuals might enter and exit.”274 
                                               
273 Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and 
Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 21. 
274 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 22. 
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Yet liberalism also provides a space to move for them because of its 
inconsistencies, despite its claim for otherwise. This discursive space is provided 
in the very disputes about the meaning of its key terms “such as individual 
autonomy, freedom of (economic, political, social) exchange, limitation of state 
power, rule of law, national self-determination, and religious toleration.”275 The 
self-reflexive and ambiguous character of liberalism in terms of the identification 
and meaning of the ideas around the major concept of “liberty” is the space from 
which these pious women are walking out to build their own piety-friendly liberal 
modernity. Because they are clearly aware that there is no way out of modernity 
for them, not even an Islamic modernity, which, they think, is not more than a 
cheap imitation of the Western modernity as exemplified in the so-called Islamic 
hotels, or Islamic fashion, or even Islamic capitalism.276 
What was sought for in these seminars both in the WP and the MC was an 
authentic, indigenous formulation of a new ethics that would not stand out as the 
other, or the alternative of an essential of the public sphere. They were not 
seeking for an “alternative modernity” as popularly attributed to many 
                                               
275 Talal Asad, Is Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, eds. 
Asad, Brown & et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 25. 
276 The rise of the conservative middle class in Turkey in the last three decades 
has forced capitalism to adapt to the religious sensitivities of these new 
consumers, while it displayed no change in its philosophy of promoting 
consumption. Hence, everything that was already available for the secular-modern 
lifestyle were modified to fit into the standards of an “Islamic” lifestyle, such as: 
holiday resorts with women-only beaches and pools, shopping malls with prayer 
rooms, fashion shows with Islamic outfit, etc. See Navaro-Yashin, Faces of the 
State for the fetishization of the headscarf as a consumption object.  
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Islamists.277 Instead, they were quite keen on being melted in the mainstream 
secular-liberal realm without being forced to give up certain bodily practices 
which they deemed important for their self-cultivation towards piety.  
That is why they had to play on the secular-liberal realm, and benefit from 
the discursive space provided by the “contradictions and ambiguities in the 
language of liberalism that make the public debates among self-styled liberals and 
with their ‘illiberal’ opponents possible.”278 However, the form of the debates that 
took place in these seminars was not like the conflict that is usually seen between 
“liberal” and “illiberal” civilizations, cultures, or traditions as seen in the studies 
of Saba Mahmood, Lara Deeb, and many other anthropologists. They were more 
like a result of the conflict which “is intrinsic to liberalism as an evolving 
discursive tradition”279 making us aware of the fact that conflict with liberalism 
takes place within liberalism itself, and one does not have to be located in an 
“illiberal” realm just because they are questioning liberalism. Their critique of this 
realm implies a certain level of distance; yet it does not mean that they are the 
“others” of this realm.  
The women that are the focus of this research are different from the 
Egyptian mosque movement participants in Saba Mahmood’s study, or the 
                                               
277 Many Turkish scholars define the rise of Islamic visibility in the public sphere 
as the rise of an alternative modernity or an Islamic modernity. See: E. Fuat 
Keyman, ed., Remaking Turkey: Globalization, Alternative Modernities, and 
Democracy (Oxford: Lexington Books. 2007); and M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic 
Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).   
278 Asad, Is Critique Secular?, 26. 
279 Ibid. 
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Lebanese Shia women in Lara Deeb’s study as both groups of women are located 
in the margins of the larger society, concerned or contented with building an 
alternative place for themselves. Whereas, the pious professional women in 
Turkey are now aware that they are the mainstream component of the larger 
Turkish society, and they demand their due share from the public sphere –i.e. as 
the hosts of it, rather than tolerated guests. The secular education they have gone 
through and the penetration of secularism into their everyday lives have made 
them desire to continue living within the secular system, albeit a modified one 
into a religion-friendly condition. Their attempt is to rebuild the secular-liberal 
realm in this fashion rather than working for an alternative non-liberal or 
“Islamic” political system that would devoid them of having public roles or 
pursuing their individual worldly goals.   
The setting of the seminars 
The seminars took place in the meeting room at the main building of the 
Journalists and Writers Foundation in Altunizade, Istanbul. It was a modern three-
story building used by the Research Center, the Intercultural Dialogue Platform, 
The Medialog Platform, and the Women’s Platform, with its conference room, 
guest hall, meeting rooms, offices for the staff working for the platforms, a 
restaurant, and  a closed parking lot. The rooms in the garret were designed as 
lounges furnished with fashionable sofa beds to allow for informal meetings, 
weekly religious talks, and performing daily ritual prayers, as well as hosting 
overnight guests albeit very rarely. In all aspects, it was built as a secular place 
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which restricted the practice of religion to its margins –i.e. the garret. The only 
visible religious practice was the headscarf worn by the women who worked at 
the building.  
Although they were all affiliates of the Hizmet movement, and they all 
knew each other as practicing Muslims, no one in the building performed their 
ritual prayers in front of others except in the prayer room. In other words, 
everyone had internalized the idea of a secular public sphere and a religious 
private sphere within their workplace.280 However, the secular vision of the public 
sphere was softened with decorative items depicting the Ottoman-Islamic art, like 
ebru (water marbling), hat (calligraphy), or the Ottoman tiles, in order to give the 
impression that modern-secular architecture could be blended with Islamic design. 
This was their way of claiming the public sphere for themselves without turning it 
into a mutually exclusive form of a religious sphere.281  
A similar attempt of building a religion-friendly secular space in the 
discourse of gender and sexuality could be observed in the Women's Studies 
seminars organized by the Women's Platform. There were 15 women attending 
                                               
280 This preference of performing namaz in private has Islamic references, as well 
as social connotations. Although Islam allows for the performance of namaz in 
any place that is clean, performing it publicly outside of a mosque (cami) or a 
masjeed (mescit) is considered an act of show-off or boasting. But this might also 
be very much related to the modernization process that deemed religion a private 
matter, and its public performance as unethical. 
281 This is different from adding a prayer room to a shopping mall in the sense that 
they do not add a religious sauce to a secular act (like consumption), but they 
conduct a religious act (i.e. tebliğ: spreading out the message of religion to the 
largest portion of the society as possible) within a secular setting (i.e. as a civil-
society organization).  
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the seminars, all of them highly educated, from different professions. More than 
half of the participants including the lecturer were covered; and I saw almost all 
of them in the prayer room at the garret after the seminars performing their 
afternoon prayers. That is, they all considered each other as somewhat pious, 
including the organizing body. Yet, there were no demands or attempts to turn 
these readings into a religious talk or sermon, from the beginning till the end of 
the seminars.  
In a conventionally religious setting, similar to the women’s mosque 
movement in Egypt,282 the women’s madrasahs in Niger,283 or the girls’ Qur’anic 
schools in Oman284 to some extent, “the woman issue” would be discussed by a 
theologian, or a self-learned religious scholar, drawing from theological sources, 
and focusing on the dos and don'ts according to the Islamic law.  However, in 
these seminars, the attempt was to understand the general concept of gender and 
womanhood in both the liberal-secular and the Islamic sense; and come out with 
their own conception at the end of this learning process. 
Being a woman: a gender-based reading of life 
  
Nazife Şişman started the seminars responding to this question: “Why are 
we reading about women? Why should we know about the feminist theories?” 
She said: “The reason why we are reading about women is not that because we 
                                               
282 Mahmood, Politics of Piety. 
283 Oseina Alidou, Engaging Modernity: Muslim Women and the Politics of 
Agency in Postcolonial Niger (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 
2005). 
284 Mandana E. Limbert, In the Time of Oil: Piety, Memory, and Social Life in an 
Omani Town (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
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are woman, but because it is an important issue we must locate in our social 
lives.” Then she continued to explain her interest in women’s issues as such:  
As Muslims in Turkey, we have gone through a major transformation, and 
we have been discussing it on the basis of women’s transformation. In 
fact, what we are discussing is not the woman, but our way of live [as 
Muslims in Turkey]. 
 
From the beginning there was an attempt to look at the issue from a larger 
perspective than women’s rights and gender equality. Because these women had 
bigger concerns than achieving gender equality, or improving the life conditions 
of women. For them, “the woman question” was part of a civilizational 
transformation that had been taking place for the last three centuries, as well as 
the current struggle to be a participant of the liberal-secular discourse rather than 
being the object of it.  
In this context, they have gathered to think over how to join this 
conversation beyond imitating its language. They have to find a way “to arm 
themselves with the weapons of the liberal-secular discourse” and yet “to protect 
their inner core while struggling for that purpose.” This means not to hurt their 
deep-rooted technologies of building connection with God, established throughout 
the discursive formation of the Islamic tradition in their specific geography.  
In order to achieve that, they have to locate the women’s issue very 
carefully in their hearts and minds as pious women who have gone through 
secular education and upbringing. Şişman emphasized the fact that “This is not 
only about women; it is a much broader historical process that should be handled 
both vertically in its chronology and horizontally in its global spread.” In other 
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words, she assured her audience that the seminar series did not aim to impose a 
gender-based understanding of being or existence, repeating that “We are 
discussing the women’s issue not because we are women, but because this is a 
topic we have difficulty in positioning in our social lives as Muslims of the 
modern age.” They must make sense of this issue for they are burdened with an 
entire social heritage whether they adopt a gender-based identity or not. 
Regardless of their personal opinions, they have all been influenced by the 
“women’s liberation” process, and they cannot simply turn a deaf ear to the 
victimization of women just because of their sexuality.  
Nazife Şişman came up with a broad spectrum of readings that covered 
seven units: 1) the emergence of the category of “woman” in Europe; 2) the 
changing definition of sexuality; 3) the theory and history of feminism; 4) 
colonialism, modernization, nationalism, and feminism in the Middle East; 5) the 
question of representation: Orientalism and the Western depiction of Muslim 
women; 6) Turkish modernization and feminism; and 7) masculinity and 
femininity in the Islamic tradition of thought.285  
Her aim was to handle this topic of gender and sexuality within the largest 
possible perspective in order not to fall into any reductionist arguments or 
judgments, for this was the main thing she, and the seminar participants, criticized 
about the secular-liberal, conservative, and Islamist perception of “the woman 
question.”  
                                               
285 See Appendix for the full translated syllabus.  
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The readings of the first unit on the emergence of the category of 
“woman” analyzed the relationship between the revolutionary fervor of the 18th 
century-Europe and were aimed to establish the idea of womanhood as a product 
of particular historicities rather than a universal, innate character.286 The articles 
touched at topics like the woman worker, women’s literacy, motherhood and the 
state, in a way to portray womanhood as an identity among many others that 
proliferated in the age of the modern states. This would allow these pious women 
to handle the issue as a secular (worldly) matter; without letting their resentments 
to be directed towards God, or the sacred sources, but seeing them as part of 
“imtihan dünyası,” the world as a realm of test. As a political category, 
womanhood was an optional identity they could claim in order to receive their 
citizenship rights, and improve their life standards in accordance with the 
standards of the era they live in.  
Modernization and gender relations 
The study of the emergence of feminism and the conception of “woman” 
somehow gathered all the arguments around the specific conception of modernity 
and modernization, which were described by Nazife Şişman on the basis of 
production modes: the end of feudalism, the birth of capitalism and the new 
                                               
286 The category of “womanhood” as a political identity has emerged in the 
process of what is today called “the first wave feminism, which dated from mid-
1850s to mid-1900s. It started as a political activism concerning women’s rights 
to vote, own property, and access to higher education, rather than being seen just 
as mothers and wives. Concerned with getting the basic human rights of white 
middle-class women, first wave feminism did not take into account any racial or 
class dimension in their claim for equal rights with men. 
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production system. She explained how this is directly related to the new gender 
roles:   
This new production system totally pushed women out of the system. 
They were pushed to the position of mere consumers with the emergence 
of the work-home separation. With this new production system, the man 
works at the factory, brings the money, and the woman spends this money. 
So, this model of “production at factory, consumption at home” created 
the “good mother” role.  
 
In this way, Şişman paved the way for an understanding of the real life 
conditions that led to the emergence of the feminist movement, which started with 
Mary Wollstonecraft’s protest of limiting women as mere consumers in her 
influential book, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman published in 1792.287 She 
noted that this was the struggle of the middle class women, while the working 
class and those in the rural areas had a different level of struggle. “Furthermore,” 
she said, “it is also in this period that women’s reproductivity gained a national, 
patriotic significance, in line with the role of the good mother.” So was the focus 
on women’s education, as the state needed educated mothers to raise good 
citizens.  
It was in this context that the second wave of feminism arose within the 
civil rights movement in the US in the second half of the twentieth century, which 
came with a stronger theoretical background in order to form a systematic 
struggle against the universal oppression of women.288 This time the concept of 
                                               
287 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, ed. Deidre 
Shauna Lynch (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2009 [1972]). 
288 In the late 1950s feminism reappeared in the West, accompanied with the civil 
rights movement in the U.S. Although Women’s Liberation movement in the 
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“woman” was established on the grounds of sexuality and the body. As Şişman 
said, the relationship between the modern state and gender roles took a deeper 
aspect with the state intervention on the bodies through population policies and 
family planning. She highlighted “the shift to the realm of modern science from 
religion in the definition of the body” and pointed at the secularization process as 
the driving force behind the replacement of God with the modern state “in telling 
men and women how to behave.” After that she talked about the emergence of 
biology, psychology, and sociology as distinct scientific disciplines, and how they 
gave birth to the concept of sexuality. In other words, she also established the 
concept of sexuality as a modern concept with particular historicity.  
By this way, she positioned her audience at an appropriate distance from 
the liberal-secular discourse of feminism and gender in order to facilitate an 
                                                                                                                                
second wave feminism tried to formulate a unitary meaning for ‘woman,’ it could 
not remain unified itself in its way of struggle. By the 1970s, there were already 
three types of feminist movements within Women’s Liberation: radical feminism 
–located particularly in the U.S. – that saw sexual oppression against women a 
universal fact and whose issues were ‘women’s reproductive freedom,’ ‘bodily 
autonomy’ and ‘representations of women as sexed and inferior (in pornography, 
advertising and prostitution); liberal feminism, which was concerned with 
women’s equal participation in the existing economic and political systems; and 
finally Marxist-socialist feminism –located particularly in Britain– that criticized 
the first two brands of feminism for ignoring the class factor in explaining the 
oppression of women. 
From the 1980s, the increasing criticism from Marxist-socialist feminists against 
the liberal and radical feminists, in addition to the appropriation of post-
structuralist and post-modernist ideas into feminist scholarship, opened the way 
for other marginalized women’s groups to elevate their voices in expressing their 
criticism against the white Western feminists, which resulted in the appearance of 
the third wave feminism, produced mainly by women of color, third world 
women, poststructuralist and lesbian women –those who were marginalized by 
first and second wave feminisms. 
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informed critique of it, without falling into the extremes of blindly supporting or 
opposing it. “You must have a sound knowledge about what you criticize” was 
the summarizing idea by the time the first three units were covered. 
Being a woman, being a Muslim woman 
 
Setting up the socio-historical process behind the emergence of the 
“woman question,” the participants of the seminar gradually agreed on the idea 
that “being born as a man or woman is part of being tested in this world, so there 
is no inequality or unfairness in terms of being a servant of God [ontological and 
moral equality]. Yet there are problems in terms of the social life, and we must 
accept them.” 
Learning about the history of feminism in the West, they came to the 
conclusion that Western women had concrete reasons to argue for rights 
considering the social and political atmosphere they lived in. They were part of a 
historical process in which the concept of rights emerged; so they could not be left 
out of this dominant discourse, as seen both in the first and second waves of 
feminism. As Şişman said, “their demand for rights naturally developed in the 
process of political participation and democratization.”  
However, there was a common tendency among the audience to detach 
women’s rights from the feminist ideology for they saw it as part of the 
Enlightenment current that drove God out of the universe. “For this reason,” 
claimed Şişman, “the feminist discourse has come to the point of revoking 
servanthood to God, and defining itself on the basis of sex.”  
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Furthermore, its approach to the issue of freedom and women’s oppression 
was seen way too generalist and ahistorical, imposing its universalist views on 
women’s experiences to women of all geographies, classes, colors, beliefs and 
cultures through the concepts like patriarchy, misogyny, sexism, bodily autonomy 
and etc.289 The participants claimed that they could argue for women’s rights and 
struggle for ending women’s oppression without resorting to the feminist 
discourse, with the motto of “Yes to women’s rights, no to feminism.” 
 So, how could they formulate their own approach to gender and sexuality 
as pious modern Muslim women? In the rest of the seminars, they had to establish 
a firm knowledge about the history of Muslim women in the Middle East. Going 
as far back as three centuries, they tracked the genealogy of the “woman issue” in 
their part of the world (i.e. the Ottoman-Turkish trajectory) touching at a broad 
range of topics such as colonialism, nationalism, modernization, and Orientalism.  
There was no attempt of referring to the books of Islamic law (fiqh) 
written in the classical period during the formation of the Sharia, for Şişman had 
already made it clear that “women’s socialization was a modern debate which 
resulted from the work-home separation.” Only after securely affirming the socio-
historical process of the debate in the Muslim societies, did they talk about the 
                                               
289 Although the third wave of feminism pays attention to the universality claims, 
and criticizes the second wave for this reason, they still use the same concepts and 
gender-based analysis method to understand women from non-white, non-
Western contexts. It is through studies like Saba Mahmood’s Politics of Piety 
(2005), Sylvia Frisk’s Submitting to God (2009) and Lara Deeb’s An Enchanted 
Modern (2008) that the women’s experiences were analyzed through particular 
and indigenous categorizations rather than explaining everything away with a 
universal, ahistorical concept of patriarchy and male authority.  
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conception of gender in the Qur’an –but not from the perspective of social roles 
but from the ontological and existential values of the concepts of masculinity and 
femininity, which had been the interest of Sufis rather than the clergy or the 
theologians.  
The feeling of defeat and “the Muslim woman”  
 
An important awareness for them was to realize how the debates on 
Muslim women were tightly connected to the feeling of defeat at the hands of the 
Western powers, the representatives of which criticized the position of women in 
Muslim societies, and Islam, for the first time. Şişman said:  
We have still not been able to get rid of this feeling, so our debates are still 
centered on this issue. Because we have experienced the transformation 
mostly over women; the changes in the lives of women have been more 
manifest. So even when we are discussing the headscarf and veiling, we 
are actually discussing modernization. 
 
The issue of Muslim women’s veiling and seclusion (hijab or purdah) first 
emerged as a colonial discourse as the symbol of the backwardness of Muslim 
societies. The status of Muslim women was used by the colonizers to “persuade 
the defeated Muslims of their inferiority in order to justify foreign occupation.”290 
It was also the gateway of pro-Western Muslims, like the nineteenth century 
Egyptian politician Qassim Amin, in criticizing their own societies. Leila Ahmed 
suggests that his book The Liberation of Women “represents the rearticulation in 
native voice of the colonial thesis of the inferiority of the native and Muslim and 
                                               
290 Fatima Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim 
Society (London: Al-Saqi, 1985), 7. 
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the superiority of the European.”291 And Barbara Stowasser claims that, for Amin, 
veiling was the “true reason for ignorance, superstition, obesity, anemia, and 
premature aging of the Muslim women of his time.”292 In a similar manner to the 
Young Turk Abdullah Cevdet (mentioned in Ch. 2), Amin “had used the issue of 
women and the call for their unveiling to conduct his generalized assault on 
[Muslim] society”293 resulting in an opposition that defined itself through the 
reaffirmation of the very criticized customs and practices. Being the gateway for 
secular liberal criticism of Islamic way of life, veiling and seclusion of women 
“came to be the focus of the conservative Islamic defense, in Egypt and 
elsewhere.”294 
Despite the conservative defense, women’s modernization did take place 
in the Ottoman Empire starting in the nineteenth century with the Tanzimat 
reforms in 1839. But in this period, “even the most Westernist reformers 
attempted to legitimize their views within the framework of Islam,” contrary to 
the Republican period after 1923. Neither Şişman nor the seminar participants 
deemed the reforms on women’s liberation as Orientalist moves, or direct 
Western importation, as they affirmed that “even before the Republican period, it 
was already clear that women would not be able to lead their lives in the same 
way.” That is, the debates on women’s liberation did not start overnight with the 
                                               
291 Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern 
Debate (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 162.  
292 Barbara Stowasser, Women in the Qur’an, Traditions, and Interpretation (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 127. 
293 Ahmed, Women and Gender, 162. 
294 Stowasser, Women in the Qur’an, 127. 
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declaration of the Republican regime in 1923. Therefore, they argued that “there 
were inner dynamics to this change” in women’s lives, and to the emergence of a 
feminist discourse; but they also emphasized the effect of external modern 
Western discourses, influences, and interventions and asked “to what extent can 
you talk about inner dynamics in a world where everyone is in interaction with 
each other?” 
This was awakening the audience to think beyond the sharp contrast 
between the Ottoman and the Republican periods which was built as the 
equivalent of religion vs. secular binary by the Kemalists, as well as the Islamists. 
Considering the Ottoman Empire as purely religious, and creating this image of 
tearing down the veil of women overnight with the declaration of the Republican 
regime worked for both group’s arguments as they established their identity in 
contrast to each other.  
Attempting to strip themselves from the totalistic accounts of both 
ideologies, they tried to see the genealogy of the change in women’s lives that 
reached up to their time and shaped how they lived today. With this larger 
perspective, they could now explain why they were not totally happy with the 
efforts of mining feminism295 from the basic sources of Islam, a task undertaken 
by many Muslim female scholars, who are roughly named as Muslim feminists or 
                                               
295 After going through the genealogy of feminism in the West and in the Muslim 
societies in the previous seminars, they formulated it as a historically grounded 
phenomenon which did not exist prior to modernity. 
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Islamic feminists.296 Going against the kind of attitude taken by Amin, and some 
secular feminists who deemed Islam and feminism incompatible with each other, 
these female scholars defended a feminist position within Islam, and attempted to 
read feminism into the Qur’an with the aim of unearthing, what they argued to be, 
the egalitarian essence of the Qur’an, which had, in their view, been sullied by the 
male dominated exegesis.297  
From the perspective of the Turkish women in these seminars, there is a 
danger in reading feminism into the Qur’an as if it were an ahistorical, universal 
concept, rather than a historically particular phenomenon. But, for the supporters 
of this Islamic feminist approach, like Miriam Cooke, for instance, “feminism is 
much more than an ideology driving organized political movements.” It is an 
“analytical tool” to assess “how expectations for men’s and women’s behavior 
have led to unjust situations, particularly but not necessarily for women.”298 The 
                                               
296 Amina Wadud, Asma Barlas, Nimat Barazangi, Fatima Mernissi, Leila 
Ahmed, Rifat Hassan, Mahnaz Afkhami, Miriam Cooke, Margot Badran are the 
major scholars who are considered within this category. There are many others 
who are not known by the Western audience because they do not write in English. 
In Turkey, though, there is not any significant existence of a Muslim feminist 
movement. There are a good number of religiously observant female intellectuals 
who write about many topics including the women’s issues. Nazife Şişman is 
considered one of them, along with Fatma Barbarosoğlu, Sibel Eraslan, Cihan 
Aktaş, Yıldız Ramazanoğlu and Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal. And in recent years, 
some covered women working as journalists and newspaper columnists have 
managed to gain popularity in the media to bring up women’s issues, such as Elif 
Çakır, Nihal Bengisu Karaca, Özlem Albayrak, and Hilal Kaplan.  
297 For a detailed analysis of Islamic and secular feminist ideologies side by side, 
see Margot Badran, Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences 
(Oxford: Oneworld, 2009).  
298 Miriam Cooke, Women Claim Islam: Creating Islamic Feminism Through 
Literature (New York & London: Routledge), x.  
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women in these seminars would suggest, however, that even this perception of 
gender relations is historically modern. 
Who asks the questions?  
While the Turkish women in these seminars are not against working on 
injustices between men and women, they differentiate between women’s rights 
and feminism as an ideology, which emerged as a post-Enlightenment idea.  In 
this sense, they do not agree with the universalization of feminism that would leap 
all the way to fourteen centuries ago to the formative years of Islam.  
These women also take issue with the range of topics with which the 
Muslim feminist literature deals.  They do not consider the questions of veiling, 
segregation, polygamy, divorce, inheritance, and witnessing as genuine or urgent 
as other problems faced by Muslim women.  They see these topics imposed by the 
Orientalists like Lord Cromer, and their native voices like Qassim Amin, as an 
“endorsement of the Western view of Islamic civilization, peoples, and customs 
as inferior.”299  Of course they do not suggest that the Muslim feminist scholars 
are choosing these topics in direct response to the Orientalists but see these 
engagements as reacting to the dominant and hegemonic discourses that have 
emerged in such a defeatist atmosphere.    
Although the women in these seminars accepted that the Western 
feminism had arisen out of genuine social problems, they seemed to argue that the 
emergence of Muslim feminism had additional “symbolic and discursive agents” 
                                               
299 Ahmed, Women and Gender, 153.  
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besides the real factors on the ground. Those “symbolic and discursive agents” 
were the Orientalists who frothed up “the women’s issue” in Muslim societies, 
which had not gone through the same process of political participation and 
democratization simultaneously with the West. When one of the participants 
asked: “Why didn’t we have feminism [as an ideology] before the modernization 
period?” Şişman replied:  “Because we had a different way of understanding life 
before the Tanzimat period.” This means that at the time we did not have the 
necessary political, social, and cultural conditions that gave rise to feminism in 
the West.  
Yet, this does not mean that there were no gender injustices in Muslim 
societies, as Şişman made it clear that the rise of the feminist discourse was 
strictly related to the industrial revolution, and the emergence of the discourse on 
rights, equality and freedom following the French Revolution in 1789. 
While they affirmed the inner dynamics to the emergence of feminism in 
the Islamic discourse, they still saw a trace of artificiality in the whole 
modernization process, which constituted the gist of their mistrust of feminism 
within the religious discourse of Islam. They expressed their impression that 
Islamic feminism or those who argue for a progressive theology, in general, were 
acting on this ongoing feeling of defeat and they seemed to seek affirmation from 
the West. At this moment of the discussion one of the participants brought up the 
cover of the Emel magazine that featured a “hijabi Barbie” to criticize the 
obsession with Western norms of fashion and body image among Muslim 
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women.300 She said “this is a sign of inferiority complex, revealing the idea that 
we can also reach up to their standards of beauty with our hijab. Do we make it 
Islamic when we dress up the Barbie in Islamic clothing?”  
This idea of “we also have it” has also plundered the asr-ı saadet.301 Many 
have fallen into the mistake of attributing the qualities of intellectualism to 
Hz. Ayşe302 and entrepreneurship to Hz. Hatice,303 looking at that time 
from today’s realities. 
 
Şişman’s response created a surprise among the audience, for they thought 
it was a virtuous act to take them as role models in their contemporary time. They 
asked: “Is it wrong to create role models from the female Companions?” And she 
answered: “It is wrong to present them with certain labels which are claimed to be 
                                               
300 Sarah Joseph, “Hijabi Barbie: Growing up Muslim in a World of Body Image” 
Emel Magazine, Volume 66, March 2010, accessed October 3, 2012,  
http://www.emel.com/article?id=83&a_id=1913  
A similar argument was also made during this seminar about the newly released 
Turkish fashion magazine Âlâ, which came up as a guide for middle and upper-
middle class Muslim women to dress up fashionably. For more information, see 
Dan Bilefsky, “A Fashion Magazine Unshy About Baring a Bit of Piety,” The 
New York Times, 29 March 2012, accessed April 11, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/world/europe/a-turkish-fashion-magazine-
ala-is-unshy-about-showing-some-
piety.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq=%C3%A2l%C3%A2&st=cse& 
301 The Age of the Companions, literally meaning “the age of happiness” referring 
to time period of the prophethood of Muhammad (pbuh). 
302 The youngest wife of Prophet Muhammad. She lived more than fifty years 
after the death of the Prophet, and she served as a great source in the circulation 
and compilation of the traditions of the Prophet that comprised the Hadith 
literature. The Arabic transliteration of the name is Aisha. 
303 The first wife of Prophet Muhammad. She was the owner of the caravans 
which Muhammad (pbuh) was leading as a merchant. She proposed to him, and 
they married fifteen years before Muhammad’s mission of prophethood began. 
The Arabic transliteration of the name is Khadija.  
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non-existent in the history of Islam. This shows our weakness.”304 Another 
participant complemented her sentence: “This is giving answers in the language 
of those who ask the question. It must be us who ask the question, because those 
who ask the question also determine the language of the answer. We must get rid 
of this apologetic position.” 
For Nazife Şişman, the methodological weakness of receiving strength 
from the Age of the Companions is the building of a long bridge that has the risk 
of collapsing. She added that “if this empowerment is done through a chain 
instead of a bridge, that is, if the argument takes its power from the recent history, 
it would be more sound and strong.” In that way, she explained the purpose of 
reading about the recent history of modernization in the Middle East, and learning 
about the women’s experiences in the late Ottoman period: “to get rid of the 
apologetic language and the reactive approach.” 
“There is not an ideal type of a Muslim woman” 
The women in these seminars, therefore, reject to be defined within the 
category of “Muslim women,” for they claim that “it is not only religion that 
shapes our lives.” There is a vertical and a horizontal dimension to their existence 
in the world: being a woman is part of that horizontal dimension, the experience 
of living in the world and “addressing at the (secular) world.” And yet, in the 
vertical dimension, they have an existence beyond this world: “We are the 
                                               
304 For more information on her ideas on the existence of women in Islamic 
history, see Nazife Şişman “Were there women in Islamic history?” World 
Bulletin, January 26, 2010, accessed October 2, 2012, 
http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=yazarHaber&ArticleID=2118 
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servants, the creatures of God. So we are all (men and women) impotent against 
God.” What matters for them in terms of this vertical dimension of their existence 
is the metaphysical equality of all human beings.  
Being a woman, in that sense, consists only a part of their subjectivity in 
relation to God; but it is the compartment they are placed in: they are created 
within a woman’s body. What they can do is to organize that compartment in 
relation to the expectations, habits, and desires of the other passengers having 
travelled on the same life journey in this world. They believe that both 
compartments, i.e. the woman’s body and the man’s body, have equal capacity of 
facilitating a comfortable travel and reaching at the final station: receiving God’s 
consent in the world and in the Hereafter. However, the maintenance of the entire 
train that would take the servants of God safely back to their Creator is in the 
responsibility of the passengers. In other words, they cannot remain indifferent to 
the injustices that the passengers inflict upon each other. This is where they reach 
at the idea that ass pious Muslim women, they can work towards creating better 
life conditions for all oppressed people, including women; and they do not have to 
resort to feminist language while working for this aim. “Social equality is not our 
own concept; but benefiting from it does not harm our Muslimness, and piety.” 
Progressive theology: “human beings creating God” 
 
Their method of caring for women’s rights is trying to keep the argument 
within the secular-liberal realm, and not let theology to intervene in the issue of 
organizing social-political rights. In that sense, they find any form of progressive 
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theology unhelpful, even harmful, to the debates on women and other matters of 
modernity, for several reasons. 
First of all, they think that progressive theology, including the feminist 
theology, has the tendency to create a situation where “human beings create God” 
by imposing their own values to God, and asking God to tell them their own 
values. There is a clear dislike towards the main idea of humanism that is at the 
heart of all progressive theology, which puts human being at the center of the 
universe rather than God. As pious and faithful Muslims, these women think that 
the humanist way of thinking might harm their feeling of submission to God, and 
God’s wills. They see it as a dangerous path to walk on because of the possible 
seduction of making God confirm their own ideas and values, while thinking that 
it is God who dictates them.  
The same unwillingness, although at a lower level, is seen in their attitude 
toward the elimination of the transmitted sayings of the Prophet on the basis of 
forgery or weak chain of transmission. They believe that one should be careful not 
to fall into the trap of trimming the entire Hadith literature according to the 
fashion dictated by the modern West. “We should not forget that our fundamental 
concept is justice, not equality,” is an important reminder in the feminist attempt 
of looking for gender equality within the Islamic discursive tradition.   
Another danger of pursuing the women’s rights argument in religious 
realm is the higher degree of defensiveness people take against any steps taken; 
for they are more afraid to see any change in their concept of sacred, which is 
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dearer to them than the secular concepts. In this sense, the socialization of 
women, and women’s working outside home should be discussed as mundane 
everyday realities rather than fundamental issues in the sacred canon of Islam. 
“The discourse of rights has only become common in the twentieth century, it is a 
recent concept,” said Nazife Şişman, and she added: “We do not have to limit 
ourselves with this discourse in order to build our subjectivity as women. But we 
can use it to defend women’s rights, for it is a social process rather than a 
religious matter.”  
By moving away from the secular-liberal and the religious discourses on 
the issue of women and gender, the participants of the Women’s Studies seminars 
attempted to engage in an informed critique of both systems they lived in. Due to 
their professions, their upbringing, as well as their need to live in a community 
that would ease their maintaining of a pious self, they did not want to totally defy 
the set of norms in each realm. Their situation, and the method they followed 
were similar to the act described by Judith Butler, in Undoing Gender, when 
someone does not want “to be recognized within a certain set of norms” such as 
the secular-liberal and religious-conservative norms of womanhood. In this type 
of a situation, what an agent does is to take a distance from these sets of norms 
which might impair her sense of social belonging, but still “preferable to gaining a 
sense of intelligibility by virtue of norms that will only do [her] in from another 
direction.”305 
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However, taking this distance to the norms that one is defined with is not a 
unilateral decision when you still have to act on these sets of norms in order to 
survive. In that matter, the critical relation to them “depends as well on a capacity, 
invariably collective, to articulate an alternative, minority version of sustaining 
norms or ideals that enables me to act.”306 The highly-educated, professional 
pious women who came together in these seminars actually worked on a 
collective capacity to articulate an alternative version of those secular and 
religious sets of norms which they needed to act on. Because, as Butler says, one 
“cannot be without doing,” thus “the conditions of my doing are, in part, the 
conditions of my existence.” Considering that doing cannot be a unilateral 
process, for “my doing is dependent on what is done to me, or rather, the ways in 
which I am done by norms,”  
...the possibility of my persistence as an "I" depends upon my being able 
to do something with what is done with me. This does not mean that I can 
remake the world so that I become its maker. That fantasy of godlike 
power only refuses the ways we are constituted, invariably and from the 
start, by what is before us and outside of us.307 
 
 Denying the norms they are defined by and acting on –whether secular or 
religious—is not an option for them, because, they also believe that one has to 
sustain her persistence as an “I” in a social world she never chose, as claimed by 
Butler: “My agency does not consist in denying this condition of my constitution. 
If I have any agency, it is opened up by the fact that I am constituted by a social 
                                               
306 Ibid. 
307 Ibid. 
  216 
world I never chose.” 308 So, their option for maintaining their agency, which 
unfolded during these seminars, was to take the step to the “juncture from which 
critique emerges” as a result of their realization that, on one hand they need social 
recognizability to live, yet on the other hand they feel that the terms by which 
they are recognized “make life unlivable.” So, at this juncture, they engage in a 
critique, which “is understood as an interrogation of the terms by which life is 
constrained in order to open up the possibility of different modes of living; in 
other words, not to celebrate difference as such but to establish more inclusive 
conditions for sheltering and maintaining life that resists models of 
assimilation.”309 
 “In our way” 
 
This effort of critique was emphasized in the last seminar on 26 November 
2011, with the closing comments of Şişman, regarding their position in the larger 
society and the larger secular-liberal discursive realm:  
We are all receiving modern education, we are all exposed to the same 
technology, same working conditions. We are sailing on the same river, so 
we are also exposed to the same problems. Then how should we act when 
we try to create solutions for these problems? We can bring more specific 
and particular solutions to these common problems like gender-based 
injustice and inequality of opportunities. 
 
In fact, the very existence of the Women’s Platform310 that organized these 
seminar series was an expression of this desire to bring their specific solutions to 
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the problems they saw in the larger society. The family conference they organized 
in November 2010 reflected their concern with the well-being of the family 
institution, which, they believed, was an empowering institution for women when 
it is sound and good. Another workshop on the portrayal of women in the media 
in March 2011was concluded with a final declaration signed by secular-liberal 
feminists, as well as religiously-observant female intellectuals.311 Thus, the 
platform manifests a living example of this desire expressed in the seminars: to 
bring solutions to the common problems of the larger society “in their own way” 
and without falling into the apologetic position.  
 Women’s experiences in the Hizmet community 
 
 These women’s capacity of doing is very much related to what is done to 
them, and what they do with what is done to them. All this complicated wording 
requires a case study to see to what extent the liberal-secular and Islamic norms 
are negotiated at the actual settings of interaction with others. For this reason, I 
will give a brief account of the experiences of some women from the Hizmet 
community who participated in these Women’s Studies seminars. Comparing the 
words of Fethullah Gülen regarding women’s visibility in the public sphere with 
the actual experiences on the ground, I will try to portray the interplay between 
the religious and the secular-liberal norms in the negotiation of gender relations 
within the pietist Hizmet community. 
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The Hizmet community is currently the only religious network that works 
closely with the secular-liberal norms, which is clearly manifested in the activities 
of the JWF. It is also the most open one to the public visibility of women, which 
is interpreted by Berna Turam as an act parallel to the male Republican elite’s 
pushing women to the public sphere to show off their “civilized, modern” 
manner:  
Similar to enabling Turkish women in the nation-building period, having 
women in Gülen's public sites complements a certain civilized image. For 
the Gülen movement, the public sites are an obvious way of distinguishing 
their own Islamic projects from other ones and displaying that distinction 
to the outside world, both the Turkish Republic and the West.312 
 
For Turam, the public sites of the Hizmet community are window sites, 
where the exercise of gender relations is in contrast with the practices in the 
domestic sites, or the private realm. She thinks that, the community’s insistence 
on the education of girls “at the cost of their headscarf” was another move to 
complement this “civilized image” of the public sites.313 
The women in these “window sites” are active, educated, professional 
women, as well as some celebrities at certain occasions. Some of these women 
wear the headscarf in non-traditional ways, and some do not wear it at all. These 
public sites, as Turam observed, welcome women and men from all backgrounds 
and lifestyles, because the purpose of these events, for the Hizmet volunteers, is to 
promote dialogue and tolerance between people with diverse opinions.  
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Their conception of the public sphere reflected the secular-liberal idea, 
somewhat reviving the Habermasian sense of the bourgeois public sphere which 
“may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a 
public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the 
public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules 
governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of 
commodity exchange and social labor.”314 By creating this kind of an alternative 
public sphere to the strictly secularist and state-owned public sphere, which has 
been denied to the religious people to speak and to be heard, the Hizmet 
community members facilitated the negotiation between the secular-liberal and 
religious realms.  
Berna Turam expresses her astonishment at seeing “religious” people 
organizing charity dinners at luxurious hotels in a completely secular-friendly 
setting.315 Yet, this is totally ordinary practice for Elif, an intern at the 
Intercultural Dialogue Platform, as it is obvious to her that “we must be able to 
live in the standards of those whom we want to talk with.” However, she thinks 
that the Hizmet community “have reached that standard today, and now they must 
be able to endorse humility as a distinctive virtue of themselves.” She complains 
that some have actually internalized the standards of these window sites, and they 
prefer to have non-covered female assistants in order to give a pleasant civilized 
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image to their secular-liberal collocutors. She herself is non-covered, and she has 
been within this religious community since she was in the secondary school. In 
the light of her experiences, she admits that non-covered pious women within the 
network have more influence with their speech than covered women. “Despite all 
the improvements over the recent years,” she says, “I realized that we still 
consider non-covered woman as the ideal teacher. I find her words more effective 
than the words of a covered woman.” 
On the other hand, she loses this advantage of being a non-covered pious 
woman in the private or one-to-one relations within the community. “I am also 
pious, but my piety is not seen.” She complains that the men from the same 
community “do not show the same level of sensitivity” in their interactions with 
her, compared to their interactions with the covered women within the 
community. Because, she says “For pious men, the first sign/measurement of a 
woman’s piety is the headscarf. Not wearing it causes a lack of identity within the 
pious community.” Is there really a duality in the public and private experiences 
of these educated, professional women within the Hizmet community?  
Technically, the spiritual leader of the movement clearly endorses the 
public visibility of women “as long as it does not harm their piety.”316 The Hizmet 
community/movement is attractive to these women because of its dynamic, non-
centralized structure, as well as its lack of any clear boundaries, and thus entrance 
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ritual or test. Within this movement they have the chance to preserve their 
individual characters while working for a collective aim. It is indeed one of the 
most liberal environments for women who desire to maintain their piety within a 
community. Yet, one cannot deny the repercussions of the ambiguous and 
polysemous character of Gülen’s criterion of not harming the piety in allowing for 
women’s public visibility:  
The contribution of women in certain fields of life is not banned in Islam, 
provided that physical conditions have been taken into consideration and 
their working conditions are suitable. Women have indeed contributed in 
every field of life (throughout history). For instance, they were allowed to 
participate in battles; their education was not only desired, but also 
actively sought and encouraged. Our mothers Aisha, Hafsa, and Umm 
Salama were among the jurists and mujtahid s (the highest rank of 
scholarship and learning) of the Companions. Moreover, the women who 
were among the household of the Prophet were a source of information 
(not only for other women but also) for men for learning religion. Many 
people from the Tabiin (the next generation after the Companions) 
consulted the Prophet's wives. 
This situation was not only restricted to the Prophet's wives; in the periods 
that followed, qualified women were teachers to many people. In Islam 
there is no such thing as limiting the life of women or narrowing their 
fields of activity. Things that appear negative to us today must be analyzed 
with respect to the conditions of the time in which they were experienced 
and to the policy of the respective states in which they happened.317 
 
Looking at Gülen’s words, one might imagine a public visibility of women 
at the standards of the window sites to be the general approach of all community 
members. However, neither men’s nor women’s relationship to a figure of 
authority is merely text-based. While the text says that women can work at any 
job including military service “if these are considered as being necessary and 
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feasible” the actual practices among the community members is far from giving 
such a liberalistic picture, although it varies in its degree of liberalism according 
to the setting the movement operates on.  
“The space available for women to act without harming their piety” is a 
very slippery concept that can take on a different meaning in the minds of each 
believer depending on the social context they act on. A man can protect his piety 
even in a bar, as seen in Berna Turam’s research, while a woman can never enjoy 
that much space without “harming her piety:” 
When, with a glass of wine in my hand, I ran into a male follower in a bar 
and felt uncomfortable, he explained that he was used to the "night scenes" 
of Istanbul. Because he worked in public relations in one of the 
movement's foundations, he was used to dealing with a variety of 
celebrities in Istanbul nightlife.318 
 
Thus, these standards of “protecting the piety” are perceived differently in 
the domestic and the public sites.  
Public-private standards in women’s piety  
 
Despite the wide appeal of the women-friendly public sites, my fascination 
with them did not last long. I soon discovered that the welcoming attitudes 
in the public sites were limited to female outsiders. During one of my 
interviews with Ahmet Bey, I was inquiring about his wife. I asked if I 
could meet her at the charity dinner that night. The answer was prompt and 
expressed a subtle tone of sarcasm: "Who...Ayşe?...Oh no, Ayşe does not 
go out at night," he replied with a smile on his face. I was confused 
because I had been told a few minutes earlier that she was "equal" to him. 
Trying to hide my astonishment, I asked if she attended communal events 
during the day. Apparently she was busy with the children. Besides, she 
did not want to participate in those events, either. "What would she have to 
do with that 'business' anyway?" At that time, I was not quite sure what 
business we were talking about. Digging further into this issue for a while, 
I soon discovered a long line of paradoxes about gender order in the 
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movement. The "business" meant the affairs of the Community, which 
took place in the non-private sphere where the wives and daughters of the 
followers did not necessarily belong. Indeed, most of the wives and 
daughters were regarded as irrelevant to the worldly pursuits of the 
movement.319 
 
As an educated woman who had been highly involved in the “worldly 
pursuits of the movement,” I was able to confirm what Turam said in her 
depiction of the paradoxical gender relations within the Hizmet community. I had 
never been the wife or the daughter of a male follower, so I was able to set my 
own criteria of piety in my relations with the affairs of the community and its 
male members. However, I personally witnessed the stark difference between my 
criteria of piety and the criteria of the wives of the prominent male members.320  
Being a “Servant of God” or/and a “Woman”  
The man whom Turam spoke with was not totally wrong when he told that 
his wife wanted to remain in the backstage, or in the domestic sphere, for this is 
actually the case for some women within the community. Even though they have 
access to the liberalistic ideas of Gülen in his books concerning the public 
visibility of women, they prefer not to be in the “window sites” of the movement. 
Because visibility is not their major concern in cultivating piety unless they have 
to be in the public sphere due to their professions. Besides, the suggestions 
transmitted through the male hierarchy within the movement may sometimes 
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  224 
include a less liberalistic conception of pious behavior, which makes them prefer 
to remain within the private sphere to be on the safe side in terms of their 
connection with God. 
For educated, professional women, though, this option of remaining within 
the domestic sphere is not available, or not preferable considering their capacity 
to contribute to the “worldly affairs” of the movement, including being the public 
faces of the movement. This comes at the expense of fulfilling the role of 
womanhood, which sometimes overshadows their essential role of servanthood. 
As previously explained, this issue of being a woman or being a servant of God is 
a major question these women ask to themselves. The participants of the 
Women’s Studies seminars needed help in finding the answer of this question, 
since they had to be in the public sphere and take public roles.  
In one sense, “being a woman” is inevitable for these women when they 
take public roles within the movement. Sevda, a doctoral candidate in industrial 
engineering, had worked at a study abroad agency that was affiliated with the 
movement. She told me that her male co-workers constantly reminded her that she 
was a woman through their attitudes. They did not have any conversations with 
her other than the job details, and they did not allow her to attend the meetings 
when the senior male members of the community were present.  
In that workplace she was never allowed to forget her gender identity; that 
is why she enjoyed working at a secular place, a public university as a research 
assistant, although she had to take off her headscarf in that workplace: “I am 
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happy to be seen merely as a person doing her job; there is no emphasis on my 
womanhood at all” she said.  
On the other hand, the experience of Elif at a secular workplace was 
totally different, since she felt very disturbed by the laxity of men in their 
attitudes towards her. She was a pious woman, but not covering her hair; so she 
had to express her piety in subtle ways, like figuring out a certain standard of 
speech style when talking to men: “a soulless speech tone, like a computer, or an 
answering machine.” She has a peculiar reason for imposing such a restriction on 
herself: “My feminine nature is quite dominant in the way I behave and talk; so I 
must pay extra attention to my attitudes when I am interacting with men.” 
As seen from these examples, people have to negotiate their behaviors 
according to the particular conditions surrounding them. There is no universal 
message dictated on men or women within the movement regarding how to 
behave in these kinds of particular situations. This allows a space for individual 
reasoning and negotiation, albeit with the risk of imposing too much restriction 
that defies basic human communication. The message of Gülen himself, favoring 
women’s presence in the public sphere, has little effect in the actual interactions 
between men and women, since they are silent on the details of how to behave 
towards the opposite sex in a workplace.  
As Nazife Şişman said in the Women’s Studies seminars, the separation 
between work and home is a recent phenomenon, and it is in vain to look at the 
canonical sources to derive rules and regulations about this situation. The women 
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during the time of the Prophet did take public roles, yet they were nothing like the 
modern jobs that required being in an office for six to seven hours, five days a 
week, with members of the opposite sex with no kinship relations at all.  
The religious sources are silent about the details of this new gender 
relationship, because they only contain the rules of modest clothing and gender 
segregation, which serves no real solution to the awkward situations experienced 
by Sevda and Elif in their particular situations. This space of negotiation means a 
lack of authority for Sevda, who thinks that the gender issue must be talked 
openly within the community in order to develop a common standard of 
behavioral code:  
We must be able to speak about this issue openly. The standards of gender 
relations within our community have not been determined yet. People are 
making their own regulations: some behave too relaxed to protest the 
current situation, and some do not even greet the members of the opposite 
sex. 
 
One might think that if Gülen were not silent about the gender relations in 
the public sphere, there would be a standard code of behavior between men and 
women in the non-private spheres. Yet this idea is refuted with numerous 
instances of unhappy marriages within the community despite the persistent 
comments of Gülen –and beyond all the messages in the Sunnah and the Qur’an-- 
favoring wives, mothers, and daughters in the family.  
In other words, religious authority is more than the sacred text, and 
people’s relation to the message of the sacred text is beyond the process of 
signification, as Talal Asad highlights “the way the living body subjectifies itself 
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through images, practices, institutions, programs, objects –and through other 
living bodies. And therefore with the way it develops and articulates its virtues 
and vices.”321His conception of the authoritative discourse explains why 
mistreatment towards women have persisted in the history of Muslim societies 
despite the overwhelming majority of pro-women discourse in the sacred texts in 
contrast to a minor number of unfavorable ones, which the modern theology has 
problems in accepting.  
As Asad says, we should take authoritative discourse “to be rooted in 
continuously interacting materialities –the body’s internal and external 
constitution, and the energies that sustain them –that make for its compelling 
character.” Therefore, reinterpretation of the sacred texts is not enough to create 
change in people’s lives because “it is not signs in themselves that explain 
people’s recognition of authority; it is how people have learned to do, feel, and 
remember signs that helps explain it.”322 
“Pious” women giving direction to knowledge: The Meridyen Circle  
The Meridyen Circle is an example to this awareness of the insufficiency 
of textual interpretation in a time of need for the production of new knowledge 
and new texts to be interpreted by the future generations. In other words, the 
recognition of the modern condition that an educated woman has to live in, have 
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led to the formation of this network of female intellectuals with an effort to 
produce new discourses that would rebuild the modern-secular public sphere. 
The annual meeting of the MC, which was held on the last day of 2011, 
had the title of “Women Giving Direction to Knowledge.” The meeting took place 
in the conference room of the Meridyen Association center, which had been 
converted from a Sufi lodge that was left unused after the Republican period. The 
conference room still had the graves of the custodians of the lodge. It was like a 
barzakh (liminal space) between death and life, the sky and the earth, past and 
present, and religion and the secular.  
The annual meeting brought together around thirty female intellectuals and 
academics, most of who lived in the Western countries like Austria, Germany, 
France, UK, US, and Canada. The idea of continuing their graduate career in 
these countries was partly the result of the headscarf ban in Turkish public 
institutions; and partly the result of the ideological structuring within the Turkish 
higher education system that restricted the pursuit of some research topics 
challenging the fundamentals of the secular state. 
More than half of the participant women were covered, in many different 
styles. Their attitudes were remarkably self-confident and displaying their 
individualities, notwithstanding the homogenizing effect of the headscarf. They 
were already tired of being defined by their headscarf, and speaking about their 
headscarf that whenever any conversation came to the mentioning of headscarf 
they would end that conversation saying “Oh, please, let’s not talk about the 
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headscarf anymore; we’ve had enough of it.” The common concern of the MC 
audience was to shift from being an object in a double sense: as women and as 
Muslim women that is read by the social scientists to being the subjects of their –
not necessarily religious—areas of interest.  
Hümeyra Şahin, the president of the Meridyen Association, opened the 
meeting with a similar message, calling them to focus on “what [they] can change 
in the areas that [they] study,” instead of looking at how they were changed as 
women: 
Change has always been defined over women; and the change within 
Muslim societies is also being defined over the change in women’s lives. 
We must do something beyond being the object of this definition.  
 
The meeting was held in different sessions which were allocated to certain 
areas of study such as history, literature, political science, religion, arts, and 
media. In each of these sessions, senior members of the network shared their ideas 
and experiences with the audience, trying to focus on what they could do within 
these secular-liberal discourses without being blind followers or staunch enemies 
of them.  
The gist of the debates was a central question: “Is there a homogenous 
conception of womanhood? Is there a common womanhood that transcends all 
differences?” At the end of the long discussion, a final answer was agreed as 
such: 
Let’s not say “woman” any more. Let’s say “human.” Womanhood is too 
limited, too restrictive for us. It is too narrow to reach at the aim of 
becoming insan-ı kamil (the perfect human). 
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In other words, they desired to transcend the gender identity in becoming 
pious, and building a modern pious self. They emphasized the fact that knowledge 
production in the Islamic tradition is not related to the specific gender of the 
scholar. They disagreed with the widely acclaimed idea that the women of the 
tabiin (the next generation after the Companions) were teaching behind curtains. 
What hampered their scholarship was not the gender segregation, or the public 
visibility of women, but the rihla system (travelling to far places to be the student 
of a scholar) because of the harsh travelling conditions (as already mentioned in 
the previous chapter). Now that those harsh travelling conditions were removed, 
they considered no obstacle to quench their thirst for knowledge, and their desire 
to be the knowing subjects of their world, rather than the known objects. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
The main question I posed in the beginning of this dissertation was: “how 
is it possible to build a pious self in a setting established on secular-liberal 
values?” This was a question that required a long journey, tracing the history of 
the political, ideological, and sociological formation of “the setting” as well as the 
individual and collective routes to piety, which ended up having a specific form 
for each of its seekers.  
Aside from the main question, I also had some subsidiary questions that 
would help giving a better answer to the main question, but also raising questions 
about the actual lives of ordinary people whose lives supposedly lack the level of 
marginality and difference to make it to the books or academic research. I asked 
“to what extent secularism has penetrated into the everyday lives of people, 
including the religious ones?” 
In connection with that, I asked a third question: “Can we extend and 
expand the scope of piety to include the kind of relationship that secularist people 
establish with God through the sacred sources (the Qur’an and the Prophet)?”  
In posing these two subsidiary questions, my aim was to invite my 
audience, in the Euro-American zone and in Turkey, to rethink about the 
religious-secular divide in categorizing people in Muslim countries –either as 
totally religious against a secular “West” or a minority of modern secularists 
against a  majority of religious conservatives.  
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In fact, a major problem I had with this research was organizing my 
thoughts and presenting my data in an intelligible categorical framework. 
However, the unique character of the subjects in this research was to defy any 
stable categorization, which was also the main idea of the entire research project. 
In other words, the curse of ambiguity was also a blessing for opening up to a rich 
realm of theories, and promising new possibilities of taking the scholarship on 
women, Islam, and Turkey beyond the boundaries presented by the binary 
oppositions such as traditional-modern, religious-secular, conservative-liberal, 
Islamist-secularist, and etc. 
Rethinking the religious-secular divide in Turkey 
Turkey had the potential to disrupt the religious-secular binary with its 
unique way of molding secularism with a long religious tradition –albeit by force 
at some periods. The historical trajectory of the relation between Islam and 
secularism in Turkey, as explored on a wide range of contexts in the second 
chapter, explicitly showed that the secular-religion relationship has had a unique 
formation in Turkey.  
As Nilüfer Göle suggests, the particularity of Turkish Muslim “habituation 
of the secular” cannot be depicted with the “deficiency theory” which 
“presupposes that non-Western experiences are lagging behind, incomplete and 
noncontemporaneous with the West” i.e. “as a second-rank imitation of the 
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Western original.”323 I also highlighted the Western Christian origin and 
development of the idea of secular and the political notion of secularism; yet I did 
not reduce Turkish secularism into “an authoritarian derivative of French ‘laicite’ 
measured in terms of its gaps, inconsistencies, and deficiencies regarding the 
French ideal-model.”324 Instead, I tried to examine the local conditions and the 
particular elements of the Turkish religio-political structure on which secularism 
found a new life of its own, as well as with the ramifications of it particular to that 
context (e.g. the emergence of performative secularism). Because, I agree with 
Göle that “each time a notion travels, and is repeated, it is never exactly the same 
because in the process of repeating a term or a concept, we never simply produce 
a replica of the original usage; every reiteration transforms the original meaning, 
adding new meanings to it.”325  
Rethinking the religious vs. secularist polarization 
Even though there has been an apparent war going on between the secular 
and the religious forces in the political realm of Turkey, I believe that this divide 
has artificially been created by the parties involved in the contestation over 
political power. The religious and secularist arguments have been used by many 
political actors to agitate the feelings of their opponents and their followers, ever 
since Turkey was introduced to multi-party elections.  
                                               
323 Nilüfer Göle, “Manifestations of the Religious-Secular Divide: Self, State, and 
the Public Sphere,” in Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age, eds. L. Cady & 
E.S. Hurd (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 43.  
324 Göle, “Manifestations,” 43. 
325 Ibid.  
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In the constant polemics plying between the Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan and the main opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, I see little 
difference between the way they use religion and secularism as a tool for 
agitation, as was seen in the “pious generation” argument which was briefly 
mentioned in the first chapter. Their strategies are based on particular calculations 
about the bulk density of their voter base, which gives the impression that the 
voter profile of AK Parti is religious (and anti-secularist), while CHP’s voter 
profile is secularist (and anti-religious). 
Although there might be some bits of accuracy in this rough calculation, it 
is very much far from being a reference for categorizing Turkish people, and 
understanding the dynamics of the Turkish society. Through two important 
political occasions that I was lucky to witness during my field work stay in 
Turkey, I was able to make some important observations regarding the asserted 
secularist-religious divide among the voters of these political parties. What I 
witnessed during the processes before and after the referendum on constitutional 
amendments on September 12, 2010 and the general parliamentary elections on 
June 12, 2011, showed me the clear mismatch between the actual feelings, 
motivations, and expectations of the ordinary people, and the way they were 
depicted by the political and intellectual elite as utterly divided in lifestyles.  
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During the referendum326 process, I was staying at our village house to 
spend the holy month of Ramadan with my family. Each time we sat down for 
breaking fast, my uncle and my mother would engage in a political polemic over 
the referendum. My uncle would complain about how the government reduced his 
retirement salary, and my mother would remind him of the pre-AK Parti years and 
how they suffered with the lack of facilities that were only provided by the current 
government. She kept telling him that “you should be thankful to them for their 
services. You’re being unfair with your complaints.” My uncle, would then reply 
as such: “I have nothing to thank them about. You get all the benefits, I got 
nothing.” These were not my uncle’s political views, but rather the surfacing of 
his years-long resentment to my father (who were half-brothers with different 
mothers) for being favored over him in the sharing of their father’s inheritance. In 
other words, there was an entirely domestic dispute in the center of a political 
debate about their vote for something very important for the progress of the 
country.  
                                               
326 The referendum on the constitutional amendments was cast as a vote of 
confidence in Erdoğan by the propaganda of both the government and the 
opposition. Hence, the majority of people argued for their “yes” or “no” positions 
without having any clear idea about the content of the referendum. Neither my 
mother nor my uncle knew what the constitutional amendments proposed, nor did 
they care about them.  
The proposed amendments included barring gender discrimination, enhance civil 
liberties and protect individual privacy. But the opposition dismissed these 
propositions claiming that these were just cosmetic reforms to hide their secret 
agenda of taking over the judiciary system and subjugating the army to their will. 
Because they thought that these were the last remaining posts of the Kemalist 
regime. For more information, see “Turkey’s Constitutional Referendum: 
Erdogan Pulls it Off,” The Economist, September 13, 2010, accessed October 28, 
2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21010673. 
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There was nothing about the secularist-religious divide, or life styles in 
these “political” debates. The reason my father was silent during these debates 
was because he was constantly avoiding a debate with his brother for any reason, 
as he feared that he would shift the conversation to the old disputes. My mother, 
on the other hand, was genuinely feeling sad for Erdoğan for being constantly 
humiliated and defied by some of her relatives who had made it a tradition to vote 
for the Kemalist CHP since the single-party era. They also had exactly the same 
kind of lifestyle with my family. Again, the disputes were never about religion or 
secularism. Most of the time, I had no explanation for these political divides 
except for the resistance to change habits. Overall, though, the popularity of 
political discussions in that rural, traditional setting showed me to what extent the 
secular discourse had penetrated into the very fine tips of the Turkish society, 
without making any remarkable change on their routine religious practices. 
Without having enough time to recover from the overdose of political 
debates, the Turkish people had to enter a fiercer political climate. Although 
Erdoğan was comforted with the 58% of pro votes in the referendum, he still had 
to carry on a serious campaign for the June 2011 elections to be able to get a 
majority in the parliament enough to make the new civil constitution, which was 
his primary pledge to his audience in the public meetings.  
Until that time I did not have a chance to observe the voter profile of the 
AK Parti in a mass gathering of its supporters. A week before the elections, I went 
out to enjoy the nice weather on a Sunday. When I arrived at the bus stop, I saw 
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the private bus of the AK Parti, taking its supporters to the great Istanbul meeting 
in Kazlıçeşme square in the European side. With a sudden decision I found myself 
in the bus filled with enthusiastic supporters with flags in their hands. I sat next to 
an old woman, who said it was her fourth time going to Kazlıçeşme for Erdoğan. 
She was an active member of the local party office in Ataşehir, where the CHP 
voters are the majority. The young boys in the bus distributed water, sandwich, 
and hand fans with the party logo.  
Everything was designed like a festival day: There were so many cars, 
buses, and minibuses decorated with Turkish and AK Parti flags, carrying people 
from both European and Asian sides to Kazlıçeşme. And I saw many boats while 
crossing the Bosphorus Bridge that took AK Parti fans to the meeting area. When 
we arrived in Kazlıçeşme, we had to walk a long way to the meeting area, because 
all the parking places were full with the other AK Parti buses that came to the area 
from closer locations. The long path we walked was occupied by all street sellers, 
selling all kinds of things from food and beverage to different items of 
merchandise with AK Parti logo on them. 
 Five hundred thousand people, from all walks of life gathered in the 
meeting area that day. I saw veiled women, and women with jeans and sleeveless 
t-shirts. I saw old men with şalvar (a type of lousy pants worn in rural areas), and 
I saw young men with suits. I saw children, happily waving their flags on the 
shoulders of their fathers. The diversity I witnessed in that meeting clearly defied 
any simplification of the AK Parti voters as anti-secularist religious people. The 
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fact that half a million people waited to see the Prime Minister Erdoğan for more 
than two hours under the burning sun is, indeed, a manifestation of devotion, but 
not necessarily a kind of devotion that endorses the religion-secular, or religious-
secularist divide.  
This meeting was a picture of the new public sphere brought by the 
transition to the post-Islamist and the post-Kemalist stage: the public sphere was 
now claimed by much more diverse voices than it had ever seen. Furthermore, as 
the referendum example showed, the public sphere could be extended to the 
domestic spheres mainly through television and other kinds of new technology 
like internet, even at the remotest corners of the country.  
Interestingly, it is this ambiguity, ambivalence, and subtlety of secularism 
that the Islamic revival was threatened by and benefited from at the same time. 
The calls for an authentication of piety were stimulated by the wide acceptance of 
the secular modern values (e.g. democracy, individualism, liberty, equality and 
empowering of the self) by the ordinary people (i.e. non-elite), but the 
authentication process was largely carried on through the possibilities created by 
these values: individual access to religious sources, and engaging in the act of 
interpretation and reasoning instead of mere imitation, communicating the ways 
of acquiring authentic faith to others (tebliğ), and manifesting the embodiment of 
authentic faith to others (temsil).  
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Rethinking piety 
The religious-secular divide, which is already blurred in Turkey’s political 
experience with secularism, gets more blurred within the everyday lives of 
ordinary people. The individual stories narrated in the previous chapters have 
already revealed how the secular schools become the first door opening to 
religion, while direct access to religious sources to empower piety opens the doors 
to pluralism and critical thinking. 
Because of this intricate relationship between the formation of piety and 
the secular modern public sphere, I believe that the popular categorizations of 
“laik” vs “dindar” in the political scene of Turkey lacks validity in the everyday 
lives of the majority of Turkish people.  Yet, they have been scared off each other 
by the limiting and hegemonic usage of these concepts. Thus, I aimed to open up 
the concept of “dindar” with a particular understanding of piety that allows for a 
non-hegemonic and non-judgmental definition that does not reduce it to either 
belief or practice, or strips it from its social dimension. 
 My method in seeking such a comprehensive rethinking of piety was to 
keep the scope of understanding piety as wide and dynamic as possible. By 
formulating piety as a becoming, rather than a static form of being, I was able to 
include a wide range of Islamic and secular scholars to the conversation, in order 
to develop the most helpful analytical tools in understanding the particular routes 
followed by each traveler in their journey towards their particular conception of 
piety.  
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By highlighting the subjective ways of becoming pious, though, I did not 
argue for the absence of an objective category of Islam. Instead, from the 
beginning of the dissertation, I made it clear that I understand Islam as a 
discursive tradition, which is strictly tied to the sacred sources of the Qur’an and 
the Sunnah —while affirming the possibility of establishing diverse relationships 
with them. Considering the kind of reservations my interlocutors held towards 
progressive interpretations of Islam, which they described as the Protestantization 
of Islam, approaching Islam as a discursive tradition functioned as a helpful 
analytical tool in understanding their idealized conceptions of dindarlık (piety).  
  Even though there are many variations to the kind of piety aspired by 
them, it has the common quality of being immeasurable, and thus different than 
religiosity, which is associated with certain social, economic, and political 
qualities in the current secularist discourse.  
  Not long ago, I came across this distinction between the two forms of 
dindarlık that I made between piety and religiosity in a weekly column by a 
Turkish Islamic scholar, Senai Demirci, who is popular in Turkey with his 
devotional writings. It captured my attention as soon as I saw the title of his 
article: “I am not dindar anymore!”  
 Recently a foreigner friend of mine asked me “Are you personally 
religious?” First I said “yes” and then I had to correct myself “not in the 
way that you think about it.” The correct answer is “I am not dindar (i.e. 
religious).” 
 
  The category of dindar he rejects is the aspect of it that corresponds to 
“religiosity” as his friend asked the question in exactly that way. He sees that 
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concept as a product of the secularization process that compartmentalized religion 
and religiosity as distinct realms (i.e. structural differentiation). Demirci thinks 
that dindarlık should not be a distinct category of people, as “the Qur'an does not 
address at scholars of din, or dindar people; it addresses at those who have 
intellect, who see, hear, talk, and think!” Dindarlık for him means making sense 
of his existence, and building a connection with God:  
 “Where am I coming from? Where am I going? What am I doing here?” 
These are the questions of “people” not only “dindar people.” The paradox 
of living a finite life with a heart that desires infinity is the problem of all 
human beings, not the obsession of the conservatives. Finding the meaning 
of standing upright with a perfect awareness in the presence of such 
perfect existence is the task of everyone with a mind, not the hobby of the 
“mystics.” 
 
  He, therefore, does not want dindarlık to be restricted into a social or 
political category, since it is the essential part of being a human, a being that 
aspires for becoming through its very nature (the spirit, the fıtrat). But he is aware 
of the implications of declaring himself as being dindar in the sense of religiosity, 
which is, according to the popular secularist discourse,  
the lifestyle of the “poor” people who go to the mosque or the church more 
frequently or regularly than the others. The person who asks the question 
and defines me as “religious,” is himself normal in his own mind but I am 
somewhat marginal. My color is a bit dark-greenish. Normality stays with 
him, and I end up being the weird one. Besides, I am “conservative”, “not 
modern,” they are the ones who are open-minded, liberalistic. They have 
the universal values, while I am left with a narrow and unimportant corner 
of religion. “Poor” me; I would not even have a name, or be recognized if 
it weren’t for them. Luckily, they have wrapped me, labeled me, and 
placed me somewhere (!) By naming their lack of perplexity at the 
perfection of existence, and their lack of gratitude for the countless 
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blessings they have received, as “normal,” they have been drowned in the 
presence of the holy secularism. 327 
 
This is a great example of why the conventional understandings of piety 
(which is collapsed into religiosity as a social category) should be reconsidered in 
a new way informed by the concepts of self-cultivation, and a matter of 
becoming, so that it would not be used for a monolithic depiction of people who, 
in reality, have their subjective ways of relationship with religion. 
No matter how much the category of dindar is used by the secularist 
political discourse to give a sense of homogenization that reduces individuals into 
the replicas of one another, people’s sense of piety is always diverse, as the stories 
in this research have already made clear.  Each one of them brings their own 
knowledge of piety and religion to the public sphere despite the attempts of the 
Diyanet or other religious leaders to maintain unity among the audience they seek 
the allegiance of. 
In the same vein, I highlighted the fact that being a follower of a religious 
community does not erase the individual perceptions of being and becoming. 
More than half of the women in this research were affiliated with the Hizmet 
movement, yet they each had different stories of piety to tell us. In addition to 
getting on the piety train from different stations, their ideas of the itinerary of this 
journey, as well as its destination were not the same. Each of them had a different 
                                               
327 Senai Demirci, “Ben artık dindar değilim (I am not religious anymore),” 
Haber7 Online News, December, 18, 2011, accessed October 23, 2012,  
http://www.haber7.com/haber/20111218/Ben-artik-dindar-degilim.php 
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way of appropriating their relationship with the community into their process of 
becoming a pious person.  
At the end of the day, everyone taking this piety journey is a test taker. 
They want to pass this test; and if they find it helpful to submit themselves to the 
collective will of a particular community, it is still their own decision and their 
own test taking strategy. 
Rethinking religious freedom 
 
Does that mean that everybody has to share the same test ground with 
them, even though they do not live their lives in such a conception of a test to 
prove themselves to some kind of higher reality or authority? This opens up a new 
perspective to the question of religious freedom in the kind of situations when it 
clashes with the secular conceptions of freedom.  
My interlocutors in this research have made it very clear that they are not 
aspiring for any kind of an Islamic system, as they must be exposed to non-
Islamic forms of living in order to manifest agentive performativities, rather than 
being forced by the state for the mere performance of the prescribed religious 
rituals.  
The logic of the test requires living in a challenging environment. In that 
sense, they aspire for a “truly” secular state that would not favor any regime of 
truth over the others, so that people would have the opportunity to use their irade 
(freewill) in the utmost sense in choosing to get on the piety train. In the current 
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economy of truth, where secularism presents itself as the neutral, the normal, 
people are disheartened to get to the position of being different, or marginal.  
Therefore, they are against the hegemony of the political discourse of 
secularism, and its presentation of the secular liberal principles of freedom of 
religion and speech as “neutral mechanisms for the negotiation of religious 
difference,” while in fact, “they remain quite partial to certain normative 
conceptions of religion, subject, language, and injury.”328 
As Saba Mahmood suggests, secularism needs to reconsider its claims for 
neutrality and thus normativity; because contrary to its “ideological self-
understanding…as the doctrinal separation of religion and state), secularism has 
historically entailed the regulation and reformation of religious beliefs, doctrines, 
and practices to yield a particular normative conception of religion (that is largely 
Protestant Christian in its contours).”329 In that context, I believe that this 
dissertation’s attempt of rethinking piety outside of the ways secularism has 
defined it, will necessarily lead to a rethinking of secularism itself, as I agree with 
Mahmood that “to rethink the religious is also to rethink the secular and its truth 
claims, its promise of internal and external goods.”330 
Pious people in Turkey do not want to be contained within a minority 
identity. They do not aspire to push the non-pious elements away from the public 
                                               
328 Saba Mahmood, “Religious Reason and Secular Affect,” in Is Critique 
Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech. ed. Talal Asad (Berkeley: 
University of California Press,  2009), 90. 
329 Mahmood, “Religious Reason,” 87. 
330 Ibid., 65. 
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sphere, either. The efforts of the Women’s Platform, the Meridyen Association, 
and the university I worked at had a common concern to create the conditions of 
sharing the public sphere with diverse identities as co-hosts rather than in a 
necessarily hierarchical manner. This aim is yet to be tested, for they have not 
been able to acquire enough power in the public sphere to be engaged with the 
temptations of creating a hierarchy and getting at the top of it.331 But at this stage, 
their struggle is just to claim the mainstream, “normal” position in the public 
sphere, because they believe that piety in the sense of establishing a close 
relationship with God can be possible for each and every human being; it is not 
the monopoly of “the religious people”, “the conservative people”, “the Islamists” 
or any other container identity.  
Conceptual openings 
Studying pious subjects that are right in the center of the secular public 
sphere generates different results than studying those within contained groups. 
The pious women in this research lacked a proper place in the secular-liberal 
realm, after they walked out of the narrow, remote place reserved for them by the 
secularist discourse. They were not happy with their reserved place in the Islamist 
conception, either. They did not want to be the symbolic object for any kind of 
missionary agenda, including the Islamic dava, or any kind of identity-
                                               
331 I do not see the political struggle between the ex-Islamists and the secular 
Kemalist elite as equivalent of the actual acquisition of power and prestige in the 
ground level, although it has made a great impact over the contestation of public 
discourse. However, I do not see the women in this research, as a party of the 
ongoing contestation over dominating the public discourse for the sake of 
recognizability and visibility. 
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construction. Their intellectual labor was devoted to the possibility of not being 
named or defined by others –in other words, becoming subjects of the discourses 
that have objectified them so far. 
Therefore, now they are acting on a space while trying to carve out a place 
in the secular modern public sphere on their own terms. They are free to walk 
along the streets of the city freely, appropriating a diverse range of technologies to 
cultivate a pious self. That is why; they are acting on multiple discourses of ethics 
and self, and constantly engaging in creative acts of interpretation to find their 
ways in the unknown and unexplored streets of the city of modern piety.332  
Empowered by a long and rich Islamic tradition of self-cultivation, they 
are trying to embrace the liberal secular ethics without being assimilated by it. 
Their experience, indeed, shows that the liberal-secular ethics and Islamic ethics 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
The paradoxical situations like being told not to act on dreams while 
having a huge literature on Islamic dream interpretation, actually create a space 
for the appropriation of different ethical formulations that defy reducing Islamic 
ethics to any single line of thinking. Or, the possibility of losing the passion for 
piety during the authentication process is a new dimension to understanding the 
realities of the Islamization process; likewise the emergence of authentication 
process and the deepening of religious interest in the youth during their secular 
schooling complicate the smoothness of the secularization process.  
                                               
332 I am using the metaphor of walking in Michel de Certeau, The Practice of 
Everyday Life, 1984. 
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Therefore, the insights in the experiences of my interlocutors, I believe, 
have the potential to open up new ways of understanding and studying the 
experiences of Muslims in the modern age, without necessarily placing them in 
any “proper place.”  
Furthermore, understanding the intricate relationships between a Muslim’s 
individual connection to God, her social relations and responsibilities, as well as 
the historical, social, and political ground that she must act on, can allow for a 
more complex and comprehensive conception of Islam as an analytical category.  
It is also my hope that this research opens up new windows to the 
conceptions of self, agency, and gender in the context of modern Muslim 
experience in Turkey, not as a special concern of those who identify themselves 
with the religion of Islam, but as a source of knowledge for any human 
experience. To me, it would be the greatest success of this research if it creates an 
awareness among the Western audience, and the secularist Turkish audience 
about the genuine attempts of these people to come up with creative ways of 
being and becoming, in a not-so-different setting for the Western eyes, which can 
see the similarities and shared experiences if they look beyond the outward 
performativities that are different from their conception of “normal.”  
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